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PREFACE 
 
This document is a report commissioned by the Australian Business Foundation 
Limited examining Australia's industrial structure in the context of recent 
developments in economic analysis. It was conducted by a project team headed by 
Professor Jane Marceau of the University of  Western Sydney. 
 
The team members were: 
 
Professor Jane Marceau, Professor of Management and Pro-Vice Chancellor 
Research at the University of Western Sydney Macarthur. 
 
Dr Karen Manley, Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Western Sydney. 
 
Mr Derek Sicklen, Managing Director of Australian Economic Analysis Pty Limited. 
 
The Australian Business Foundation Limited is a recently formed independent 
economic and industry policy think-tank.  It has been established and sponsored by 
Australian Business Ltd, a pre-eminent and long-standing industry association and 
business services network. 
 
The mission of the Australian Business Foundation is to commission and conduct 
high quality research on issues that impact on Australia's international 
competitiveness and job generation capability. 
 
The Australian Business Foundation aims to tackle the complex issues of industry 
and economic policy with fresh analysis, rigorous research and a more innovative 
perspective that bridges divergent economic philosophies that underpin today's public 
policy debates. 
 
In commissioning the University of Western Sydney to undertake this study, as its 
inaugural project, the Foundation set the following aims and objectives: 
 
(i) provide the Australian Business Foundation with a picture of Australia's 
industrial structure; 
 
(ii) indicate why that structure matters to the future of the country. At the same 
time provide the tools which can provide the basis for an industry policy 
which can support the private sector in delivering high growth, wealth and job 
generating industries. 
 
The study aims to achieve these objectives in three ways, by providing: 
 
1. a range of contemporary intellectual approaches which provide better 
understandings of the processes of industrial development than does traditional 
neoclassical analysis; 
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2. a picture of the structure of the Australian economy which highlights strengths 
and weaknesses in the light shed by the alternative analytical tools proposed, with 
relevant international comparisons; 
 
3. an assessment of the adequacy of Australia's capacity to meet the challenges 
presented by international competition, indicating points of particular concern if 
Australia is to remain prosperous in the competitive conditions likely to emerge in 
the twenty-first century and suggestions about potential policy responses.” 
 
This study is structured as a three-part report, where: 
 
 Part One presents the findings of a review of contemporary economic and 
business organisation literature describing the key hallmarks that seem to be 
associated with high growth and successful economic development. 
 
 Part Two assesses the shape, structure and dynamics of Australian industry 
against the characteristics for successful economic development derived from the 
earlier literature review. This is a broad overview, not an in-depth analysis, given 
the scope of the study and the availability of data. 
 
 Part Three builds on the findings in Parts One and Two and indicates some 
directions for public policy which all concerned with economic growth in 
Australia should consider urgently. 
 
 
At the heart of this study’s findings is a concern for innovation and the evaluation of 
the national capacity to innovate. 
 
Finally, the authors wish to thank the Australian Business Foundation, and especially 
its Chief Executive, Ms Narelle Kennedy, for support for this project. It is hoped that 
this study will prove to be a useful contribution to a debate which vitally affects the 
future of all Australians. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
PART ONE: DYNAMICS & CAPABILITIES OF MODERN  
   WESTERN ECONOMIES 
 
 
Neoclassical growth theories 
 
The brief review of recent international literature shows that the traditional 
neoclassical growth model does a poor job in explaining the drivers of economic 
growth and development. The ‘new’ neoclassical growth theories have attempted to 
rectify this problem in several ways, most notably via the inclusion of knowledge and 
technological change within their frameworks. Economically useful knowledge can 
be embodied in capital equipment, may be associated with research and development 
expenditure or it may come with improvements in human capital. Thus growth may 
potentially be enhanced by the encouragement of these factors. 
 
Further, the new growth theories stress that growth is driven by knowledge 
externalities.  This means that it is theoretically possible to accept that benefits may 
flow from the active encouragement of knowledge-related activities or processes 
which generate those externalities and assist in their diffusion. Research using the 
framework provided by new growth theories also suggests that particular industrial 
structures may affect positively or negatively the innovative capacity of a country’s 
economy. A particular structure may, for example, affect the social returns to R&D 
by encouraging firms to conduct R&D domestically versus forcing them to import the 
necessary knowledge. 
 
In trade theory, the traditional framework is also encountering increasing difficulty in 
explaining observed patterns of international trade. First, observed trade patterns may 
in some cases not be optimal because of the possibility of factor price equalisation 
and concentration in activities which generate few positive externalities. Also, 
internal and external economies of scale can create dynamic advantages which can be 
reinforced through appropriate trade specialisation. 
 
Strategic trade theory acknowledges these problems and links with new growth 
theory to identify the importance of a nation’s trade mix for generating desirable 
externalities and hence growth. The theory, again, explicitly acknowledges the 
possible need for government intervention to encourage spillover-intensive activities 
as well as scale economies. Even without progressing beyond the realms of 
neoclassical orthodoxy, there is thus a strong presumption that industrial structure 
and government policy matter beyond just the macroeconomic settings. 
 
Innovation and learning approaches 
 
Innovation-based approaches to industrial development recognise, as do new growth 
theories and strategic trade theory, that technical change is central to economic 
growth. In contrast to neoclassical approaches however, such approaches focus on the 
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dynamics of innovation processes. Based on the work of Joseph Schumpeter and 
others, one important branch of this analysis is ‘evolutionary economics’. 
 
Evolutionary economists have contributed substantially to innovation-based 
perspectives on growth. They see the present era as one of accelerating, even 
revolutionary, technological change. They summarise this change as a techno-
industrial paradigm shift, which is leading to the emergence of a new international set 
of competitive conditions. New responses by firms, governments and other important 
players are therefore necessary to maintain and improve growth rates.  
 
Evolutionary economics is also significant because it recognises the importance of 
the ‘selection environment’ - that is, the factors which influence a firm’s take-up of 
new technology and its consequent commercial viability. The arrangement of 
institutions like research bodies, regulators, educational organisations and, of course, 
competitors in the selection environment is important because it affects learning and 
marketing opportunities for firms. 
 
The focus on innovation as a driver of growth invites analysis of the ways in which 
innovation occurs. It has become clear that much depends on the ways in which firms 
interact with other firms and with the institutions which make up the broader 
framework within which innovation occurs. The literature canvasses different ways of 
looking at these linkages 
 
It is also clear from recent work that influences on innovation are systemic. National 
institutional differences come together to compose ‘national systems of innovation’. 
These national systems of innovation are composed of relationships among firms 
themselves, which one may consider the ‘glue’ of the system, but also of broader 
institutions such as government rules, public sector research and training 
organisations, labour relations, publicly available infrastructure and so on. These are 
important because particular systems can either constrain opportunities open to firms 
or successfully stimulate new activity. The key function of a national system of 
innovation is to promote learning by its constituent economic actors. The new 
economy has been termed, therefore, ‘the learning economy’. 
 
The functioning of a national innovation system is limited by past practices and 
existing industrial structures. This is because what happened in the past determines, 
to a considerable extent, present opportunities unless strategic policies are 
implemented to shift the direction of development. Because of the workings of their 
national innovation systems, countries specialise technologically and seem not to 
converge as much as has often been thought. Some specialisation can be positive for 
economic development and can lead to the development of new capacities. In 
contrast, over-specialisation can be a problem, especially if it involves low-tech 
activities. 
 
The importance of knowledge for growth 
 
In this learning economy framework, ‘knowledge’ is different from ‘information’ 
because it requires understanding, ordering and recombining. Moreover, this 
understanding also involves appreciating that knowledge is of different types. Each 
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type plays different roles in competitive success. This means that both firm and 
national strategies for generating and using knowledge must reflect the differences if 
they are to be effective. The four major types of knowledge are: know-what, know-
why, know-how and know-who. These various types flow differently through sets of 
communication channels of communication. 
 
Knowledge is also both tacit and codified, tacit being in many ways the most useful 
because the hardest to transmit and replicate and because it is the key to the 
successful transfer of codified information and hence of technology transfer. 
 
It is not enough, however, for firms to have access to knowledge. It is not enough to 
have an invention: firms must possess or be able to access in their environment 
additional  factors which ensure commercial success. Knowledge has to be allied to 
‘complementary assets’ both at firm level and at industry/national levels. These 
complementary assets include high level management skills, good marketing and 
distribution channels, manufacturing facilities and customer support capability. It is 
the use of these assets that determines whether the original innovator - or imitators - 
win from innovation. 
 
Good management skills and labour relations are also critical. International work 
shows, for instance, the importance of training and the positive role played by human 
resource management programs in encouraging commitment by all staff to the 
success of the enterprise. This commitment and training are associated with higher 
labour productivity growth and enhanced firm performance. 
 
A learning economy must adapt well to competitive challenges. Trade liberalisation is 
placing enormous competitive pressures on national economies. It is bringing not 
only those firms in the tradeable goods and services sectors into competition with 
new market entrants, but is also extending the competition to the non-tradeable 
sectors which supply the tradeables. In many ways entire national innovation systems 
are now being brought into competition with each other. 
 
The technology/innovation choice 
 
The OECD has identified a number of factors important to export success. These 
include, firstly, the adaptability to changing patterns of world demand and, secondly, 
the nature of responses via technology/innovation, exchange rates and wages. The 
technology/innovation response is more important in high knowledge industries, 
whereas competition in lower-tech goods and services will largely be played out via 
exchange rates and wage rates. This suggests that firms and countries have choices as 
to which route they wish to take. 
 
The OECD has also observed positive correlations between knowledge intensity, on 
the one hand, and employment and wage growth, on the other. It appears that the 
prognosis for economies based around the production and export of knowledge 
intensive products will, on some criteria at least, be brighter than that for producers 
and exporters of standardised products in fragmented markets. 
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The learning and innovation-based analyses described herein are largely based around 
structural factors at work in modern economies. These factors can, and frequently are, 
in the short term overwhelmed by macroeconomic changes such as government-
determined alterations to interest rates and fiscal policy. Although there is evidence 
of increased recession resilience among innovation-rich firms, no economy can grow 
rapidly and enhance its learning capability in the face of aggressive low growth 
policies pursued by restrictionist governments or central banks. A string of interest-
rate induced recessions, for example, lowers growth regardless of the learning 
potential of firms. Thus, cross-national (and even intra-national) performance 
comparisons of learning capability need to be viewed in the light of the 
macroeconomic settings applying to the respective countries. Differences in national 
and intra-national performance will always reflect more than simple differences in 
learning and innovation activity. 
 
 
PART TWO: AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD 
 
This part of the study reviews some of the Australian data in the light of issues rated 
as important in the literature review of Part One, highlighting a number of features of 
the Australian economy which are relevant in an innovation and learning context. The 
data suggest a number of strengths and, in particular, weaknesses in the economy 
which impact on the likely ability of Australia to provide a growing number of well-
paid jobs in the knowledge economy.  
 
The review of the data showed a number of both positive and negative features of the 
Australian economy examined through the ‘learning economy’ framework. 
 
On the positive side: 
 
 Australia’s services sector rates very highly in international comparisons in terms 
of its propensity to engage in research and development activity. R&D is one of 
the  key factors in producing the knowledge that drives the ‘learning economy’. 
 
 Australian industry in general has shown a marked increase in its R&D 
performance since the introduction of a number of taxation incentives (especially 
the 150 per cent tax concession) since 1983. Our R&D expenditure growth rate 
has exceeded that of other OECD countries. Australia’s electronics industry’s 
R&D is high by world standards, probably reflecting the taxation concession as 
well as various industry programs for the information technology and 
telecommunications sectors. Shipbuilding and metal industries are also above 
OECD average R&D performance levels, again partly reflecting government 
policies. 
 
 Australia’s gross exports of more knowledge intensive manufactures have 
increased sharply since the middle of the last decade, again probably linked to the 
application of various industry programs together with favourable movements in 
exchange rates. 
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 Many firms in Australia are experimenting with cooperative business linkage 
arrangements, which the literature suggests (and the Australian evidence 
supports) is positive for company performance. 
 
 Training by Australian firms appears to have increased substantially over 1990s 
and this should be having a positive effect on knowledge generation and diffusion 
in the economy. 
 
 There appears to have been some increase in productivity growth rates in the 
1990s compared with the latter half of the 1980s, although cycle timing 
differences make international comparisons difficult. Australia’s productivity 
growth continues to exceed that of the United States and New Zealand which are 
at a similar phase of the economic cycle. 
 
On the negative side, a number of features of the economy give rise for some 
considerable concern. 
 
 Australia is operating substantial and growing trade deficits in more knowledge 
intensive, more innovative industries - the industries where both the theory and 
the data suggest are the fastest growing areas of world trade and carrying the 
greatest productivity benefits - and large and growing surpluses in less knowledge 
intensive, less innovative industries. This is precisely the opposite trade structure 
to that regarded as advantageous by the literature reviewed in Part One. 
 
 There is evidence that the structure of Australia’s employment growth appears to 
be shifting in favour of lower paying industries and lower skilled groups of 
occupations. This is the response to increased international competition which the 
literature would predict as being characteristic of a lower-tech, lower innovation 
economy, which can only react to such competition using wages and exchange 
rates rather than an increase in knowledge intensity. 
 
 Australia’s trade structure carries a number of negative externalities, including a 
deteriorating terms of trade, a tendency to increase unemployment (and thus exert 
downward pressure on real wages), expansion of low wage employment and 
industries, a propensity for reduced R&D, the growing risk of adverse 
environmental policy shocks and the short term economic cost - through the trade 
account’s impact on GDP growth - of upgrading productivity via substantial 
increases in equipment investment which increasingly must be imported. 
 
 Australia’s relatively poor aggregate industrial R&D performance in OECD terms 
is primarily a function of the low-tech composition of Australian manufacturing. 
 
 The quality of Australian management appears to be low by world standards and 
this is of concern for the future of industrial innovation. This is reflected in a 
relatively low export propensity by Australian companies, an apparent inability to 
commercialise Australian inventions and an apparent low priority given to human 
resource development programs. 
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 There is evidence that the strength of Australia’s domestic industrial linkages is 
declining. This, ceteris paribus, makes cooperative alliances more difficult by 
reducing the number of potential participants. It also increases the economy’s 
import propensity because gaps in value chains need to be filled by imported 
products. Thus ‘hollowing out’ begets more hollowing out, with potential 
negative trade and employment implications. 
 
 Australia’s industrial structure appears to be getting more concentrated in the 
hands of large conglomerates, making the position of small and medium sized 
enterprises more precarious and, in a context of trade liberalisation, putting 
downward pressure on employment, wages and working conditions in SMEs. 
Moreover, the growing importance of large firms means that in some industries 
the loss of just a few companies can mean the effective loss of the industry or 
much of its activity. This is reflected in Australia’s trade where fifty corporate 
groups account for three-quarters of the economy’s exports, and in research and 
development where two companies account for twelve per cent of all private 
industrial R&D. Across the economy a mere 0.4 per cent of corporations account 
for nearly forty per cent of all business sector employment. 
 
 The popular fascination with the importance of small firms may well be 
misplaced, as the evidence suggests that smaller companies show a lower 
propensity to innovate, are less export-oriented, devote less resources to training, 
show a lower propensity to network, pay lower wages and invest less in capital 
than do larger firms. The size of firms should not of itself be the defining 
characteristic of policy. 
 
 Australia’s public infrastructure provision appears to be declining and is already 
very low by OECD standards. Given the important productivity (and 
employment) enhancing effects of this form of capital, this development does not 
augur well for future economic growth. 
 
 Australia’s overall trade performance, as measured by export/import ratios, has 
showed no improvement from the four decades from the 1950s to the 1990s. This 
is despite considerable reductions in the exchange rate, in relative unit labour 
costs, in the relative prices of our manufactured exports and despite trade and 
microeconomic reform. Australia’s share of OECD exports, which rose sharply in 
the decade prior to the mid-1970s, has declined consistently ever since. 
 
 Australia’s taxation system is biased against knowledge-embodying equipment 
investment as compared to property investment. 
 
 Access to capital appears from surveys to be the major impediment to innovative 
activity by firms. 
 
Thus the research presented here suggests that much needs to be done if the trends 
apparent within the Australian economy are to be re-oriented towards those regarded 
as appropriate to a learning economy in a world where economic growth is 
increasingly driven by knowledge production and diffusion. Some general policy 
observations will be made in Part Three of this document. 
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PART THREE: THE WAY FORWARD 
 
Part Three of the study discusses in a very general way some of the possible policy 
directions which could be relevant to redirecting the Australian economy towards a 
path characterised more by innovation, learning, growth and rising living standards - 
at least in so far as these directions arose from the literature and the data. These 
general prescriptions may be itemised as follows: 
 
 Governments must acknowledge, and develop policies incorporating, the 
importance of the industrial structure of the economy. Structures rich in 
knowledge and linkages are more likely to encourage a strong, vibrant economy 
with rising living standards and lower unemployment. These structural issues are 
relevant at the national, industry and firm levels. 
 
 Governments at all levels should work with industry to increase the ability of the 
economy to produce, diffuse and utilise economically useful knowledge. This will 
involve not only upgrading existing industries but also encouraging more of the 
knowledge and innovation-intensive industries at the cutting edge of research. 
 
 To this end, industry and trade policies should be thoroughly integrated, and all 
major policy decisions should be assessed for their impact on the industrial 
structure. 
 
 Inter-firm networking, as well as ‘cluster audits’, should be encouraged so as to 
facilitate greater cooperative activity among stakeholders. Further, policies aimed 
at attracting foreign transnational firms to Australia should be based on anchoring 
those firms within the economy via research, development, innovation and 
sourcing strategies which link them closely to the domestic industrial fabric. 
 
 Key factors identified in the literature as being related to productivity growth 
should be targeted for detailed research and, where the causal linkage is found to 
be strong, appropriate policy developed to encourage their development. Some of 
these factors are: 
 
 the rates of investment in machinery and equipment, which may reflect 
changes in the industrial mix or biases in the tax system; 
 the use of human resources management programs; 
 levels of public infrastructure provision; 
 labour turnover rates; 
 the commitment to training, especially management training; 
 levels of income inequality; 
 the quality of management. 
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 Specific programs which involve the expenditure of public funds or tax or other 
publicly-derived benefits should ensure that all such programs should maximise, 
or even mandate: 
 
 increased investment in R&D or other innovative capability-enhancing 
activities (e.g. market research); 
 greater investment in training for both management and workforce; 
 increased local sourcing; 
 employment expansion; 
 networking with others in the same or complementary sectors; 
 retention of adequate minimum employment conditions; 
 use of inclusive human resources management programs. 
 
 Government should: 
 
 encourage the emergence of a tier of Australian transnationals in high-
knowledge industries with substantial global scale;  
 actively use its leverage - especially procurement leverage - to encourage 
both local and foreign transnational firms operating in Australia in such 
industries to source and distribute products and services developed by 
local suppliers; and 
 investigate mechanisms for increasing the access to capital of small 
innovative firms, including examination of the foreign venture capital 
industry. 
 
 Government should carefully weigh the possible long term cost to the nation of 
shorter term policy measures before eroding the resources of scientific and 
research institutions so essential for a learning economy. Further, the links 
between the private sector and R&D institutions should be strengthened, and 
public-private coordination of and commitment to increased training and 
retraining should become a cornerstone of policy in the years ahead. 
 
 Priority in trade policy emphasis should go to actions which build Australia’s 
industrial capability and our capacity for innovation and technology development, 
rather than trade liberalisation and cost-cutting per se. Dealing with the 
manufacturing trade deficit - especially in knowledge intensive areas - should 
take much greater prominence. 
 
 Policy capability within State and Commonwealth governments should not be 
eroded. Strong relationships should be forged between the public and private 
sectors to enhance Australia’s ability to analyse, understand and capitalise on 
innovation and technological advantages. 
 
What is important is that public policies are coherent and sustained over time, that 
industry is treated as a responsible partner and that industry both as a whole and as 
separate sectors, work with government to improve the match between corporate and 
public interest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Part One of this study describes some of the main themes in the international 
economic literature which have emerged over recent years and which focus on the 
generation of economic development. Some of this lies within the neo-classical 
tradition but develops it in new directions. This is the case of the two theories 
discussed here, New Growth Theory and Strategic Trade Theory. These are relatively 
well-known in Australia, although their recognition in policy circles is low. 
 
Internationally, however, increasing prominence is being accorded to a different 
stream of economics which largely stems from the work of Schumpeter in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. Although for long largely neglected by mainstream 
economists and policymakers alike, these new streams work have recently received 
much international attention as useful means of understanding the processes of change 
in western industrial economies. 
 
The approaches summarised as ‘evolutionary economics’ are perhaps the most used, 
although some analysts have focused more on the institutional side than have others 
working within the same general framework.  Evolutionary economics treats the 
economy as an evolving system, contingent upon previous development paths, the 
innovative activities of firms and the ‘natural selective’ properties of the innovation 
environment.  These various strands of thought were accepted by the OECD which 
started a special program of analysis devoted to their ideas in the early 1990s.  Since 
then the OECD has continued to strengthen the empirical basis of the theoretical 
propositions made. 
 
This short summary describes the recent development of these ‘neo-Schumpeterian’ 
approaches. The economists’ approaches have been supplemented, enriched and given 
empirical application by the work of organisational analysts and innovation specialists 
working particularly in business schools around the world, but also in the public 
sector. Industry departments in many countries and the OECD as an international 
body bringing countries together have undertaken a continuing series of empirically 
related studies. 
 
Part One of the report advances the argument in several sections. The first chapter 
outlines the classical and neoclassical approaches to economic growth and trade 
which continue to have major currency in policymaking circles in Australia and 
elsewhere. 
 
The second chapter presents the new approaches mentioned above and points out the 
emphasis they place on innovation as the driving force of economic change. It 
illustrates the arguments with examples of findings from international work and 
suggests the conclusions which may be drawn for understanding, and where necessary 
changing, the Australian situation. 
 
Chapter Three focuses attention on the mechanisms for knowledge-generation, 
diffusion and use because of the centrality of innovation to growth in the late 
twentieth century and the decades to come. It outlines several approaches to 
understanding the dynamics of economies through understanding what happens in 
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‘chains’ of production, ‘clusters’ of activity and industrial ‘complexes’. All these  
focus on the interaction of key players in the system. In the first two approaches - 
chains and clusters - the focus is on the interaction between firms, whether as clients 
and suppliers or as competing and collaborating units. The focus on the latter relates 
to a broader range of players because ‘complexes’ of activity include research 
institutions and government in its capacity as regulator and stimulator. The chapter 
suggests that much useful information is gathered on the real workings of an economy 
using any or all of these approaches. 
 
Importantly, the chapter outlines the importance of the institutional structures within 
which firms operate and points to the fact that analysts now see these as patterning 
firm responses to economic stimuli. The patterning effect on innovation is seen as so 
strong that nations effectively have ‘national systems of innovation’. Some of the 
institutional arrangements making up the national system of innovation in any country 
may well inhibit economic activity and innovation in general. Some such systems are 
therefore more effective in generating sustained innovation than are others. The 
national system of innovation approach to understanding patterns of growth is now 
the subject of empirical studies coordinated by the OECD. Attempts are being made 
to find indicators that will enable countries to measure the effectiveness of their own 
system or its constituent elements and evaluate economic development policies 
accordingly. 
 
Chapter Four moves on to outline the newest ideas on what successful economies will 
increasingly look like in the twenty first century as far as the emerging trends can be 
seen now.  It points to the change in focus to the learning economy which will 
demand many different kinds of skills on the part of economic actors and public 
policymakers alike. It also indicates the importance of understanding the different 
kinds of knowledge and their flows within a ‘learning economy’ composed of 
‘learning firms’. The chapter outlines the ways in which such firms are both organised 
internally and in their linkages with other economic units. It emphasises such things 
as routines, trust and human resource management.  
 
Chapter Five discusses trade liberalisation, its effects on learning economies, and also 
the importance of human capital development for economic growth and living 
standards. 
 
Chapter Six presents a short summary of the critical findings on the ways in which a 
country’s industrial structure matters. 
 
A summary at the end of each sub-section of each chapter indicates the major findings 
which the reader should bear in mind when assessing the evidence on the challenges 
facing the Australian economy over the next few decades. 
 
Chapter One  
 
SUMMARY OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO 
ECONOMIC GROWTH & TRADE 
 
 
Economics is replete with theories purporting to explain the processes of economic 
growth and trade.  Some of these date back to the early 19th century and Ricardo, 
Marx and Malthus while others are more recent and less controversial in their 
analyses and predictions. 
 
This chapter explores some of the more orthodox streams of economic thought in 
relation to both growth and trade. With respect to growth, the standard ‘neoclassical’ 
growth model is discussed and reviewed with an analysis of its essential weaknesses. 
This is followed by discussion of more recent developments within the neoclassical 
stream which address some, though not all, of the limitations of their predecessor. 
These are, not surprisingly, known as New Growth Theories. 
 
Similarly the discussion of trade theory begins with a recital of perhaps one of the 
cannons of contemporary economic doctrine - the Theory of Comparative Advantage 
developed by David Ricardo in the early years of the last century. Some of the 
difficulties of this approach are also explored and a more recent set of theories - still 
located within the economic mainstream but substantially more radical in their 
implications - is outlined. The latter are known as collectively Strategic Trade 
Theory. 
 
 
1. The Traditional Growth Model 
 
The most popular of the mainstream growth models are the traditional ‘neoclassical’ 
growth theories, pioneered by Solow (1957) and Swan (1956). In their approach, 
which assumes perfectly competitive markets, growth (defined as growth in per 
capita national output) is an equilibrium process based around an optimal (or 
‘golden’) saving rate, which determines investment. The rate of economic growth in 
such models is a function of growth in the workforce, in available capital stock and 
technological progress. Together these constitute a ‘production function’1. Critically 
here, technological change is assumed to be exogenous (BIE 1992). 
 
Investment is not the driver of economic growth within this framework, and full 
employment growth will result if prices in all markets (including labour markets) are 
allowed to adjust freely so that markets can clear.   This approach has one aspect 
which is especially important.  This is the problem of diminishing returns to 
investment. In these models increased investment, leading to an increase in the 
                                                 
1 A production function is a mathematical expression of the relationship between inputs (typically, in 
the traditional models, of land and capital) and output. The difference between total output and the sum 
of inputs is called, in the standard growth model, ‘technological change’ or ‘productivity growth’ and 
is essentially unexplained. 
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capital/labour ratio, will ultimately lead to diminishing returns. In the absence of 
technological progress, economic growth would grind to a halt. Policies designed to 
expedite investment only hasten the onset of those diminishing returns (EPAC 1995) 
and penalise future generations. Good summaries of the traditional neoclassical 
position are contained in BIE (1992) and Dowrick (1995). 
 
In this model the role of government is to try to ensure that markets approximate 
perfect competition and that there is an optimum (not necessarily maximum) saving 
rate.  The theories emphasise that further government intervention is only appropriate 
when there is market failure and costs of intervention are likely to be less than those 
of the market failure itself. 
 
 
2. Problems with the Traditional Model 
 
A number of problems have been identified with this school of growth analysis. 
These include a number of empirical and theoretical considerations. 
 
Firstly, there is the assumption that technological change is exogenous. In these 
models there is no means by which technical progress is generated from within the 
investment or production process. Technology is, indeed, ‘manna from heaven’. As 
the theory assumes that returns will diminish over time (i.e. output per unit of input 
will decline), it is technical progress which stops the growth machine from grinding 
to a halt. As there is no theory of technical progress, however, despite the fact that 
technical progress is posited as the essential driver of growth, then there is in effect 
no theory of growth:  everything of importance, from a growth perspective, happens 
outside the model. In the words of Dowrick: 
 
‘Agents can accumulate human capital and physical capital as much as they 
like, but they will always run aground on the rock of diminishing 
returns...’ (Dowrick, 1995: 21) 
 
Convergence. The theory predicts that poor countries with low ratios of capital to 
labour will have lower diminishing returns than developed countries and will catch up 
in their growth rates until their capital/labour ratios become closer. Thus the theory 
suggests that there will be ‘convergence’ of growth rates between rich and poor 
countries. Examinations of the data, however, show that convergence has tended to 
take place among developed nations but not as much as would be expected between 
developed and underdeveloped ones. Indeed in some cases there has been growth 
divergence rather than convergence (BIE 1992 and Dalum 1995). There are also 
examples where the growth rates of some lesser developed economies, most notably 
the Asian ‘tiger’ economies, have far outstripped those of their western counterparts 
by more than would be expected by sheer accumulation of inputs alone. 
 
Investment. In the traditional theory, changes in the level of investment are assumed 
not to be relevant to steady state growth. This assumption appears to fly in the face of 
evidence that growth and investment are positively correlated and that government 
policies can influence the rate of investment (BIE 1992). 
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The production function. At a more theoretical level, debates in the 1960s and 1970s  
between Cambridge Massachusetts and Cambridge England (the ‘Cambridge capital 
debates’) raised serious doubts about the traditional neoclassical model's ability to use 
a standard production function, in which output is viewed as a function of measurable 
input, when applied to capital. The debate centred around the measurement of the 
marginal product of capital (a key element in the production function approach) and 
concluded that the same physical unit of capital  could have a different value at 
different wage and profit rates. Thus it was shown that the marginal product of 
capital, a central ingredient of neoclassical models, could not be measured 
independently of the rate of profit. This left the adherents of the neoclassical 
approach without a theory of capital and thus without their standard production 
function (Harcourt 1972). 
 
East Asia. The standard model does not seem to have been very successful in 
explaining some of the world's most famous recent growth episodes such as those of 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. An attempt by the World Bank (1993) to 
ascribe much of the spectacular growth of the high performing Asian economies to 
pro-neoclassical government policies has now been rejected by Asian experts who 
have stressed the active role played by governments in encouraging investment, 
exports, technology transfer, saving and promotion of particular sectors (see, e.g. 
Fishlow et al. 1994).  
 
The primacy of saving. The same East Asian growth phenomenon has cast doubt on 
the neoclassical notion that investment and growth are determined by saving. Work 
by Carroll and Weil (1994) has demonstrated that income growth can occur before 
saving growth. In their words: 
 
The recent literature on economic growth has typically explained the 
positive cross-country correlation between saving and growth as the result 
of high saving producing high growth via capital accumulation. Our 
empirical results suggest, however, that higher growth precedes higher 
saving. Furthermore, higher saving is not followed by higher growth, at 
least in the medium run.  (1994: 137). 
 
The authors state that this finding has serious negative implications for the credibility 
of the traditional neoclassical growth model. 
 
Scarce resources. With the neoclassical model there is always the assumption of a 
fixed pool of resources (or a pool growing at a steady rate). This means that any 
stimulus to any one industry or sector will always be at the expense of other 
industries or sectors. As will be shown below, this is not necessarily the case if 
‘externalities’2 are allowed into the system. Such externalities or ‘spillovers’, if 
positive rather than negative, can thus improve aggregate growth without the 
competition for a fixed supply of resources which could damage growth in the longer 
term.  In other words, the net effect of the stimulation of externality-producing 
activity can be positive for growth across the aggregate economy.  Recognition of the 
                                                 
2 Externalities are costs or benefits that are not fully paid for by a firm which produces them and which 
spill over to other firms or to society (e.g. pollution is a negative externality). 
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positive role played by externalities is very important in newer theories as we shall 
see below. 
 
For the above reasons it is becoming clear that the traditional neoclassical growth 
model, in which the role of government is largely confined to fine-tuning the saving 
rate and perfecting the operation of markets, is beginning to lose much of its 
analytical power and policy-related credibility. In the words of the BIE: 
 
The usefulness of the standard model as one that can explain in any detail 
the relationships between the forces determining long term economic growth 
is under attack. (BIE, 1992: 10) 
 
The reasons for the attack have contributed to the emergence of alternative views 
within the main neoclassical stream. 
 
 
3. ‘New’ Neoclassical Growth Theories 
 
The best-known of these alternative approaches are the so-called ‘New Growth 
Theories’ (‘NGTs’).  These theories, in contrast to the earlier neoclassical 
approaches, show how technological progress and knowledge become the drivers of 
growth. Technological change is related to investment in physical capital, investment 
in human capital and investment in research and development.  New Growth Theory 
views knowledge as a key factor in development (EPAC 1995).  
 
All versions of NGT models better approximate the real world in another key area: 
they allow for the presence of ‘imperfect’ (as opposed to ‘perfect’3) competition and 
recognise the importance of economies of scale4 (BIE 1992). Moreover, at least in 
principle, they recognise the potential for government policy to affect and improve 
economic growth outcomes through direct policy intervention. 
 
The NGTs thus address some of the problems associated with the traditional 
neoclassical theories, despite still retaining some core elements of the neoclassical 
framework. 
 
The BIE (1992) distinguishes several groups of NGTs. 
 
 
(a) ‘Romer’ models 
 
                                                 
3 Perfect competition has a number of critical assumptions, including: standardised products; large 
numbers of buyers and sellers who cannot individually influence the price of a good or service; perfect 
knowledge on the part of producers and consumers; no increasing returns to scale; perfect mobility of 
factors of production across alternative uses (implying no barriers to the entry of competitors). In 
perfect competition all producers are price takers and there is only one market price for each good and 
all output is sold at this price. Imperfect competition relaxes one of these key assumptions: products 
may be differentiated. (Baumol et al. 1992) 
4 Economies of scale occur when costs rise by less than a rise in output. 
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The first group of NGTs identified by the BIE was developed by and around Paul 
Romer from 1986 to the present. The group includes several variants, some of which 
are described below. 
 
Firstly, the theories include a country’s stock of knowledge as a factor of production 
alongside labour and capital.  For this reason, the theory predicts that an increase in 
investment will both increase output and increase knowledge in ways which have 
external effects which in turn enhance growth. The knowledge recognised, however, 
is ‘disembodied’, by which is meant that it is not contained within physical capital 
goods.  
 
Secondly, the theories allow for imperfect competition. Imperfect competition can 
(and usually does) lead to competition based on product differentiation. This means 
that consumers will gain a range of goods and services which would not be available 
under conditions of perfect competition, which leads to increases in their welfare. 
Thus imperfect competition, which is usually a negative and a growth-reducer in 
standard theory, can become welfare-enhancing. 
 
Thirdly, Romer and his colleagues recognised the importance of human capital 
development.  This was at two levels - the development of human capital in general 
and the investment in R&D in particular. These capital investments generate 
spillovers - knowledge which cannot be trapped within a particular entity - which 
then increase overall productivity. 
 
(b) ‘Lucas’ models 
 
The second group of models grew from the work of Nobel Prize winning economist 
Robert Lucas. His models share two important characteristics. The first is their focus 
on the idea that human capital drives productivity growth, with the former being very 
much linked to the general level of education.  The second is their focus on the notion 
that economic actors learn-by-doing and become more productive as they do so.  This 
is significant because this is the form of learning seen as most developed in high 
technology industries and because the knowledge thus generated cannot be contained 
within a single firm but necessarily spills over into other parts of the economy. 
Knowledge is generated through investment in a way similar to that posited in the 
Romer models mentioned above. 
 
(c) Later models 
 
The models of the first two groups have been modified by others. Most importantly in 
the context of the present report, Grossman and Helpman (1991), for example, show 
that higher technology manufacturing makes greater use of R&D and gains greater 
return from it than does manufacturing of more standard items. High-tech 
manufacturing and its associated R&D can be the source of substantial technological 
spillovers which can generate growth.  This approach thus emphasises the important 
role of high-tech industries in economic growth. 
 
The later NGT models also introduce international trade into the discussion.  They 
see international trade as important because it can: 
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 increase pressure to innovate via increased competition; 
 encourage the creation of inter-organisational networks and the movement of 
researchers, thereby encouraging the greater diffusion of knowledge; 
 be a mechanism for the transmission of knowledge embodied in goods that are 
traded. 
 
The use of NGTs in economic modelling has since indicated some important benefits 
and qualifications surrounding the impact of R&D, suggesting that the value of R&D 
can vary in an economy according to its origin.  Modelling for the Industry 
Commission’s report on R&D (Industry Commission 1995), for example, using an 
NGT approach showed a gross rate of return to the economy from R&D investment 
of 159-171 per cent (1995: QA.61). 
 
On the other hand, the returns to Australia from R&D done overseas were 
significantly lower at 24-32 per cent (1995: QA.61). Importantly, the Commission 
went on to add, ‘[t]his is lower than for other countries’. 
 
The differences which the Industry Commission noted between the returns to 
imported R&D in Australia as compared to other countries seem in part to be due to 
variations in industrial structure between Australia and other nations (1995: 158) and 
this indicates that a nation’s industrial structure is important to the take-up of new 
knowledge. 
 
Overall, the Industry Commission concludes, its analysis ‘indicates strong and 
positive returns to R&D investments.  International studies also provide evidence 
consistent with this assessment.’ (1995: 159).   
 
 
4.      Implications of the New Growth Theories for Public 
 Policies 
 
This research raises many issues in relation to public policy.  In particular, the BIE 
(1992) lists a number of important implications for policy of key elements of the 
NGT growth models’ analyses.  These include the following: 
 
 Growth is generated by spillover-inducing activities based on knowledge 
generation through investment in physical capital, human capital, innovation and 
research and development.  Governments may act to increase this investment. 
 
 NGT models clearly allow for the fact that the market solution is not necessarily 
the best solution because of the existence of knowledge externalities and the 
increasing returns to scale associated with imperfect competition.  These 
externalities and market structures also provide a rationale for potential 
government intervention. 
 
 It is theoretically possible to promote some activities where the costs of the 
promotion are less than the benefits arising from the externalities associated with 
the activities. 
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 More generally, government may wish to intervene to counteract the adverse 
effects of free trade. While it is true that free trade can allow importers to capture 
the knowledge contained in another country's exports, especially in intermediate 
goods, NGTs suggest that free trade can also lock a country into a low 
productivity and growth path if the country has few knowledge intensive 
industries or specialises in sectors with low productivity and spillovers. The 
theories recognise that trade-induced specialisation can thus lead to either 
virtuous or vicious circles: free trade can encourage the formation of clusters of 
related industries, thereby reinforcing a high-knowledge (and thus high growth), 
or it lead to a low-knowledge (and thus low growth) path.  
 
Importantly in this respect, NGTs do not give a clear pointer towards the desirability 
or otherwise of free trade, indicating instead that to a large extent the desirability of 
free trade will be influenced the structure of industrial specialisation of each 
particular country. This theme has been taken up in what has become known as 
Strategic Trade Theory and is discussed below. 
 
 
5. Limitations to New Growth Theory Approaches 
 
The New Growth Theories raise issues which have been welcomed by growth 
theorists as being more in accord with empirical realities, but there remain a number 
of limitations in these models (Kurz and Salvadori 1994, McCallum 1996). 
 
Firstly, they are still production-function-based and suffer from the weaknesses 
mentioned earlier about these models, most notably an internal inconsistency in the 
treatment of capital. Even Romer (in Kurz and Salvadori 1994: 20) acknowledges that 
NGTs do ‘violence to the complexity of economic activity by assuming that there is 
an aggregate production function’. 
 
Secondly, growth is still, according to these variants of the neoclassical tradition, 
supply-side constrained. This means that the models view the rate of economic 
growth as constrained by the supply of capital, labour, human capital or knowledge. 
Growth cannot be demand-constrained in these theories, meaning that in effect supply 
always creates its own demand. Further, they assume that what is saved is 
automatically invested (1994: 9) so NGTs have no theory of the determinants of 
investment. Indeed, even the saving rate is viewed as exogenously determined (1994: 
26). This assumption is in stark contrast to the views of other growth traditions, such 
as post-Keynesian models, where demand side rather than supply side factors and the 
expectations of investors are key determinants of investment and growth.  
 
Thirdly, NGTs appear to ignore the economic fluctuations apparent in real 
economies. They stick to the ‘equilibrium’ notion of growth where there is full 
employment of labour and capital resources in the long run (1994: 25). One of the 
pioneers of neoclassical growth theory, Robert Solow, has expressed his concern 
about the failure of neoclassical models to address the issue of aggregate demand and 
its influence on employment and growth (1994: 25). 
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Fourthly, some of the NGTs assume precisely constant returns to scale - i.e. output 
increases in direct proportion to input (McCallum 1996: 24). McCallum argues that 
this means that technical change is still in fact exogenous to the model (: 24). 
 
Finally, McCallum states that the Lucas models require never-ending increases in 
human capital to generate permanent growth (: 21). He regards this as ‘implausible’ 
because human capital is, unlike the stock of knowledge, specific to individual human 
beings (: 21). ‘Thus’, he says, ‘it is some form of knowledge, not human capital, that 
can plausibly provide the basis for never-ending growth’ (: 22). 
 
Despite these problems, however, NGTs do contribute important insights in to the 
processes of economic growth and development. They form the basis of the theories 
which underlie recent work on the role of technology as an engine of growth and 
development. 
 
Before turning to these other streams it is important to briefly discuss recent 
developments in theories of international trade as these have picked up many of the 
concepts from the debates on growth theory. 
 
 
6.  Classical and Neoclassical Theories of Trade 
 
Two standard models of analysis are used by most economists to explain observed 
patterns of trade. These are the Theory of Comparative Advantage and the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. 
 
(a) The Theory of Comparative Advantage 
 
This, the first standard trade model (the ‘classical’ trade model), derives from the 
work of David Ricardo in the early 18th century.  Ricardo studied trade between 
England and Portugal in two commodities, wine and cloth. After observing the 
specialisation by England in the production of cloth and by Portugal in that of wine, 
Ricardo applied some simple logic to show that nations should specialise in the 
production of those things in which their relative (not absolute) costs are lowest. He 
further suggested that nations should export such products, while importing others so 
as to maximise output and welfare. This view has become known as the doctrine of 
Comparative Advantage and underlies much of the contemporary case for free trade. 
In this view the gains to national income arise from specialisation in activities in 
which each country is relatively efficient. The theory holds that, for each commodity, 
relative efficiency derives from the relative unit labour cost differential, across the 
production of different goods, between each country (Krugman & Obstfeld 1994). If 
a country has a higher relative unit labour cost in the production of X than another 
country (i.e. the ratio of its unit labour cost to other domestically produced goods is 
higher than that of the other country), the theory suggests that it should import X 
from that other country. The relative unit labour cost is determined by wage rates and 
productivity. In this model every country benefits from free trade. 
 
(b) The Heckscher-Ohlin Model  
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The Ricardian model essentially dealt with only one factor of production - labour. 
Swedish economists Heckscher and Ohlin proposed an alternative which introduced 
other factors such as land and capital, and sought to apply neoclassical principles 
relating to relative prices of those factors determining trade patterns. This model (the 
standard ‘neoclassical’ trade theory) asserts that a country will in general be more 
efficient in production of those things in which it is the most factor-intensive and 
factor-endowed.  For example, a country with a greater relative endowment of land 
with a high usage of that land will be more efficient at producing, and therefore 
should specialise in the production of, land-based commodities (Krugman & Obstfeld 
1994) which it then trades for other goods. This is also called the ‘factor-proportions’ 
theory. Changes in the supply of the various factors (as in most neoclassical 
frameworks) alter the prices of those factors and thus change their mix in production. 
Such changes then alter the ideal trade mix a country should have. 
 
 
7. Problems with the Standard Trade Models 
 
A number of implications, and some problems, arise from the application of these 
orthodox frameworks to the real world.  
 
Firstly, most international trade does not conform to the factor-proportions model 
where trade composition is supposedly determined by relative factor intensities.  Thus 
the Heckscher-Ohlin predictions do not accord with empirical reality (Krugman & 
Obstfeld 1994).  
 
Secondly, intra-industry trade now accounts for a high proportion of world trade.  
The growth of intra-industry and, more particularly, intra-firm trade casts doubt on 
the concept that national endowment characteristics (including relative unit labour 
cost differentials) principally determine the composition of trade between nations. 
Estimates suggest that from 30 and 50 per cent of intra-firm world trade involves 
exchanging goods and services which are largely similar. The world automotive 
industry, for example, exchanges highly engineered components between countries 
with very similar production or potential production techniques and which pay very 
similar wage rates. In many industries production facilities are often located for 
strategic reasons (such as proximity to new markets or the existence of government 
incentives) as much as for reasons of relative unit labour costs. Intra-industry trade 
does not reflect comparative advantage (Krugman & Obstfeld 1994: 130). 
 
Thirdly, exchange rate movements can dwarf changes in unit labour costs as a 
determinant of trade outcomes. This will affect products with high price elasticities 
more than those with low elasticities and thus affect the composition of goods and 
services traded by the nations concerned. 
 
Fourthly, standard trade theories imply a concept known as ‘factor price equalisation’ 
or the Stolper-Samuelson effect. As trade expands between countries, the prices of 
factors of production (including labour) should tend to converge (Krugman & 
Obstfeld 1994). The Stolper-Samuelson effect does not require there to be 
international movement of capital or labour - the simple fact of freer trade creates 
tendencies towards such equalisation. The effect can be mitigated by transport costs 
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(remoteness).  In the context of this report, it is important to emphasise also that 
differences in technology across countries can keep factor prices high in the relatively 
higher technology countries, thus reducing this equalisation effect5.  
 
Fifthly, trade should induce industrial specialisation so that specialisation is expected 
to increase with economic openness. If the outcome of  this specialisation is a 
reliance on industries where productivity is low, the specialisation tendency can 
condemn a country to low productivity growth over a long period, indeed perhaps 
until some other ‘shock’ occurs. 
 
Sixthly, standard trade theories assume a situation of perfect competition, from which 
the benefits of trade are large (Krugman and Obstfeld 1994: 113). Once imperfect 
competition is introduced via, for example, economies of scale, the benefits of trade 
are less clear and depend on the nature of the economies of scale. If the economies of 
scale are internal to the firm, greater specialisation through trade will increase the 
value of scale even more, reducing unit costs further. 
 
Where scale economies, however, are external to the firm - occurring at the level of 
the industry such as in the case of micro-electronics in Silicon Valley - this scale 
 
...gives an important role to history and accident in determining the pattern of 
international trade. When external economies are important, a country starting 
with a large industry may retain that advantage even if another country could 
potentially produce the same goods more cheaply. When external economies are 
important, countries can conceivably lose from trade’ (1994: 145).  
 
More importantly, ‘learning-by-doing’, or ‘dynamic increasing returns’ can  
 
... lock in an initial advantage or head start in an industry... Dynamic scale 
economies...potentially justify protectionism.’(Krugman and Obstfeld 1994: 
144). 
 
Finally, even where economies of scale are internal to the firm free trade does not 
necessarily lead to reduced costs (or increased variety) to consumers. Norman (1994), 
for example, argues that there is both theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest 
that in industries dominated by a very small number of firms a tariff can increase 
output rather than price, potentially leading to an increase in net welfare rather than 
the more usually assumed reduction in welfare. Further, an export subsidy can 
increase the profit of a firm by more than the amount of the subsidy, thereby again 
increasing rather than decreasing the net welfare of a society. 
 
Many existing trade patterns can therefore not be explained either by the factor-
proportions theory or by the doctrine of comparative advantage. This is not to say that 
large gains cannot arise from trade, but rather that standard theory cannot adequately 
explain existing trade specialisations, especially among advanced countries.  
 
                                                 
5 There is some debate among economists as to whether the Stolper-Samuelson effect actually exists. 
Work by the OECD (1994) suggests that free trade in relatively standardised products in fragmented 
markets does expose workers in those industries to factor price equalisation pressures. 
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This point is important because it means that more targeted and sophisticated policies 
for economic development may be necessary rather than a simple reliance on 
reducing barriers to trade. Furthermore, the existence of external scale economies (in 
particular learning-by-doing) can give some industries and countries permanent head-
starts in some products and can reduce tendencies toward the equalisation of wages 
and profits. 
 
 
8. Strategic Trade Theory 
 
The development of New Growth Theory discussed above, together with recognition 
of the problems inherent in traditional theories of international trade, has led to a new 
set of analyses of patterns of and reasons for international trade. These have become 
collectively known as Strategic Trade Theory (STT). Krugman (1986) has written 
much on this subject, sometimes changing his views over time. STT approaches have 
also been taken up by economists from outside the neoclassical stream, such as the 
Schumpeterians, to provide links between trade theory and their own theories about 
the critical role played by innovation and knowledge as the major drivers of 
economic growth.  Strategic Trade Theories also leave an opening for a greater role 
to be played by government in economic development. 
 
STT begins from two observations that we have already mentioned: that much 
contemporary trade cannot be explained by the standard theories for the reasons 
outlined in the previous section, and that real world economies tend not to be 
characterised by the predominance of perfectly competitive firms.  
 
The rejection of the illusion of perfectly competitive markets is critical to STT.  It is 
also critical to the present report because, in the words of a leading contemporary 
economist, Grossman: 
 
As soon as we leave the world of perfect competition where all resources 
earn their opportunity value...we can no longer be indifferent to our 
country's industrial structure. There are some industries that provide 
greater national benefit than others, and all the countries in the 
industrialised world would prefer to be active and successful in these. 
Government policy can, in principle, help to ensure that this comes about. 
(Grossman in Krugman 1986: 66. Emphasis added.) 
 
Central elements of the STT approach are laid out below.  
 
Firstly, if there are indeed advantages in economies of scale, especially external 
economies, arising from such factors as steep learning curves or the presence of 
significant barriers to entry, firms in some industries are likely to earn higher profits 
than they would in perfectly competitive markets since they receive what economists 
call ‘rents’6.  This extra profitability gives firms in these industries the capacity to pay 
higher wage rates. In such instances, there could be at least a prima facie case for 
governments to develop policies to increase the presence and success of these 
                                                 
6 Rents are returns above what competitive markets would deliver and therefore above what would 
otherwise be required to keep a firm in an industry. 
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industries and firms in their economies (Krugman 1986).  Thus STT approaches 
potentially recognise both that industrial structure matters and that public authorities 
may have a role to play in ensuring that the industries of greatest national benefit are 
present in their economies. 
 
Secondly, even if internal economies of scale are the only ones present, the case 
against trade policies such as tariffs or production subsidies is less clear. As Norman 
(1994) points out, it all depends on a given industry's behaviour in a particular 
country. Broad rules of thumb can be dangerous. 
 
Thirdly, if certain industries carry with them positive externalities, where benefits 
cannot be trapped within the original entity and spill over from individual firms or 
from the industries to assist other parts of the economy, there may be an argument for 
publicly encouraging those industries, perhaps through trade policies such as tariffs 
and export/production subsidies. 
 
Fourthly, the fact that chance and history have resulted in the location within some 
countries of industries which are both endowed with scale economies and generate 
positive externalities suggests that governments could offer inducements to attract 
such valuable industries.  Some theorists, such as Arthur (1996) indeed go further.  
They argue that through ‘path dependence’ countries can be locked into dependence 
on the industries or activities they started out with.  A preponderance of low growth, 
low productivity industries can theoretically condemn an entire economy to poorer 
economic outcomes. 
 
The discussion of strategic trade theories is important because theorists such as 
Krugman acknowledge the prevalence of imperfectly competitive industry structures 
that generate ‘excess’ profits for some firms while also providing no market 
compensation for spillover benefits. Such ‘excess’ profits arise from innovation 
which both confers market advantage to the innovating firm and is a prime source of 
benefits which spill over to others, such as highly trained staff changing firms, or 
increased usage of a good or service which by itself generates further usage. 
 
Krugman concludes that, given the absence of perfect competition, a country's 
economic welfare may not be maximised by embracing free-trade as there is no 
assurance that critical innovative activity will be maximised. As suggested above, a 
country's government might therefore want to encourage the development of firms 
and industries earning excess profits and/or generating spillover benefits. Innovation 
will be under-supplied in the absence of policy action because the prices received by 
producers will not reflect the true social value of the output once spillover benefits 
are considered. STT has led to some development of strategic policy analysis which 
has been applied to the possible nature of government support for innovative firms 
and  industries (examined in Part Three of this report). 
 
Branstetter (1996) encapsulate the key issues in relation to STT in a paper designed to 
establish whether knowledge spillovers are primarily international or intranational in 
nature. This is an important distinction, as the two different characterisations have 
directly opposite policy implications. He is worth quoting at length: 
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Do the results of traditional models, where the pattern of trade is determined by 
comparative advantage, still hold in a world of innovating countries? In their 
work, Grossman and Helpman have demonstrated that even in a model in which 
innovation is fully endogenous, trade can still be determined by factor 
endowments if new ideas flow as quickly to other nations as they flow within 
nations. 
 
On the other hand, if the rate of knowledge spillover is much stronger within 
nations than across them, then patterns of trade are no longer necessarily 
determined by factor endowments. Instead,  they can exhibit path dependence. 
For example, a country that acquires a temporary advantage in R&D-intensive 
sectors can build on that advantage, eventually developing a position of 
enduring comparative advantage. Once this country’s firms begin to innovate at 
a faster rate than those outside the country, these new innovations become the 
foundation upon which more ideas can be created. Because this ‘foundation’ is 
higher than it is elsewhere, firms in this country have a powerful advantage over 
foreign rivals - they are likely to continue to generate more ideas than their 
foreign rivals, further enlarging and broadening the national ‘stock’ of 
knowledge from which they can draw and further cement their technological 
advantage. It is possible that by limiting trade temporarily or subsidising 
industry, a country could ‘build up’ an R&D-intensive sector, resulting in the 
establishment of a comparative advantage in that sector, arising not from 
exogenous factor endowments but endogenous innovation. Here, temporary 
policies can have permanent effects on the pattern of trade. (1996: 4) 
 
The question Branstetter is asking is a clear one: are spillovers primarily domestic - in 
which case path dependence is likely and government policy intervention may be 
beneficial by encouraging certain types of industries - or are they mainly international 
- in which case importing technology may be better. Branstetter’s research comes 
down clearly in favour of the domestic impact of spillovers rather than the 
international impact (1996: 4). 
 
A final point relates to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that free trade will equalise 
the returns across countries to labour and capital and thus reduce real wages in 
developed countries. Krugman and Venables (1995) constructed a model of trade 
taking into account both transport costs and scale economies. In particular they 
modelled the effects of reductions in transport costs on real incomes of both 
developed and underdeveloped countries in a context of free trade. They found (: 25) 
that as transport costs fell, at a certain point there was a transfer of income from the 
poorer to the richer countries as activity agglomerated in the latter. As transport costs 
continued to fall, however, activity would move to the poorer countries, resulting in a 
decline in incomes in the developed countries.  
 
Thus New Growth Theory and Strategic Trade Theory provide new insights within 
the traditional approaches to economic development. These insights have been 
paralleled by other streams of economic research which focus on some of the same 
variables (such as R&D and knowledge) as growth drivers but which also include 
other, innovation-based, approaches. This is the focus of Chapter Two. 
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9. Conclusions 
 
This brief review shows that the traditional neoclassical growth model does a poor 
job in explaining the drivers or processes of economic growth and development. The 
new growth theories have attempted to rectify this problem in several ways, most 
notably via the inclusion of knowledge/technological change/information issues 
within their frameworks. Economically useful knowledge can be embodied in capital 
equipment, may be associated with research and development expenditure or it may 
come with improvements in human capital. Thus growth may potentially be enhanced 
by the encouragement of these factors. 
 
Further, the New Growth Theories stress that growth is driven by knowledge 
externalities.  This means that it is theoretically possible to accept that benefits may 
flow from the active encouragement of knowledge-related activities or processes 
which generate those externalities and assist in their diffusion. Research using the 
framework provided by New Growth Theories also suggests that particular industrial 
structures may affect positively or negatively the innovative capacity of a country’s 
economy. A particular structure may, for example, affect the social returns on R&D 
by encouraging firms to conduct R&D domestically versus forcing them to import the 
necessary knowledge. 
 
The traditional framework of trade theory is also encountering increasing difficulty in 
explaining observed patterns of international trade. First, observed trade patterns may 
in some cases not be optimal because of the possibility of factor price equalisation 
and concentration in activities which generate few positive externalities. Also, 
internal and external economies of scale can create dynamic advantages which can be 
reinforced through appropriate trade specialisation. 
 
Strategic trade theory acknowledges these problems and links with new growth 
theory to identify the importance of a nation’s trade mix for generating desirable 
externalities and hence growth. The theory, again, explicitly acknowledges the 
possible need for government intervention to encourage spillover-intensive activities 
as well as scale economies. Even without progressing beyond the realms of 
neoclassical orthodoxy, there is thus a strong presumption that industrial structure 
and government policy matter beyond just the macroeconomic settings. 
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Chapter Two  
 
INNOVATION-BASED APPROACHES TO 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
1. Background 
 
Innovation-based approaches to industrial development recognise, as do New Growth 
Theories and Strategic Trade Theory, that a central key to economic development is 
technical change. In contrast to neoclassical approaches however, they focus on the 
dynamics of economic systems, especially as these relate to innovation and the ways 
in which technical change occurs. They thus pay more attention to business structures 
and the conditions surrounding entrepreneurship and innovation. The aim of the 
remainder of Part One is to provide the reader with an overview of these approaches 
to understanding growth in Western economies.  
 
Innovation has been variously defined, but the international literature now largely 
follows the definition provided by the OECD.  The OECD defines technological 
innovation as comprising 
 
 ...new products and processes and significant technological change in products 
and processes.  An innovation has been implemented if it has been introduced 
on the market (product innovation) or used within a production process (process 
innovation).  Innovations therefore involve a series of scientific, technological, 
organisational, financial and commercial activities. 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics, in conjunction with the Department of Industry, 
is also leading the OECD in developing definitions of non-technological innovation. 
The ABS defines non-technological innovation as activity involving significant 
management and/or organisational improvements. 
 
Current views on the importance of innovation at both firm and national have been 
summarised by Dodgson (1996): 
 
While difficulties remain in measuring the precise contribution of technical 
change to the growth of industries or countries, no one doubts that 
innovation is essential to this process (Freeman 1994). At the national level, 
technological activities - as measured by R&D and international patenting - 
are statistically significant determinants of export and productivity 
performance (Fagerberg 1987). Technological innovation has played a 
significant role in the economic transformation of the East Asian economies 
(Hobday 1995). Entire industries and geographical regions can be 
invigorated or depressed by technological change (Utterback 1994; Saxenian 
1994). At the corporate level, new products less than five years old account 
for, according to one estimate, 52% of sales and 46% of profits of US firms 
(Cooper 1993). Within the factory, the use of advanced manufacturing 
technology is unequivocally associated with greater productivity, higher 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
Australia’s Industrial Structure                                                                                              7.33 
survival rates, higher wages and more rapid employment growth (US Dept of 
Commerce 1994). At all levels of analysis, competitiveness and the ability to 
pay your way in the world depend on the effectiveness of technological 
innovation. 
 
 
Innovation-based approaches to growth have been receiving increasing attention 
internationally. Recent work has been led in the UK by Freeman and his colleagues at 
the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex. In Europe a number of 
centres have developed. These include MERIT at Maastricht, led by Soete, and a 
group at the University of Aalborg in which Lundvall has a prominent role. There are 
also many others at different universities and institutes in the Nordic countries, 
France, the Netherlands, Italy and elsewhere. In the USA, the leading roles have been 
played by Nelson and Rosenberg whose early work has been taken up and developed 
in key universities in the USA and Canada.  
 
There has been much empirical testing of the ideas as they work in different national 
arenas.  Business schools have been significant here, most famously through the work 
of Porter and his team at the Harvard Business School - but also through the detailed 
work of von Hippel and others at the Sloan School at MIT and many others 
elsewhere. In the 1990s the approach received the imprimatur of the divisions of the 
OECD whose special concern is industrial development. The OECD has conducted a 
series of major international studies on technological change and economic growth.  
 
In this work, much attention has been paid to the evolutionary (how economic change 
proceeds), organisational (how firms and other bodies are structured and work 
together) and institutional (how laws, practices and customs affect business activity) 
aspects of innovation processes.  
 
In large part, our understanding of these aspects of innovation stems from the ideas of 
Schumpeter, an Austrian economist writing in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Schumpeter was particularly interested in entrepreneurship and the dynamics 
of competition as individuals and firms vied for competitive advantage through the 
development of new or improved products and processes. Schumpeter saw that firms 
did not only compete on the basis of price, but also on the basis of product 
differentiation, and that innovators sought temporary monopoly profits by being first 
to market with new ideas. 
 
Innovation-based approaches to economic growth are developing fast and are 
becoming increasingly prominent in discussions in international policy circles as well 
as in the academic world. Many economists recognise the current era as one of 
accelerated - possibly even revolutionary - technological change.  This change is so 
great, they argue, that the advanced countries, and behind them the developing 
nations, are seeing what they call a ‘techno-industrial paradigm shift’ (Freeman and 
Perez 1988).  A techno-industrial paradigm shift means that a significant break with 
established technologies and their associated production regimes has occurred.  The 
existence of such a fundamental shift means that many aspects of our understanding 
of how economic growth is generated and maintained have to be rethought.  Older 
assumptions can no longer be taken for granted. 
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In particular, in this rethinking, attention must be paid to the alterations to 
competitive conditions brought about by: 
 
 the introduction and spread of major technological changes; 
 the increasing knowledge intensity of production; 
 the opening-up of the global market place; and 
 the accelerated pace of change. 
 
The new thinking focuses on the competitive advantages to firms and countries 
brought by the creation and use of new technologies and related product and process 
innovations. This focus stands in contrast to neoclassical comparative advantage 
based on God-given resource endowments and relative costs outlined briefly in 
Chapter One. Innovation-based approaches suggest that in the long-run a country’s 
competitive advantage will be in areas where its rates of learning are higher than 
those of their competitor countries. The theory has been given some empirical testing. 
Using econometric techniques, Fagerberg, for instance, concluded that this would 
indeed be the case in the innovative clusters described, for instance, by Porter. 
 
As innovation-related analytical approaches have developed over recent years, new 
short-hand characterisations of modern Western economies have emerged.  One 
which is central here is the ‘knowledge-based’ or ‘innovation-intensive’ economy, 
another is the ‘high-technology’ economy. We employ the term ‘learning economy’ 
because it brings together much of the focus of the other epithets, but emphasises the 
nature of new competitive processes and gives the nature of the economy as a whole a 
more comprehensive description.  A learning economy is both knowledge and 
innovation-intensive and is usually technology-intensive. 
 
Note that we do not argue that the beneficial effects of improving the learning 
capacity will alone be sufficient to ensure growth in the short term. 
 
The learning and innovation-based analyses described herein are largely based around 
structural factors at work in modern economies. These factors can, and frequently are, 
in the short term overwhelmed by macroeconomic changes such as government-
determined alterations to interest rates and fiscal policy. Although there is evidence 
of increased recession resilience among innovation-rich firms, no economy can grow 
rapidly and enhance its learning capability in the face of aggressive low growth 
policies pursued by restrictionist governments or central banks. A string of interest-
rate induced recessions, for example, lowers growth regardless of the learning 
potential of firms. Thus, cross-national (and even intra-national) performance 
comparisons of learning capability need to be viewed in the light of the 
macroeconomic settings applying to the respective countries. Differences in national 
and intra-national performance will always reflect more than simple differences in 
learning and innovation activity.   
 
The point, however, is that in the long term it seems clear that the countries which 
will do well economically will be those that have rates of innovation and learning 
which are higher than those of our competitors.  The challenge for governments and 
business alike is to make sure that we maximise our chances of developing and 
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maintaining those high rates of learning and supporting our companies as they move 
towards being learning firms working in a learning economy. 
 
Similarly, it is important to recognise that in some critical areas aspects of micro-
economic reform can be very beneficial.  These areas include the provision of 
infrastructure, the encouragement of greater flexibility in labour markets, better 
energy provision etc.  However, it should be pointed put that these are facilitating 
factors only. The critical factor is the nation’s capacity to innovate and to do so on a 
continuing basis. Technology is a key, developed through R&D, information 
generating and sharing, leading to product innovation as the critical element in long 
term niche market success. 
 
 
2. Evolutionary Analysis 
 
What has  now become known as ‘evolutionary economics’ was pioneered by 
Schumpeter (1934, 1942). His central postulate was that ‘capitalism is an economic 
system characterised above all by evolutionary turmoil associated with technical and 
organisational innovation’ (Freeman, 1994: 464).  Schumpeter stressed the role of 
technological change in capitalist systems. The term ‘evolutionary’ refers to a process 
of gradual change and draws our attention to the dynamics of economic systems, 
noting especially the changes arising from ‘learning-by-doing’ which encourage 
technological shifts.  
 
Schumpeter focussed on the role of entrepreneurs in generating economic growth. He 
saw temporary monopoly profits (arising from innovation based on new knowledge) 
as providing economic incentive to innovate. Freeman and others have developed 
these ideas further into a series of propositions which are gaining wide international 
acceptance.  
 
These propositions are centred around three notions: 
 
 that innovation drives the growth of nations;  
 that the free market alone will not maximise innovation performance; 
 that policy needs to focus on generating knowledge and promoting the efficacy of 
flows of knowledge.   
 
Neoclassical tradition tends to focus on notions of equilibrium in economic activity. 
In contrast, the evolutionary approach to understanding economic growth emphasises 
the disequilibrating impact on economies generated by continuous innovation, vividly 
expressed as the ‘gales of creative destruction’ identified by Schumpeter (Pianta 
1995: 175).  
 
Evolutionary theory sees technological change as creating constant structural change 
in an economy (Tisdell 1994).  In particular, evolutionary theory recognises that firm-
level behaviour in the highly uncertain world in which enterprises must operate is 
highly variable and hence that strategies are heterogeneous, generating innovations 
on many fronts which in turn generate further innovations. In these situations, 
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successful firms use knowledge to generate new products, adapted to differentiated 
markets rather than competing solely on price. 
 
The variety in firm responses to the challenges of the market does not mean, 
however, that the processes associated with innovation are random.  On the contrary, 
they are clearly patterned. Nelson and Winter (1982) note consistent patterns in 
firms’ decision-rules, learning capabilities and responses to the external environment.  
Recognising and analysing these patterns is crucial because it is the patterns which 
make possible public policies to encourage innovation and hence speed economic 
growth. 
 
In evolutionary models of growth, competition is a driving force in growth, as it is in 
neoclassical theories. Evolutionary approaches, however, see competition as 
operating in imperfect, rather than perfect, markets characterised essentially by the 
cost, quality  and scarcity advantages gained through innovation (Metcalfe 1995, 27) 
leading to new products and services.  
 
The competition which firms engage in influences both the range of innovations 
available and the relative economic rewards flowing from different innovations. Seen 
from the ‘evolutionary’ perspective, the profitability of firms which underpins 
economic growth depends on the characteristics of what has been termed the 
‘selection environment’ surrounding decisions.  The ‘selection environment’ is 
composed of the extent to which existing technological and institutional arrangements 
support or impede the introduction of a particular innovation. The theory suggests 
that there are strong feedback loops between firm-level processes generating 
innovation and the nature of the selection environment. A successful selection 
environment is one which encourages the development of many new products by 
providing good access to new knowledge, effectively diffusing existing knowledge 
and supplying easy access to financial support, assistance with penetrating new 
markets and so on. (These ideas are explored under the heading of ‘complementary 
assets’ in other innovation-based approaches to growth - see Chapter 4). 
 
Evolutionary economists further believe that normal market mechanisms do not 
necessarily optimise the generation of the product variety necessary to avert the 
inefficiencies associated with ‘technological-lock-ins’ of the kind which in turn may 
encourage dependence on paths set by earlier innovations (Tisdell 1994). The 
existence of technological lock-ins can mean the failure of a later but superior 
innovation to survive and spread because of the entrenchment of an earlier one which 
has become the dominant design. The existing design may have come to dominate 
through chance events but barriers to market entry (such as the need for economies of 
scale or for firms to possess complementary assets, complementary products and so 
on) may ensure its survival. The classic and oft-cited example of technological lock-
in is the continued dominance of the ‘QWERTY’ keyboard7. Policy intervention may 
be necessary to encourage variety and hence efficiency (Tisdell 1994). 
 
                                                 
7 For review of the debates surrounding QWERTY and ‘path dependence’ see discussion in 
newsgroups at: http://www.eh.net/lists/eh.res/forum3/ and pkt@csf.colorado.edu. There is further 
discussion later in this paper. 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
Australia’s Industrial Structure                                                                                              7.37 
Taking an evolutionary economics perspective suggests therefore that there may be a 
role for policy makers in finding means to create an industrial environment which is 
well equipped to sponsor the profitable generation of variety, learning, creativity and 
innovation. 
 
The Industry Commission (1994: A.82) provides an interesting summary of elements 
of this literature: 
 
Some of the main insights from evolutionary economics are as follows: 
 
• inter-firm diversity (or variety, or asymmetry) is central to initiating 
the dynamic process of technological competition. In its absence, each 
firm would see the potential gains from moving by itself but would 
recognise that if all firms moved together, none could individually 
profit. None would therefore move at all unless one of them believed 
itself superior to the rest. The trigger for one to move first is the 
prospect of profit from innovation based on an asymmetric advantage. 
(Dasgupta, 1988; Silverberg, Dosi, Orsenigo, 1988 - emphasis in 
original ); 
 
• inter-firm diversity is central to maintaining the process of 
technological competition. The greater the range of performance is 
among firms, the more the survival of laggards is threatened and the 
greater are the opportunities for them to profit by playing catch-up. 
Competition is thus driven by diversity (emphasis in original); 
 
• catching-up is a time-consuming and expensive business - because 
technical knowledge is highly specific to particular lines of 
production, has significant tacit elements and calls for the 
accumulation of considerable experience before it is mastered; 
 
• the process of technological competition results in lower industry 
average costs and/or higher industry average product quality as 
uncompetitive firms are eliminated or imitate industry leaders well 
enough to be able to approximate their performance; 
 
• industry average performance will improve only until all firms have 
caught up with the industry leaders. For industry average performance 
itself to improve in the long run, at least one firm in the industry must 
be innovating successfully, at any one time; 
 
• only when continuous innovation is combined with imitation and 
selection  (weeding out the least competitive) is it possible to explain 
familiar long run patterns of differential inter-firm performance 
observed in practice (Iwai 1984). Innovation thus generates variety. 
 
In conclusion, evolutionary economics and, as suggested earlier, even some new 
neoclassical theories, confirm the centrality of innovation to economic growth in 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
Australia’s Industrial Structure                                                                                              7.38 
modern economies (OECD 1996a; Stoneman 1995; Freeman 1994; Pianta 1995; 
Samuels 1995). 
 
 
3. Models of the Innovation Process8 
 
Since innovation is now seen to play such a key role in modern economic 
development, it is clearly important to understand what both stimulates innovation 
and maintains high levels of knowledge-generation and diffusion in a given setting. 
 
The impetus to, and the process of, innovation both at firm and national levels have 
been the subject of much investigation.  Beginning from  Schumpeter (1934, 1942), 
analysts from the 1960s to the 1990s, such as Schmookler (1966), Nelson and Winter, 
(1977), Mensch (1979), Mowery and Rosenberg (1979), Roobeek (1987) and others, 
have sought to define innovation processes clearly and to explain why they are 
successful.  Conceptual advances over this period have also been directed towards the 
particular understanding of the innovation process which is needed for a more 
informed public policy in this arena (Kline and Rosenberg 1986: 285).   
 
There have been several major sets of approaches. 
 
The first, prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s, was the 'science-push' approach.  
This approach assumed that innovation was a linear process, beginning with scientific 
discovery, passing through invention, engineering and manufacturing activities and 
ending with the marketing of a new product or process.  Until the early 1980s, many 
policy makers in OECD countries and managers of major industrial companies 
accepted the view that a new product or process is the result of discoveries in basic 
science, brought to the attention of the parent organisation by its research staff for 
possible commercial applications.  In this model there are no forms of feedback.  The 
model was rapidly shown to apply only to relatively simple forms of product such as 
petrochemicals and has been largely superseded by new models, although it 
sometimes seems still to be the model lying behind aspects of public policy making in 
the research and innovation field. 
 
From the early- to mid-1960s a second linear model of innovation was adopted by 
public policy makers in advanced capitalist economies. This was the 'demand-pull' 
model.  In this model, innovations are viewed as derived from a perceived demand 
which then influences the direction and rate of technology development.  Kamien and 
Schwartz (1982: 35) argued that in this model innovations are induced by the 
departments which deal directly with their customers who indicate problems with a 
design or suggest possible new areas for investigation.  The solutions to any problems 
raised are provided by research staff.  
 
Many commentators now see both linear models of innovation as oversimplified (eg  
Steinmueller 1994: 55; Rothwell 1992).  Rothwell (1992: 222), for example, uses the 
case of the biotechnology industry to show that not only does the development of few 
products conform to science-push models but also that at an industry-wide level the 
                                                 
8 Reproduced from Rymens (1996) with kind permission of the author. 
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importance of science-push and demand-pull may vary during different phases in the 
innovation process.   
 
The third model - the ‘coupling’ model - was centred around an interaction process in 
which innovation was regarded as a ‘logically sequential, though not necessarily 
continuous process’ (Rothwell and Zegveld 1985: 50).  The emphasis in this model is 
on the feedback effects between the downstream and upstream phases of the earlier 
linear models.  The stages in the process are seen as separate but interactive.  
 
New models (the ‘fourth and fifth generation’ innovation models, as Rothwell calls 
them) have incorporated the feedback processes operating between scientific 
research, technical development and production, the simultaneity of R&D activities, 
the interactive nature of innovation processes and the interdependence among various 
actors in industrial R&D.  Innovation becomes a team effort where all aspects of 
product generation, production and marketing are tackled together. 
 
The new innovation models places great new emphasis on the importance for 
innovating firms of working both with other firms and with a range of other 
organisations.  The firm is seen as part of a broader scientific and technological 
community and as influenced by relationships with suppliers, customers, joint-
venture partners and public sector research organisations.  These sets of links have 
become increasingly central to contemporary analysis of the learning economy, as we 
shall show in detail later in this report. In this model a new emphasis is put on the 
role of governments in affecting and effecting technological change and economic 
growth. 
  
The overall pattern of the innovation process can thus be thought of as a complex 
network of communication paths. Some of these work by linking together the various 
in-house functions within a given firm in a ‘rugby tackle’ approach to developing 
new products and processes while others involve firms in developing complex 
‘intelligence gathering’ systems through collaboration in networks as described 
above.  
 
This broader perspective on how successful innovation occurs has implications for 
analysis of the industrial structure in which innovation occurs.  More specifically, it is 
likely that the importance of the set of outside relationships implies that there must be 
potential ‘partner’ firms with which to link.  This in turn suggests that a successful 
industrial structure must contain or be able to rapidly generate, these potential partner 
enterprises.  It suggests that it is important to have several good players in each sector 
and to have several flourishing sectors since these are the areas which drive 
competition. This theme is explored further in the work of Porter and others which we 
discuss in Chapter Three. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Innovation-based approaches to industrial development recognise, as do New Growth 
Theories and Strategic Trade Theory, that technical change is central to economic 
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growth. In contrast to neoclassical approaches however, innovation-based approaches 
focus on the dynamics of innovation processes. 
 
Evolutionary economists have contributed substantially to innovation-based 
perspectives on growth. They see the present era as one of accelerating, even 
revolutionary, technological change. They summarise this change as a techno-
industrial paradigm shift, which is leading to the emergence of a new international set 
of competitive conditions. New responses by firms, governments and other important 
players are therefore necessary to maintain and improve growth rates. 
 
Evolutionary economics is also significant because it recognises the importance of the 
‘selection environment’ - i.e. the factors which influence a firm’s take-up and 
commercialisation of new technology. The arrangement of institutions in the selection 
environment is important because it affects learning and marketing opportunities for 
firms.  
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Chapter Three 
 
KNOWLEDGE GENERATION, DIFFUSION AND 
USE 
 
 
1. Background 
 
Innovation involves developing communication channels for knowledge generation 
and the diffusion of economically useful information. This information flows in 
patterned ways within economies. Much flows through firms’ activities which link 
them to other firms (at home and overseas), to and from research institutions, and to 
and from government agencies. 
 
Understanding the innovating capabilities of an economy requires understanding 
these linkages and the patterns of information flow. 
 
Over recent years a number of approaches have been developed which seek to track 
and measure these patterns of communication to see how they affect innovation and 
how they are coordinated. This chapter presents the main features of these 
approaches. 
 
The chapter then looks at some of the institutional and structural determinants of the 
production and diffusion of the knowledge related to innovation. It particular it 
presents the importance of well-functioning national systems of innovation. Finally, 
the chapter indicates the constraints on the production of new knowledge which arise 
from a nation’s existing industrial structure. This is where we begin to see clearly 
why a country’s industrial structure matters. 
 
 
2. Networked Nations 
 
Recent work on linkages between firms and other institutions stresses the role of 
networks as a ‘third form’ of productive activity. Networks do not fit the traditional 
economic approaches which focus on individual firms with clear boundaries or 
transactions between firms operating in a purely buy-sell relationship with each other. 
Networked relationships are created by firms forging various kinds of inter-
organisational links which are different from those of simple agreements on market 
sharing to limit competition. There are several kinds of networked relationships 
which we describe below. 
 
The factors determining inter-firm cooperation are highly complex and can vary 
according to the perspective of the analyst at any one time.  It maybe useful to 
consciously view the relationships within which firms are embedded in an economy 
through several rather than just one analytical ‘lens’.  This approach allows analysis 
of different kinds of networked relationships and through these, different views of the 
associated dynamics. 
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The following three analytical ‘lenses’ allow the different knowledge flows and 
network dynamics to be explored:  
 
 links between firms operating in a chain or web;  
 links between firms as they appear in clusters; and 
 links between firms, between firms and government and between these players 
and public sector research and training institutions to see how all these players 
form ‘complexes’.   
 
Using each of these lenses to view what is happening in particular industries can 
highlight areas of concern which do not appear if only one approach is taken. 
 
 
(a) Three Views of Networked Economies: Chains, Clusters and Complexes 
 
(i) Chains 
 
The notion of production ‘chains’ or webs (filieres) as used here arose from the work 
of two French economists, Bauer and Cohen (1981), who analysed the French 
economy as a series of groups rather than the single firms they appeared at first sight 
to be. The combination into groups became known as chains/ filieres. Gradually, this 
notion gained more common currency as a useful way of viewing the functioning of 
other OECD nations. Its use is commonplace in some forms of business analysis.  
 
Chains have usually been examined in the context of particular client-supplier links. 
However, the notion of chains has now developed more broadly so that each industry 
or industrial sector can be considered as a chain.  Areas included in these chains of 
production are broader than the traditional economic notions of an industry.  They run 
from the suppliers of raw materials (primary sector) through the companies involved 
in the manufacturing process to the enterprises servicing manufacturing needs and the 
retailers distributing the final product - often in different industries altogether.  It has 
now become commonplace in Europe to talk of the electronic chain, the automotive 
chain or the textiles chain (see, for instance, Walsh 1988; Penner 1990). 
 
These chains thus cut across the traditional divisions of activities into primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors. Although the primary purpose of the chain ‘lens’ is to 
highlight what is happening in the ‘ribs’ of an economy, their analysis requires a 
focus on the links across as well as within these sectors.  Many of these links are 
coordinated by large, leading firms.  Strong chains may also generate clusters of firms 
cooperating at links in the chain and so generate stronger innovation networks which 
in turn may ‘leak’ across into other sectors and encourage innovation there. An 
example might be that of a group of engineering firms which provide some output to 
the automotive sector and which have their competencies upgraded across-the-board 
due to the demands placed on them by their automotive clients. They in turn pass 
their skills on to their suppliers in other sectors through the demands they impose. 
 
Using the ‘chain’ lens highlights relationships rather than seeing industries in an 
economy as just a series of price-mediated markets. The approach shows how in each 
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chain the operations of the different units carrying out productive activities are 
shaped and constrained by their links with others in the chain, and sheds light on the 
interactions which public policymakers may need to take into account. 
 
Using the ‘chain’ lens focuses attention on the coordination mechanisms at work in 
major areas of an economy.  These are frequently not ‘market’ mechanisms as 
normally understood.  In France, for example, this coordination has often been 
achieved through direct and indirect ownership links, sometimes led by state-owned 
and private banks (such as Paribas) as well as through close links between business 
and government leaders and officials. In other countries, such as Germany, 
coordination is often achieved by interlocking directorships which serve to bring 
together the financial and manufacturing sectors.  In Japan, in the automotive industry 
for instance, it is ensured both through ownership links into keiretsu and through the 
management technologies such as Just-in-Time (JIT) production which force supplier 
firms to adopt technologies mandated by lead firms. Indeed, supplier firms must 
adapt most aspects of their productive organisation to the needs of their large, 
dominant clients because of the emphasis on co-design and co-manufacture and/or on 
particular quality standards or delivery routines which may involve extensive 
production and supply improvements in return for long term contracts (Gorgeu and 
Mathieu 1988 and 1989; Marceau and Jureidini 1989).   
 
Coordination of chains does not necessarily have to be undertaken by manufacturers 
since chains may cross several sectors.  Work by Senker(1988) in the UK on 
supermarkets and by Greig (1990, 1992) on the clothing industry in Australia has also 
shown that coordination is increasingly achieved via major retailers such as Marks 
and Spencer and Coles Myer rather than by manufacturers.  This may be achieved by 
retailers’ insistence on Quick Response, JIT technologies, or via the demands of 
particular decisions taken by retailers in terms of quality and market niches. 
 
 
(ii) Clusters 
 
In relation to innovation one may distinguish two kinds of linked or nodal activity 
known as clusters.  The first concerns the way in which innovations themselves 
cluster together and how one key invention might lead to a whole stream of new 
products.  Interest in the clustering of innovations was generated by DeBresson’s 
work on the cluster of innovations which surrounded the invention of the Canadian 
snowmobile. DeBresson showed that there were processes at work that made it likely 
that once one innovation had been set in train others were likely to follow.  This 
aspect of innovative activity shows a high degree of technological ‘path dependence’ 
which is discussed further below. Some path dependence can be very beneficial since 
innovating clusters can gain strength and lead on to further innovations, strengthening 
industries. Encouraging exploitation of clusters of innovation could be one goal of 
public policy. 
 
The second, more usual and more important sense in which innovation relates to 
clusters, concerns the ways in which firms with similar interests often grow by 
clustering together. In his influential work, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 
(1990), Porter puts together the vast body of international work carried out by his 
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team in the 1980s on the role played by a nation’s economic environment, institutions 
and policies in the competitive success of firms in particular industries in that country 
and particularly the role played by clusters of firms and activities in generating 
national economic success. 
 
Porter made a critical shift in the language used: that from comparative to competitive 
advantage.  He demonstrated both that it is competitive not comparative advantage 
which makes industrial countries dynamic and that manufacturing advantage is 
indeed manufactured. While it is the success of individual firms which in Porter’s 
view leads to the competitive advantage of nations, he emphasises that such success 
is more usually generated in clusters of activity than by isolated firms seeking to 
work alone. 
 
Porter followed Piore and Sabel’s original work (1984) on the production systems of 
what has become known as the ‘Third Italy’.  Their work indicated for the first time 
that firms could achieve international success through a form of organisation different 
from the large scale hierarchies of the firms such as Ford which the world had come 
to see as the dominant model. Far from this ‘Fordist’ form being the necessary means 
to export success, Piore and Sabel showed that small and medium-sized firms 
organised into what Porter called ‘clusters’ and what Piore and Sabel, following 
Marshall, named ‘industrial districts’ could be equally successful in national and 
international competition.  In these clusters, highly specialised firms, which were 
often in fierce competition with each other, also collaborated and innovated as 
mechanisms for their success.   
 
Work done by teams working with Porter in different countries of the world in the 
1980s found that clusters, which included both large and small firms, could be found 
in dynamic regions in many fields in many nations, including the tile industry in 
Spain, furniture in Denmark, knitwear and ceramics in Italy.  Very recent work in 
Denmark by Dalum (1995), a member of the Danish Porter team, has shown how 
such success could also be seen in non-traditional industries such as radio-
telecommunications. The existence of such competing/collaborating clusters of 
enterprises can be seen as one major element of national economic success. 
 
This work has suggested to many subsequent analysts that public action may be 
needed to encourage embryo clusters of the kind he describes as leading to success in 
countries which do not have strong existing clusters. 
 
Networking their activities in clusters is not, however, the only factor accounting for 
firms’ success as analysed by Porter.  Porter identifies four major sets of broader 
conditions which must be fulfilled if clusters of such firms are to succeed in 
international competition.   
 
These four factors he conceptualises as a ‘diamond’.  The four ‘corners’ of the 
diamond are:  
 
 factor conditions - the nation’s possession of factors of production such as 
adequate amounts of skilled labour, capital stock, knowledge resources and 
infrastructure; 
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 the nature of home demand, rather than world demand, for a product or service, 
and particularly the presence of demanding users; 
 
 the presence of related and supporting industries that are also internationally 
competitive; 
 
 firm strategy, structure and rivalry - the conditions governing how companies are 
created, organised and managed and the nature (intensity) of domestic rivalry.   
 
Crucially, the different elements of the diamond constitute a mutually-reinforcing 
system so that the effect of one is contingent on the state of the others.  Porter 
explains how the mutually reinforcing system works in practice when he says: 
 
Benefits flow forward, backward and horizontally. Aggressive rivalry in one 
industry tends to spread to others in the cluster, through the exercise of 
bargaining power, spin-offs and related diversification.  Entry from other 
industries within the cluster spurs upgrading by stimulating diversity in 
R&D approaches...Information flows freely and innovation diffuses rapidly 
through the conduits of suppliers and customers...Interconnections within the 
cluster...lead to new ways of competing and entirely new opportunities. 
(1990: 151). 
 
Porter’s initial analysis did not specifically suggest a significant role for government 
and allocated little importance to technological capability, although some of his later 
work does suggest a role for public policy in generating competitive advantage.   
 
Porter’s work made clear that geographical proximity matters, as do high levels of 
trust and a socio-legal framework which encourages horizontal 
collaboration/competition rather than vertical integration. 
 
Porter’s studies thus show that: 
 
 a country’s competitive advantage in the long run will be in areas where its rates 
of learning are higher than those of competitor countries;  
 
 firms can be organised on collaborative lines as well as competitive ones and that 
such networked relationships are often those that mark the successful firm; 
 
 countries tend to develop competitive advantages in areas where there are many 
advanced domestic users.  
 
Importantly, Porter’s model is that of absolute rather than the comparative advantage 
as understood by neoclassical theory, both at the firm and the country level. 
 
 
(iii) Complexes  
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Since Porter wrote his book in 1990 a group of European and Australian analysts and, 
independently, some American observers, have been developing the notion of 
industrial ‘complexes’. This perspective is similar to Porter’s but broader in that it 
analyses the workings of an economy in terms of the functioning of its constituent 
industrial ‘complexes’. ‘Complexes’ include players which Porter did not group 
together, but which are especially important not only in small countries such as 
Australia, but also even in the USA.  
 
The ‘complexes’ framework suggests that critical areas of a national economy’s 
operations can be seen as crucially shaped by the interaction between four sets of 
players (for analytical purposes firms are divided into users and producers in a given 
area):  
 
 user firms; 
 producer firms 
 government regulators; and  
 public sector research and training institutions.  
 
‘Complexes’ are networks of relationships between four groups of actors.  The 
relationships among these players which are central to a country’s capacity for 
innovation.  Together the actors and their interconnections represent a bargaining 
arena and a forum for the exchange of information.  Their functioning may be 
analysed by analysing the strength of the relationships and the information flows 
among players.  
 
Observers using the ‘complex’ lens can view the flows of information among all the 
major players in a sector of activity and assess the extent to which flows are 
adequately balanced between each set of players and see whether existing or 
proposed regulation is appropriate and affects all sets of players as intended or 
whether action is needed to redress imbalances.   
 
A ‘properly functioning’ complex could be defined as one in which there are active 
communication channels which allow participants to benefit fully from the expertise 
available within the complex and associated innovations (Glatz and van Tulder 1989). 
It can also be seen as one where collective problems are quickly recognised and 
rectified. 
 
The networks in complexes usually involve both large and small firms.  They may be 
hierarchical and organised principally as networks of control (monopsony), as 
networks of influence (oligopsony), or as networks of competition or of flexible 
specialisation (egalitarian relationships among all players).  They may behave 
differently and may have different potential in each case.  The relations between 
players within the complex are a mixture of those created by formalised markets and 
those developed through informal cooperation. 
 
An example of a complex is the health sector, which is an important industry in most 
OECD countries. 
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The Health Complex 
 
       
 Producers (Firms)     Users 
 
 Pharmaceuticals      Hospitals 
 Medical Instruments     Patients 
 & Devices 
 
 
  
 Formal Knowledge      Govt Regulators 
 Providers                
 
 Medical schools      Regulators (drugs 
 Univ. Science Depts     doctors, etc.) 
 Hospital Research     Medical Payments System  
 N H  &  M R C      Standards, etc.  
  
 
 
 
In most countries the ‘health complex’ is not organised as an innovation complex. On 
the contrary, regulators are most concerned with costs, payments systems and safety. 
Hospitals seldom think of themselves as having a ‘demanding user’ status in relation 
to the producers of the goods and services they use; medical schools focus on medical 
training in relation to particular aspects of patient care; medical researchers often pass 
over local firms when developing new product ideas. Producers seldom focus on users 
when developing products because of the users’ focus on payments systems, cost and 
quantity.  
 
In this situation, refocussing the eyes of the players so that they can see their roles as 
active participants in an innovation system may allow them to add extra dimensions to 
their activity which do not detract from the ‘main game’. If, for example, regulators 
thought less about cost reduction over the short term and considered the long term 
implications of present policies, they may be able to work more closely with users, 
producers and research institutions to develop cost-cutting technologies which also 
improve patient care. If hospitals considered themselves as ‘demanding users’, they 
may also inculcate different attitudes into the producers, encouraging innovations in 
different aspects of patient care.  
 
The kind of complexes found in an economy is very much a function of the identities 
and power of the principal actors.  If, for example, one firm is too dominant, that 
actor’s presence and dominance may distort the functioning of the complex as a 
communication system by dominating the agenda of research institutions and 
adversely affecting local practices of sharing information and of collaboration.  
Similarly, if government regulators are too specific in their demands they may distort 
the activities of firms as the latter seek to comply with rules that leave them too little 
space to experiment. 
 
Analysis of complexes indicates a positive role for government in development, a role 
which extends beyond the simple provision of infrastructure to encompass the 
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provision of more appropriate regulation and research and training systems.  The 
analysis also more strongly emphasises the importance of technology, and of firms 
and organisations using technology at the cutting edge, than does the Porter approach.  
 
In applying the concept to see whether particular complexes are functioning to their 
full potential or whether they need policy attention, analysts need to assess the degree 
of development and cohesion of any complex in an economy by examining:  
 
 the degree of its internationalisation, including the extent to which products from 
the complex are exported and that to which key players are either located outside 
the country of the complex or are controlled by players from abroad;  
 
 the ways in which the actors are linked together by forward and backward 
integration within any given range of demand or field of activity, such as energy, 
medical services or transport or basic research;  
 
 the ways in which all actors are embedded in a defined set of state authorities and 
other regional, national and local bodies such as trade unions and chambers of 
commerce;  
 
 the degree to which the complex is a major site for innovation (Glatz and van 
Tulder 1989; Ruigrok and van Tulder 1993; Marceau 1994). 
 
All countries have complexes but smaller countries have fewer large ones, making it 
especially important that those which are present function well.  Moreover, the 
complexes on which past national prosperity has been built may become fragile.  In 
some cases, existing complexes may have developed only weak links between all 
players or strong links only between two or three of the players, reducing the 
development potential of the complex.  In these situations, appropriate public policy 
action may be needed to create links or re-balance information flows and 
collaborative practices and encourage greater investment in new technologies, new 
markets and the like.  
 
The notions of ‘chains’, ‘clusters’ and ‘complexes’ outlined above are analytical tools 
for viewing the functioning of linkages in an economy. The linkages themselves are 
part of the institutional arrangements of national innovation systems. 
 
 
3. The Generators of Innovation: Firms and their National 
 Support Systems 
 
It has recently been internationally recognised that innovation does not occur 
randomly but is a function of a broader institutional system. It has become clear that 
networked relationships in the form of chains, clusters and/or complexes operate in 
the broader context of, and are essentially shaped by, what has come to be known as a 
National Innovation System (NIS). The characteristics of a nation’s NIS shape the 
possibilities for interaction open to the firms operating in the chains, clusters and 
complexes of an economy. The NIS approach to understanding the particular 
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innovative practices of an economy focuses on the configuration of flows of 
knowledge within that economy.   
 
A national innovation system is constituted by a country’s institutions, organisations 
and the resulting inter-relationships which come into play in the production, diffusion 
and use of new and existing economically useful knowledge.  
 
The OECD describes the importance of a national innovation system as follows, 
saying that: 
 
...as there is an increasing number of institutions with specialised knowledge 
of very different kinds, the ability to access different sources of knowledge 
and to apply these to their own needs becomes crucial for the innovativeness 
of firms. It is the configuration of these institutions and the [resulting] flows 
of knowledge which characterise different national systems of innovation and 
underlie the innovative performance of countries. (1996b: 3).  
 
We have mentioned that the strands of economics deriving from the work of 
Schumpeter and the later evolutionary theorists all emphasise ‘technology as a major 
force in the transformation of economic systems’ (Samuels 1995). The recognition 
that innovation is not random but systemic provided the next step in the analysis of 
what firms actually do when innovating in both product and process and hence, why 
some nations seem to be better at innovating successfully than are others.   
 
Recognition of the systemic nature of innovation has led in the 1990s to international 
work on national systems of innovation as part of the search for the sources of 
national competitive advantage. 
 
The NIS approach suggests that innovation is both more frequent and better managed, 
leading to more substantial national competitive advantage, when the elements of the 
broader environment surrounding firms’ activities are well articulated into a system 
of information sharing, than in situations where each element works largely in 
isolation. 
 
The elements of the systems studied in OECD member nations include the innovation 
activities carried out by institutions of government and other public sector bodies, 
notably universities and other science-intensive institutions, and the different players 
in the private sector. A national innovation system thus includes public policies 
which encourage innovation, as well as the funds invested both in public and private 
sectors and the inter-relations between players in both sectors. 
 
The earliest discussion of national innovation systems appears in the work of 
Friedrich List.  List’s emphasis on a government role in the development of 
productive resources arose as an alternative to Adam Smith’s (1776) focus on free-
market exchange and allocative efficiency.  List went beyond analysis of perfect 
markets and ‘emphasised the infrastructure and institutions which contribute to the 
development of productive forces through the creation and distribution of knowledge’ 
(OECD 1996a: 11).  However, it was not until Freeman’s work on Japan, published in 
1987, that the term ‘national innovation system’ was employed.   
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Freeman began his work on national systems of innovation in the mid-1980s as a 
result of observing the post-war economic success of Japan.  He argued that much of 
Japan’s industrial success was the outcome of a well-oiled mix of public and private 
institutions which exchanged information and jointly developed a policy framework 
which maximised the chances of success of private sector firms. 
 
Freeman’s initial work was taken up and re-examined in relation to other western 
economies, and some of the newly industrialising economies of Asia, by two groups 
of economists.  The first was led by Lundvall who is Professor of Economics at the 
University of Aalborg, Denmark, and a consultant to the OECD. 
 
The second group of contributors in this field has been led by Nelson (1959; 1993 
and elsewhere) and Rosenberg (eg 1982), who emphasise the economics of scientific 
research, technology, institutions and national innovation systems. The focus on 
national innovation systems has derived from the view that, despite great increases in 
the rate at which company operations in many fields are internationalising, it is still 
nations which remain vitally important for generating economic growth. 
 
As was mentioned above, this is because it is nations which almost always design 
policies for the infrastructure and local environment which underpin economic 
development.  This environment includes the rules governing the activity of almost 
all the critical elements of the business system - the financial system, the public 
policymaking system, the education and training system, the research system and 
such areas as the tax system and environmental controls and other regulation. The 
national innovation system is one area where national governments have considerable 
influence.   
 
National innovation systems have usually emerged principally through the everyday 
action and interaction of the major players in an economic structure without much 
conscious guidance from public and private decision-makers.  Despite the lack of 
design, a nation’s system of innovation has clear effects on the development of the 
economy.  This is partly because changes in an economy are cumulative and path-
dependent (see below) and existing institutional arrangements may reinforce existing 
directions, and partly because if there are gaps in either the productive structure or the 
research infrastructure, potential opportunities are not recognised or cannot be taken 
up. 
 
There is active international interest in the analysis and measurement of the 
effectiveness of different national innovation systems. A major program is currently 
under way under the auspices of the OECD, for example.  Work available from the 
OECD program is incorporated into the following sections of this chapter. 
 
OECD and other work has indicated that any NIS is constrained by the underlying 
industrial structure of an economy.  A ‘patchy’ industrial structure, for instance, 
where firms have few potential innovation partners and where public sector research 
is linked only to a few companies or industries, breaks down the effectiveness of 
linkages within the national innovation system. 
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4. Path Dependence, Cumulative Change and Industrial 
 Structure 
 
Recent work suggests that there are serious limitations on innovation which derive 
from past practices and existing industrial structures which impact of the efficacy of a 
national innovation system. 
 
There is now considerable international evidence which shows that national 
economies develop along lines which grow out of, and hence closely follow, the 
activities that were present at earlier stages of the process. This is known as ‘path 
dependence’. Path dependence suggests that future industrial development options are 
embedded in current industrial structures and processes. Change is cumulative. It is 
influenced by forces such as ‘learning-by-doing’ and by the presence or absence of 
‘complementary assets’, which enable information about new products and processes 
to be absorbed by firms and so improve their capacity to produce, finance and market 
these effectively. The current industrial mix of a country substantially determines the 
path of skill development and the sorts of complementary assets available to firms.  
 
David (1985, 1986, 1993) and Arthur (1989, 1994) have explored the notion of path 
dependence in some detail. David’s classic study is the emergence of the dominance 
of the QWERTY keyboard9. However, he also discovered the same phenomenon in 
the electric light and power supply industries. Arthur has focused on the increasing 
returns to scale that can be obtained from cumulative acceptance of a particular 
product or standard. This can effectively freeze rivals out of a market and can 
generate positive feedback loops with increasing innovation levels around the product 
as it gains acceptance.  
 
In this way a head start, combined with very rapid market penetration or capture of 
the national or international standard, can lead to market dominance for many years. 
But the importance of the head start is greater for more knowledge intensive 
industries than others because they are the ones best able to benefit from the ‘network 
externalities’ that often surround such industries10 and these are the ones where 
standards are not yet set. 
 
Path dependence is a technological and industrial process that can be gainfully 
exploited, as in the example of the cluster of innovations derived from the technology 
behind the snowmobile as described by DeBresson and mentioned previously.  A 
small shift in policy to encourage given industries can also eventually create new and 
cumulative development paths, as Branstetter (1996) has indicated. 
 
The path-dependent nature of much technological change can, however, create 
problems as it may lead both firms and nations towards over-specialisation. 
                                                 
9 This was mentioned previously. The important factor in the debates over path dependence is not (as is 
the case in debates regarding QWERTY) whether an inferior technology dominates a superior one, but 
whether, through marketing, distribution, scale economies or standard-setting, a product can dominate 
its market and drive out rivals on a near-permanent basis. 
10 A network externality exists when the value of an innovation rises more rapidly as the number of 
users of the innovation rises - i.e. there is a premium in the return for such innovation because demand 
will rise if there are more other users. Examples would include local area networks or fax machines. 
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Overspecialisation may reduce a nation’s capacity to invent or adopt new 
technologies or generate activities in a new area. A current situation where there is 
little manufacturing, for example, reduces the likelihood of human capital investment 
in many forms of engineering and thus the capacity of existing firms to review their 
capabilities or take up new opportunities.  Similarly, a situation where few firms are 
involved in manufacturing narrows the opportunities for future entrepreneurs to gain 
experience in the manufacturing field in the course of their pre-entrepreneurial 
careers.  This lack of opportunity for manufacturing experience in turn reduces the 
likelihood that entrepreneurs will invest in manufacturing enterprise because research 
suggests that most new entrepreneurs invest in areas in which they have had some 
career experience (see eg Marceau 1984). 
 
 
(a) Technological Specialisation 
 
There has been increasing interest in the ways in which countries are specialising 
their production and the implications of such specialisation patterns. Some of this 
technological specialisation can be positive for a nation’s economic development.  
Thus, for instance, a country strongly specialised in agriculture and food product 
exports may also specialise in machinery for agriculture and food production and 
from this base develop new engineering products and a specialist export capacity 
which in turn feeds into the further development of the economy.  This is the case 
with several Nordic countries, notably Sweden and Finland which both industrialised 
successfully and became open exporting economies from the natural resource base 
constituted by their forest and forest-based industries (Ahonen 1995).  
 
The Nordic countries’ successful transition is said to have occurred in part because 
export-oriented manufacturing firms were always competent and demanding so that 
knowledge has long been fed back from those firms to their suppliers in a process 
which has fuelled innovation in the machinery sector.  In this case, the purchase of 
domestic technology by an internationally competitive sector has pushed the suppliers 
to that purchaser to be themselves internationally competitive. This creates a virtuous 
circle.  Successful change has been pushed along the production chains by the core 
firms making the new demands.  Furthermore, the NIS in which this activity took 
place has permitted or encouraged the release of the full productive potential of the 
networks concerned.  In the Nordic countries, for example, the presence of industry-
level training institutions, responsive financial markets and a strong industry-oriented 
research system seem to have been most important (Ahonen 1995) 
 
Analysts such as Dalum in Denmark have developed databases which show that small 
countries tend to be more technologically specialised than do large ones (1995).  This 
may be a source of weakness.  Some authors warn of the potential dangers of over-
specialisation.  Marceau (1996), for instance, suggests that, given what we know of 
the processes of effective innovation, nations should not let their industrial bases 
become too narrow.  A reasonably diversified economy seems necessary for long-
term growth because if firms usually move only in small steps from their existing 
activities, as appears to be the case, an economy must, in the absence of specific 
policies for new industrial development, have many firms operating in different areas 
so as to maximise opportunities for the generation and take-up of innovations.  
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(b) Knowledge Accumulation and Path Dependence 
 
The above discussion of technological dependence tends to apply also to the way in 
which whole industries innovate. Specialisation/change tends to be cumulative, rather 
than taking off in completely new directions unless there is some exogenous ‘shock’ 
to the economy or some specific public policy action to intervene and change the 
course of the process, as seems to have occurred in the fast developing nations of 
Asia. 
 
There are five mechanisms behind this path dependence: 
 
 the importance of user-producer interaction in product and process innovation; 
 
 the ways in which knowledge is disseminated in an economy; 
 
 the capabilities which underpin innovation which are more likely to build closely 
on each other than to start afresh in uncharted waters; 
 
 a tendency for firms to stick to their core business, which implies both risks and 
limitations; 
 
 feedback loops and cumulative learning leading to consistent processes which 
transform innovation into long-lasting specific patterns of change. 
 
These factors operate together and mean that a country’s future industrial trajectory 
depends greatly on its current industrial structure and, in turn, on its previous 
structure.  As Dodgson (1996: 21) notes: ‘history matters and what you do today 
depends in large part upon what you did in the past’.   
 
There are other reasons too why industrial structure influences what a country can do 
‘next’. Innovation is mostly incremental rather than radical and often involves finding 
new uses for established possibilities and components and using existing knowledge 
to combine activities in new ways. It is, contrary to popular opinion, infrequently a 
matter of entirely new invention. Innovation usually derives from existing learning 
processes which in turn are substantially dependent on existing routine activities.  
This means that innovation must be ‘rooted in the prevailing economic structure’ 
(Lundvall 1992: 8 and 9).  
 
Most knowledge generation is thus ‘cumulative and integrative’. Cumulative 
knowledge arises because ‘today’s advances lay the basis for tomorrow’s, which in 
turn lay the basis for the next round. The integrative aspect of the production of 
knowledge means that new knowledge is selectively applied and integrated into 
existing systems to create new systems’ (Teubal et al. 1996: 8). Knowledge is both an 
output from and an input to its own creation. In this context, it is easy to see that 
innovation is - or can be - a continuous process rather than an isolated event and that 
it usually proceeds along already defined - though not necessarily predictable - paths. 
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These characteristics of knowledge suggest that the generation of new knowledge is 
dependent on easy access to the existing knowledge stock. Hence, technological 
opportunity and economic performance will be based in part on the rapid diffusion of 
knowledge. 
 
The cumulative nature of learning therefore leads to path dependent technological 
and industrial development.  This path dependence involves the development of 
interconnected relationships and clusters of activity.  Systemic synergies arise which 
lead to areas of competitive strength and export specialisation. These clusters of 
mutually reinforcing relations provide opportunities for developing new 
competencies, particularly through user-producer interactions in the home market 
(Anderson et al. 1981, quoted Lundvall 1992). 
 
The cumulative nature of learning and the associated path dependence of much 
industrial development links back to concerns about whether free trade is always 
beneficial to an economy’s chances of sustained economic growth. In their 
investigation of the links between cumulative technological change and trade, Dosi, 
Pavitt and Soete (1990) examine the economic effects of relaxing some of the 
orthodox trade assumptions of non-increasing returns to scale and the absence of 
externalities. They argue that the cumulative and partly local nature of technological 
change, the widespread existence of static and dynamic economies of scale, the 
existence of technological gaps between firms and nations and the importance of 
other country-specific factors allow for either advantageous or disadvantageous 
outcomes from trade. 
 
The structure of an economy matters here.  This is because different industrial 
structures have different potential in such areas as scale economies, technical 
progress, learning-by-doing, division of labour, etc. which may result in either 
virtuous or vicious development circles in the long run (Dosi et al 1990: 249). The 
results of these circles may outweigh any short term allocative efficiency advantages 
derived from free-trade. This implies that, for example, a country with an industrial 
structure specialised in low-knowledge intensive activities may develop further in 
that direction under free-trade, reinforcing the disadvantages of specialising in 
activities yielding few external benefits. Free trade with an inappropriate industrial 
structure may be harmful. 
 
This analysis suggests that: 
 
 Innovation involves dynamic processes which usually appear as incremental 
shifts rather than radical changes of direction. If radical changes are needed, 
policies for industrial development must be developed. These should aim to:  
 
 create positive cycles of development based on the sponsorship of firms 
and industries generating external benefits; and 
 avoid over-specialisation and the creation/entrenchment/exacerbation of a 
‘patchy’ or low-knowledge industrial structure. 
 
 Any policies which aim to move a country towards a more innovation-driven 
industrial structure will also require recognition by government that: 
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 the market mechanism on its own may not maximise innovation and 
growth; and 
 globalisation does not eradicate the benefits of national industry policies. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The focus on innovation as a driver of growth invites the analyst to consider further 
the ways in which innovation occurs. It has become clear that much depends on the 
ways in which firms interact with other firms and with the institutions which make up 
the broader framework within which innovation occurs. The literature canvasses 
different ways of looking at these interlinkages. Each approach permits an analysis of 
the different aspects of a what is often a dense and complex set of relationships which 
do not show up in more conventional paradigms. 
 
 This brings one again to consider how innovative activities are stimulated, promoted 
or constrained. It is clear from recent work that one reason why countries vary in their 
capacity to innovate is that influences on innovation are systemic. National 
institutional differences come together to compose ‘national systems of innovation’. 
These national systems of innovation are composed of relationships among firms 
themselves, which one may consider the ‘glue’ of the system, but also of broader 
institutions such as government rules, public sector research and training 
organisations, labour relations, publicly available infrastructure and so on. These are 
important because particular systems can either constrain opportunities open to firms 
or successfully stimulate new activity. 
 
The functioning of a national innovation system is limited by past practices and 
existing industrial structures. This is because what happened in the past determines, 
to a considerable extent, present opportunities unless strategic policies are 
implemented to shift the direction of development. 
 
Because of the workings of their national innovation systems, countries specialise 
technologically and seem not to converge as much as has often been thought. Some 
specialisation can be positive for economic development and can lead to the 
development of new capacities. In contrast, over-specialisation can be a problem, 
especially if it involves low-tech activities. 
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Chapter Four  
 
THE LEARNING ECONOMY 
 
 
1. Background  
 
Chapters two and three outlined contemporary approaches to the understanding of 
processes of innovation and economic development in modern Western countries. 
These have led away from neoclassical emphases on perfect competition as the ideal 
or even naturally occurring form of company behaviour. 
 
In this chapter, we consider the most recent international research on the kind of 
economy which analysts, both at national and intergovernmental levels, are 
suggesting is emerging and which many suggest contains the keys to continuous 
growth in the future.  
 
This is increasingly known as the ‘learning economy’. The learning economy refers 
to the processes of use of knowledge and its incorporation into innovation as the basis 
of competition. 
 
Similarly, the ‘learning firm’ is very different from the neoclassical firm which has 
clear boundaries, produces standardised and homogeneous products for an ‘atomistic’ 
market and faces a disincentive to share information because such knowledge sharing 
can confer a cost-advantage on a competitor. In contrast, learning firms, although still 
constrained by issues of scale and cost are ‘obsessed by building non-price 
competitive advantage’ from creative use of information whose cost is rapidly 
decreasing with the ongoing information technology revolution’ (Guinet in OECD 
1996:209). 
 
This chapter therefore follows from the broad outline of innovation processes and the 
generators of innovation which were described in the preceding section to indicate the 
contours of a learning economy.  It focuses on the importance of having an economy 
which can maximise the learning capacity of its constituent parts.  To make clear the 
issues, we look at different conceptions of knowledge, its production and 
transmission.  
 
In a steady state system, firms often focus on the allocation of their existing 
resources.  In contrast, Pasinetti (1981, quoted Lundvall 1996), for example, asserts 
that, in a system marked by accelerating change, attention by firms to the allocation 
of their existing resources is of only secondary importance. Indeed, he suggests that 
firms which concentrate exclusively on resource allocation among existing activities 
will not survive in the long-run since technologies, preferences and institutions are in 
a state of flux and are continually being reshaped, making current assumptions 
unrealistic.   
 
To enable effective responses to emerging challenges and the associated new 
opportunities and to manage the increasing turbulence of their environment, both 
firms and nations now need to have learning strategies in place. 
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2. Knowledge and Learning 
 
Learning involves the acquisition of knowledge.  Knowledge is a collective asset that 
is generated and shared both within individual organisations and through networks of 
relationships, some of which involve formal linkages between ‘networked firms’. 
 
Knowledge is a concept broader than that of information.  Information can be broken 
down into bits and transported through information infrastructures such as 
telecommunications. Knowledge, in contrast, involves understanding the significance 
of information and its reorganisation into useful applications.  Because of this, the 
concept of knowledge includes a skills component as a central element.  
 
Learning, or the process of acquiring knowledge, is therefore broader than the process 
of accessing increasing amounts of information.  Learning is a process of building 
competencies.  
 
The concept of a ‘learning economy’ therefore extends beyond that of an 
‘information society’ and is not synonymous with a high-tech society, or a science-
based economy.  It is also a flexible and adaptive economy. In a learning economy, 
learning is undertaken by all levels of staff in a company since the use of knowledge 
is not confined to those who are highly trained.  In a learning economy, old ideas 
become quickly obsolete and new ideas are in high demand.  All participants must 
therefore have the capacity to learn and to do so effectively. 
 
Knowledge generation and acquisition are concepts which are more complex than 
they first appear.  This is because knowledge is of several kinds.  According to 
Lundvall (1996) four kinds of knowledge are important to understanding the learning 
economy: 
 
 know-what, which  is knowledge about facts.  Know-what is information that can 
be broken down into bits and easily codified; 
 
 know-why, which is knowledge about principles and laws - it reduces the 
frequency of errors in technological trials; 
 
 know-how, which is skills, the capability to undertake a given task successfully; 
 
 know-who, which is information about who knows what and who knows how to 
do what. 
  
 The first two kinds of knowledge, know-what and know-why, are those which are  
closest to traditional concepts of science. 
  
 It is important that know-how should be an attribute of staff at all levels. In the past, 
know-how has typically been developed and kept in-house but the increasing 
complexity of the knowledge base has greatly encouraged the development of 
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cooperation through industrial networks. Possession of, and the capacity to share 
know-how effectively must become part of all levels of an enterprise. 
  
Know-who involves the social capability to gain expertise through relationships with 
skilled individuals and specialised groups, the classic view of networking. 
 
Different kinds of knowledge are absorbed and mastered through different channels.  
Codified knowledge - know-what and know-why - can be accessed as information in 
books, lectures and data-bases.  Information technology, permitting the development 
of information-sharing mechanisms such as electronic bulletin boards, has reached a 
point where scientists world-wide can now share codified knowledge in real time.  To 
some extent, know-what and know-why are now sometimes considered the least 
valuable forms of knowledge in a commercial context because they are widely 
available and easily transmitted. 
 
Know-how and know-who, in contrast, involve tacit knowledge which is not easily 
transmitted. Tacit knowledge derives primarily from practical experience and from 
social interaction. Know-how is passed on through means such as apprenticeships, 
field work, laboratory work and case training. Know-how also involves learning-by-
doing and interaction with experts. Efforts to codify know-how, for example through 
computerised systems that simulate the minds of experts, have met with limited 
success.  
 
Most advances in know-how also involve elements of know-who. Know-who is 
learned in social interaction with peers and colleagues and increasingly develops in 
day-to-day, long term dealings with suppliers and customers. Clearly, know-who is 
least easily quantified through market signals such as price and depends most on 
networks of relationships.  The economic value of know-who depends critically on 
proximity to the persons concerned in most cases because of the tacit nature of the 
knowledge tapped. 
 
The commercial importance of tacit knowledge was recognised in 1974 in a famous 
paper by Gibbons and Johnston.  It has recently been emphasised again in a study of 
the development of three new science-based technologies - parallel processing, 
biotechnology and industrial ceramics - by Senker and Faulkner.  (See Senker and 
Faulkner (1994)) 
 
Faulkner and Senker show not only how important tacit knowledge is to successful 
innovation, but also the importance of both the surrounding institutional structure and 
customer firm capabilities in building knowledge.  They further indicate that the 
relative importance of different aspects of knowledge production varies over time and 
technology. They show, for instance, how university research knowledge was 
critically important in the development of biotechnology and parallel computing.  
They also show, however, that for industrial ceramics, research was important only at 
one stage of the process: critical to success in the ceramics case was the presence of 
user firms who could test the new materials out in real situations.  Again, the 
importance of structure is indicated: without the surrounding advanced firms, know-
who and know-how become difficult to foster. 
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The complexity of new technologies will always reserve an important role for tacit 
knowledge. Patel and Pavitt (1995: 17) conclude that that since useful processes and 
products draw knowledge from a wide range of sources and need to match 
performance criteria along multiple dimensions, codified knowledge is an insufficient 
guide to putting technologies into practice. Recent work carried out within the 
OECD’s National Innovation Systems Project has also highlighted ‘the importance of 
tacit knowledge and tacit knowledge flows for the innovation process’ (OECD 1996c: 
4). Tacit knowledge is hard to transfer over long distances.  Its transmission therefore 
usually means that transferring firms must be in relatively close proximity because 
transfer depends on personnel mobility and interaction. 
 
Moreover, as current observers are increasingly recognising, codified and tacit 
knowledge can no longer be clearly separated. ‘There are skills of an intuitive kind 
which remain hidden and tacit and which cannot be incorporated when the 
codification takes place’ (Hatchuel and Weil 1994, quoted in Lundvall 1996: 9). 
Indeed, the rapidly increasing supply of codified knowledge increases the demand for 
skills relating to recognising patterns in data and selecting relevant data for scrutiny. 
These skills are tacit and specific to individual fields of knowledge. Hence, the 
importance of know-who and other tacit forms of knowledge will increase as 
codification increases.  
  
The increasingly important role of tacit knowledge and the difficulty of transmitting it 
over long distances suggests the importance of having complementary manufacturing 
and service industries of various kinds located in relatively close proximity. Links 
with firms offshore are not always enough to guarantee that such links will be 
effective in engendering innovation. 
 
Antonelli (1996) notes, for instance, that the generation of knowledge useful to firms 
is a process arising from interaction between innovators drawing on highly localised 
learning processes which are specific to the experience and history of each innovator.  
Localised knowledge is tacit, highly specialised and very idiosyncratic because it 
depends on what has been available in an economy. This emphasises again the 
importance for the future of what went before at a very micro-level, that of personal 
experience. 
 
Since innovation capability is strongly influenced by the amount of information a 
firm can absorb from its environment, both what is available inside and outside the 
firm is important. 
 
 
3. Complementary Assets 
 
While potential opportunities available to firms to acquire different types of 
knowledge are numerous - and include in-house R&D; exporting; investment; mass 
production; inward investment; reverse engineering; in-house design work; training; 
hiring key workers; joint ventures; installing capital goods - it is important to 
emphasise that firms cannot learn well unless they possess the capabilities or 
‘complementary assets’ which promote successful commercialisation of their efforts. 
 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
Australia’s Industrial Structure                                                                                              7.61 
Successful innovation relies on the commercialisation of knowledge through its use 
in conjunction with other capabilities and/or assets.  Hence, in introducing a new 
product or service on to the market, access to these associated assets will be required.  
These include: 
 
 management skills; 
 marketing and distribution skills and mechanisms; 
 for products, manufacturing facilities; 
 customer-support capability; 
 access to adequate finance. 
 
The last of these has been dealt with elsewhere in Australian policy debates and will 
not be discussed at length here. 
 
The presence or absence of complementary assets is so important that Teece (1987) 
and others consider that it determines who wins from innovation - the original 
innovator or imitators.  
 
There are several reasons why possession of complementary assets is so critical.  The 
most important derives from the fact that before a dominant design is established for 
a product or group of products in a particular industry, competition is based on design 
modifications or importing new concepts.  In this phase of technological 
development, who wins from innovation - the original innovator or an imitator 
making design modifications - may depend on the extent of a company’s familiarity 
with user-needs and the speed which the market can be penetrated.  If users are in the 
manufacturing sector, then clearly a manufacturing sector which includes potential 
customers is likely to be important to competitive success. Scale and well-functioning 
distribution channels may also be necessary to get products to market efficiently. 
 
What is true of individual firms can also be true of a country.  A country performing 
strongly in science and technology but with a poor industrial structure may lose 
profits to imitator countries that have the complementary assets needed to support the 
commercialisation process.  A country with a ‘manufacturing disadvantage may find 
that an early advantage at the research and development stage has no commercial 
value’ (Teece, 1987: 91).  This situation is ‘potentially crippling’ in the absence of 
government policy.  Teece concludes that, in this context, ‘concern that the decline of 
manufacturing threatens the entire economy appears to be well founded’ (1987: 91). 
 
In a similar vein, Cohen and Zysman (1987) have argued that a nation should not be 
complacent in the face of a declining manufacturing sector. They emphasise the 
complementarity between the manufacturing sector and high-wage service-sector jobs 
by focussing on linkages in the economy. Further they argue that competition is a 
strategic process in which governments can and do play a vital role. They do so: 
 
... because the new technologies involve the emergence of new sectors and 
reopen and disrupt established competitive patterns in traditional sectors, [thus 
making]... competition a strategic game. It is not simply one in which the clear 
constraints of competition in perfect markets bound the choices and 
possibilities of firms. Rather the decisions of particular firms, and often of 
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governments, alter the market by changing the possibilities of other firms in 
the industry. Competition in emerging and transforming sectors does not 
follow the model of perfect competition so dear to economic analysis. 
Markets in these cases are inherently imperfect and the outcomes - what firms 
produce and where - are powerfully and often in an enduring way shaped by 
corporate strategic decisions and government policy. (1987: 106). 
 
 
Cohen and Zysman further indicate that a careful analysis of linkages reveals that 
many service-suppliers are linked to the manufacturing sector through technological 
interdependencies and the need for physical propinquity.  In other words, there are 
benefits in having a strong manufacturing sector that are not captured by the market. 
 
Cohen and Zysman note that if a nation loses manufacturing activity it will risk losing 
high-wage service jobs (1987: 20). They conclude that: 
 
A strategy of trying to hold onto the high-value-added activities while 
subcontracting production to foreign producers who have a manufacturing 
edge defines the fast track to disaster... The only viable strategy is to combine 
advanced technology with high-skilled labor and innovative management to 
create high-wage, high-productivity, flexible production capabilities... The 
key generator of wealth... remains mastery and control of production... It is 
the high-value added service roles tied directly to manufacturing that we must 
hold and develop. (1987: 16-23) 
 
These views tie in with more current views held by the OECD in relation to the 
importance of complementary assets: 
 
In learning economies, firms are in search of linkages to promote inter-firm 
interactive learning and of external partners and networks to provide 
complementary assets. Such relationships allow firms to spread the risks and 
costs associated with innovation across a larger number of firms, to access 
new research results, to obtain important technological components and to 
share production assets. (OECD 1996a) 
 
‘Complementary assets’ can also be considered as a set of national-level assets or 
capabilities. In particular, it could be argued that one set of complementary assets 
includes the existence of a sophisticated machinery and industrial equipment sector. 
This is because this sector is R&D-intensive and constitutes a high concentration of 
embodied knowledge. The knowledge embodied in these products is of value to many 
firms in diverse fields and can be instrumental in raising overall economic 
performance. The OECD report mentioned above also suggested that productivity 
gains from R&D and its diffusion have been mainly reaped in the machinery sector 
and the information technology sector. 
 
This leads to the more general point that demanding or leading edge customers are an 
important complementary asset. Research by analysts at MIT has shown the 
importance of the interaction between firms and user experts where most of the ideas, 
and indeed the prototypes, for new products came from users - surgeons in the case of 
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medical devices (see, for instance, von Hippel 1988 and 1994).  The role of the firm, 
they found, was often limited to testing, production and marketing.  The same 
findings were made by de Vet and Scott in a 1992 study of the medical device 
industry in California, especially where the products which involved the greatest 
input from advanced technologies were concerned. 
 
One of the most critical complementary assets in a learning economy is the capacity 
for rapid and widespread distribution. This is particularly the case in products or 
services which can be re-engineered or copied quickly by competitors who may have 
global distribution channels. Manley (1994) cites research by a number of 
organisations related to the failure of Australian inventors to commercialise their 
inventions from Australia. One of the causal factors cited was the lack of strong 
onshore firms and linkages which enable inventors to commercialise their products on 
a sufficient scale. 
 
 
4. Learning & Management 
 
The search for, and employment of, such complementary assets requires a competent 
management function within firms. Work by Whitley (1992) suggests that firms 
which are based on the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model tend to have managers in critical senior 
positions who are ill-equipped to deal with innovation issues or even production 
matters more generally since they are excessively finance-oriented.  Similarly, a 
study by Oakland and Sohal (1989: 88) found that in the UK changes in production 
management have not kept pace with changes in technology. In other countries, such 
as Germany, external linkages (achieved via interlocking directorates and the nature 
of financial systems) mean that senior managers can focus more on the long- term 
strategic elements of their businesses, including technological and product 
development through networking relationships (Whitley 1992). 
 
(a) Routines 
 
Firms also learn through the routines related to their production, distribution and 
consumption activities. Despite their apparently anti-innovatory bias, particular 
routines provide an important input to the innovation process. This is because the 
daily experience of workers, engineers and sales people can be harnessed so as to 
positively affect the direction of innovation in the firm (Lundvall 1992: 9). Thus, for 
example, if an employing firm has processes which permit the effective 
communication of information about production problems noted by a line worker to 
decision-makers, the firm may be able to change direction in a timely fashion. Such 
processes are the secret of at least part of the success of Japanese auto companies. 
 
Routines have other important effects on the amount of knowledge available to an 
enterprise.  Everyday experience increases the stock of knowledge. According to 
Nelson and Winter (1982, quoted in Dodgson 1993: 283), routines operationalise 
firms’ memories and knowledge bases.  
 
Lundvall (1996: 17; 1992: 8) sees routines as critically important in three different 
areas of learning: 
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 learning-by-doing - increasing the efficiency of the production process (Arrow 
1962); 
 learning-by-using - increasing the efficiency of the use of complex systems 
(Rosenberg 1982); 
 learning-by-interacting  - innovation arising from interactions between consumers 
and suppliers (Lundvall 1988). 
 
All three forms of learning have several significant common attributes in relation to 
technological change in a particular industrial structure. All learning is cumulative 
and costly.  In relation to incremental innovation, the most common form of learning 
is localised and involves interaction between internal and external sources of 
knowledge (Malerba 1992, quoted in Metcalfe 1995: 32).  This means that it is 
important for innovating firms to have the local interlocutors who can advise on the 
incremental changes which improve products and constitute the most common form 
of innovation, the incremental kind. Such proximity increases information flows and 
reduces learning costs. 
 
(b) Human Resources Management Programs 
 
Firms competing in a learning environment need to harness the skills and information 
held by all their staff.  This may mean considerable modification of existing internal 
structures both hierarchical and horizontal.  The British biotechnology firm Celltech 
found that it needed to adopt a ‘cell-like’ structure to keep the interest of their 
scientists in a competitive situation, allowing them time to develop their own interests 
during an agreed proportion of ‘company time’. 
 
Freeman (1993) lists a number of ways in which the use of a team-based approach to 
work enhances firm performance: 
 
 Workplace democracy. This increases trust and the free flow of ideas that follow 
greater levels of trust. 
 
 Efficiency. This occurs through better information flows and diffusion of best 
practice as well as via pressure by teams to introduce more productive work forms 
and technologies rather than react to competition through ad hoc price reduction 
or downsizing. 
 
 Regulatory performance. This occurs through workplace health and safety 
improvements.  
 
More generally, the use of human resources management programs (HRMPs) has 
been shown internationally to substantially improve firm performance: 
 
 Work by Kato (1995) on Japanese firms shows that the introduction of HRMPs 
can act as a significant spur to productivity. Kato found, for example, that the 
introduction of joint labour-management committees initially boosted company 
productivity by 9 per cent per year, rising to 11 per cent after 20 years. 
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 The productivity impacts of HRMPs have been investigated in an analysis of 43 
studies published internationally. The findings indicate that employee ownership 
and employee participation are both positively associated with productivity 
(Doucouliagos 1995). 
 
 A survey of 600 SMEs in the US by Reish & Luftman reported in Weaver (1996) 
found that 93 per cent of respondents experienced lower absenteeism, 86 per cent 
experienced lower staff turnover (indicated earlier in this report as being relevant 
to productivity) and 79 per cent experienced improved morale after introducing 
employee share ownership plans (ESOPs). 
 
 In 1987 the US General Accounting Office (GAO) found that participatively 
managed employee ownership firms increased their productivity growth rates by 
52 per cent per year (http://www.nceo.org/library.html). 
 
As well as these studies, a number of employee share ownership advocates have 
conducted their own research in this area. Some of their conclusions are shown below. 
 
 A 1990 study by the Michigan Center for Employee Ownership and Gainsharing 
and Michigan State University asked executives to indicate if employee 
ownership had had an impact on sales, profits, productivity and other measures.  
The results were very positive.  They were the most positive, however, in 
companies that scored high on participative management measures.  Majority 
employee owned companies also did better.  In addition, the study found that the 
incidence of employee participation programs, such as work teams and advisory 
councils, increased 50-100 per cent after an employee ownership plan was set up. 
(http://www.nceo.org/library.html). 
 
 A US study by Northeast Ohio Employee Ownership Center in 1993 also found 
dramatic increases in participation after an ESOP was set up, with the incidence of 
programs like team-based management and participation training programs 
doubling in most cases. (http://www.nceo.org/library.html). This survey of over 
500 firms also found that 41 per cent of the employee ownership company 
respondents increased employment, 22 per cent reduced it, and 37 per cent kept it 
level. The study did not provide before and after data, but it did find that 
employee owned companies outperformed competitors on job growth measures 49 
per cent of the time, did the same 50 per cent of the time, and did worse only 1% 
of the time. The authors concluded that ‘if the rest of the Ohio companies had 
matched Ohio's ESOP firms during the last three years, the state would have full 
employment’. (http://www.nceo.org/library.html). 
 
 A survey of over 1,000 firms by the US Employee Ownership Foundation found 
that 75 per cent reported their financial figures as improving in the year their 
ESOPs were established, and 60 per cent said that overall productivity had 
improved after the ESOP began (Weaver 1996). 
 
(c) Trust 
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High levels of trust are essential in a learning economy because while market 
mechanisms can be used to exchange codified information, although sometimes with 
difficulty, such mechanisms fail when it comes to exchanging tacit information. This 
means that the diffusion of tacit information, and hence the realisation of the learning 
economy’s full growth potential, relies on nurturing trust in intra-firm, inter-firm and 
other inter-organisational relationships. Saxenian’s work on the reasons for the well-
known success of many Silicon Valley firms shows that such firms exchange even 
commercially sensitive information about business strategy, sales and costs and are 
mutually committed to long-term relationships (1991). This finding indicates again 
the importance of co-location of related activities and of critical mass ‘at home’.  
‘Partner’ firms can rarely operate in this manner if they are located in other countries. 
 
Trust is thus central to networking behaviour (Saxenian 1991; Sabel 1993)  which in 
turn is central to generating useful user-producer relationships (Sako 1991) and to 
furthering the technological collaboration needed for innovation, both in low-tech and 
high-tech industries (Dodgson 1996).  Trust can be translated as honesty, reliability, 
cooperativeness, and a sense of duty to other people.  Its generation relies on a high 
degree of social cohesion. An important expression of social cohesion occurs in the 
form of the industrial networks discussed earlier. Where such networks are weak or 
absent one may assume low levels of inter-organisational trust and poor information 
flows. 
 
A poor level of networking is a significant constraint on growth because the 
increasing complexity of the knowledge base and escalating rates of technological 
advance have increased the value of long-term relationships between firms for the 
production and distribution of knowledge. 
 
 
5.  Knowledge Distribution Power 
 
In 1994, the working group on Technology and Innovation Policy convened by the 
OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry commenced an international 
study of national innovation systems.  The study focuses on the concept of an 
industrial structure’s ‘knowledge distribution power’ as affected by the characteristics 
of given national systems of innovation.  The concept is a tool for looking at the 
flows of knowledge moving through a national system of innovation and especially at 
any impediments to these flows which reduce an economy’s capacity to learn. 
 
The ‘knowledge distribution power’ of an industrial system is its capacity to ‘ensure 
timely access by innovators to the relevant stocks of knowledge’ needed for the 
innovation process (OECD 1996a: 16). The knowledge-distribution power approach 
guided empirical investigations of the functioning of national innovation systems in 
eight member countries during 1995-96.  The application of the concept involved 
efforts both to map the diffusion paths of knowledge and innovation and to quantify 
the knowledge and information produced and its contribution to economic 
performance.  
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Despite encountering many measurement difficulties, the OECD found that the eight 
pilot case studies confirmed the key importance of the distribution of knowledge to 
economic performance (1996b: 5).  
 
Knowledge creation and distribution are inextricably linked but their relative 
importance to economic development may vary with different national circumstances 
and over time.  The OECD’s focus on knowledge distribution suggests that useful 
knowledge cannot be really said to be created unless it is part of a broader process of 
knowledge diffusion/distribution.  Knowledge creation and diffusion should thus be 
understood as part of the same process. 
 
The OECD (1996b: 5) reports that the following trends in local systems of knowledge 
distribution were observed in all eight countries involved in the OECD’s pilot study - 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United 
Kingdom: 
 
 increasing skill-intensity in the domain of the production of goods and services; 
 
 blurring of the boundaries between pure and applied research, with more research 
being application-oriented; 
 
 growth in transdisciplinary approaches, with an increasing share of publications 
being found in journals which span the boundaries of established disciplines; 
 
 a trend towards stronger links between science and technology and shrinking 
timelag between scientific publication and citation in patents; 
 
 an increasing diversity of research performers to include firms and a growing 
variety of research institutions such as hospitals; 
 
 increasing numbers of company-to-company R&D alliances; 
 
 increasing reliance of (parts of) industry on partnerships with universities; 
 
 increasing pressure for research institutions to seek closer ties with industry; 
 
 increasing collaboration both between scientists and between institutions; 
 
 a growing number of policy initiatives to foster such cooperation. 
 
These results were derived using an empirical procedure that views the ‘knowledge 
distribution power’ of a national innovation system as operating through a series of 
channels. These channels constitute ‘four basic types of knowledge interactions, 
whose intensity can provide a picture of the strengths and weaknesses of national 
innovation systems with regard to ‘knowledge distribution power’ (OECD 1996b: 5).  
The channels operating at national level are: 
 
 inter-industry flows of technology; 
 joint industry research; 
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 industry/research institute/university collaborations;  
 mobility of highly trained personnel. 
 
Some countries also chose to study the channels of knowledge distribution at sub-
national level by looking at how they functioned within various clusters of 
institutions and activity. 
 
The experience of the countries involved in the pilot study leads the OECD to 
conclude that the evaluation of knowledge flows is critical but difficult at present 
because of the current absence of data and the crude nature of many existing 
measurement indicators.  
 
The OECD therefore recommends that, in addition to using conventional measures of 
knowledge generation, such as R&D expenditures, analysts should also pay attention 
to such factors as production and trade in high-technology output and patent activity.  
The Organisation also recommends that approaches used should include studies of 
input/output links and labour market statistics and that information should be 
gathered using innovation surveys, case studies, bibliometric exercises and cluster 
analyses. We present in Part Two of this report some of the results of such indicators 
for Australia. 
 
Outside the OECD other analysts have further emphasised the importance of 
assessing a nation’s ‘knowledge distribution power’ on the basis of the norms, 
institutions and incentive structures present (David and Foray 1996).  An ‘ideal’ 
system, David and Foray suggest (1996: 97-98) would have high distribution power 
and be characterised by the following features: 
 
 predominance of the norms of disclosure, openness and free-access in contrast to 
the secrecy and associated access restrictions which characterise many existing 
structures; 
 
 an intellectual property-rights system that enhances disclosure and coordination, 
such as a system that maintains free access to new findings for research use; 
 
 strong incentives toward codification of knowledge rather than leaving it tacit in 
policies and practices aimed at maintaining the knowledge-base. 
 
Because of the importance of knowledge distribution, the same authors also propose 
that nations should take steps to establish a better knowledge distribution system as 
part of their economic system (1996: 98).  A good system would be one where 
 
...universities act as open nodes in global information networks; firms diffuse 
their new practices and findings very quickly through a variety of market and 
non-market mechanisms; and researchers from different organisations and 
locations are drawn easily into collaborative institutional activities 
(standardisation committees, cooperative research networks) that enable them 
to solve coordination problems posed by collective actions.’ 
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The notion of ‘knowledge distribution power’ can be used to organise the mapping of 
knowledge flows according to the four channels suggested, using both conventionally 
accepted and the proposed new indicators. The resulting map can then be analysed to 
determine the intensity and appropriateness of national knowledge flows as a first 
step towards improving the system. This mapping, of course, requires detailed 
empirical work and should be undertaken not once but as part of a program of 
continuous upgrading of national capacity. 
 
 
6. Technological Infrastructure 
 
One prominent group of analysts of the characteristics of the learning economy points 
to the crucial role of ‘technological infrastructure’ in promoting an economy’s 
knowledge distribution power  (Teubal et al. 1996). In their view technological 
infrastructure has the same strong developmental encouragement effect as the 
provision of publicly available infrastructure in the normal sense of roads, rail and the 
like. 
 
Technological infrastructure includes more than just the normally-accepted 
infrastructural categories, embracing also ‘the set of specific industry-relevant 
capabilities which have been supplied collectively and which are intended for several 
applications in two or more firms or user organisations’ (Teubal et al. 1996: 10).  
Technological infrastructure thus comprises such things as joint industry training 
schools, marketing boards and export assistance bureaux for particular industries. In 
this view, the most effective technological infrastructure is provided collectively by 
the industry concerned because in that way the industry gets what it needs and 
collectively has some responsibility for its design and implementation. 
 
Collective technology capabilities are embodied in four principal forms: 
 
 Human capital. This includes skills developed through formal education and the 
tacit skills arising from training and experience. 
 
 Physical capital. This includes instrumentation, research and test facilities. 
 
 Knowledge. This includes design methodologies, strategic planning. 
 
 Organisation of the productive system. This includes the strength and spread of 
networked relationships between users of a technological service and its suppliers 
and the existence of joint industry-government planning forums. 
 
Adequate technological infrastructure is important to industrial development because 
it develops capacity.  It does this because it: 
 
 absorbs and diffuses externally-developed knowledge, services and innovations;    
and  
 involves the ‘development of generic, cutting-edge technologies through the        
cooperative efforts of business firms, often in collaboration with public sector  
institutions’ (Teubal et al. 1996: xi). 
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The development of technological infrastructure, Teubal and his colleagues suggest, 
will require the coordination of the individual efforts of firms. This may be done by 
groups of firms in the private sector. In many cases, however, initiating such 
collaboration may need government action and public sector support.  In this respect, 
provision of technological infrastructure is similar to provision of the conventional 
infrastructure of roads, rail, ports etc and education and training systems. In both 
cases there is a strong role for collective action and what Teubal and his team call 
Technological Infrastructure Policy (TIP).  
 
Because of the importance of technological infrastructure in underpinning knowledge 
diffusion and hence the improvement of rates of learning by firms, appropriate public 
policy is critical. TIP is therefore increasingly at the forefront of growth-promoting 
policy discussions in advanced and developing economies. TIP is particularly 
relevant to the pursuit of economic growth through structural change because it can 
be focused on the particular needs of given industries at any time. The authors 
suggest that TIP was used successfully in the newly industrialising countries of Asia 
to create capacity in new areas. 
 
Conventional infrastructure supports physical capital development, while the other 
infrastructure elements - human capital, institutional and technological - ‘facilitate 
and stimulate the accumulation of firm-based technological capabilities’ (Teubal et al 
1996: 3).  Such firm-based capabilities combine with the effectiveness of industrial 
networks, and the other factors outlined in earlier chapters, to determine the success 
of industrial change. Nations must have policies for the development of firm-based 
technological capabilities, Teubal and his colleagues suggest, just as they must also 
have them for encouraging intra-and inter-sectoral links. 
 
The skills component of technological infrastructure in building firm-based 
capabilities is especially significant, as the following examples demonstrate: 
 
...under certain conditions a minimum pool of electronics engineers may be 
required for guaranteeing a capability for effectively using and adopting 
available microelectronics technology; similarly, both this factor and the 
involvement of consultants and a technology center may be preconditions for 
successful diffusion of the technology to SMEs of emerging industrial 
branches. Also, a minimum pool of mechanical, metallurgical and chemical 
engineers may be a requirement for creating production and investment 
capabilities within infant steel-industry firms. (Teubal et al. 1996: 3 & 4). 
 
This is a further aspect of the need discussed above for firms and industries to hold 
not only R&D capabilities but also complementary assets - for effective 
commercialisation - and brings us back to focussing on the knowledge base a nation 
has at its disposal. A nation’s technological infrastructure plays an important role in 
‘providing mechanisms for the transfer and transformation of existing and new 
knowledge, making the stock of knowledge more socially useful. Technological 
infrastructure policy can be designed to improve these mechanisms, help create 
capabilities to exploit existing knowledge and facilitate the accessibility of the stock 
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of knowledge’ (Teubal et al. 1991: 9).  Examples of knowledge diffusion mechanisms 
include inter-firm training courses and industry planning forums. 
 
In designing TIP it is particularly important to pay attention to ensuring that: 
 
 the distribution of knowledge is widespread and timely; 
 access to new findings is easy and inexpensive; 
 wasteful duplication of research efforts is minimised; 
 information is put into the hands of a more diverse population of researchers. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Work on the learning economy has focused on the different dimensions of the new 
competitive circumstances facing firms, as Western societies increasingly shift to a 
growth path based on capacity to innovate. The term ‘learning economy’ itself 
indicates the importance of knowledge generation, diffusion and use as a key driver 
of growth. This chapter has therefore focussed on spelling out the role played by 
knowledge. The dimensions sketched in here need to be spelled out in the context of 
any particular society, so that the functioning of the system of innovation available to 
firms can be measured and if necessary, improved and the changes made monitored 
over time. 
 
In the competitive circumstances characterising the learning economy, firms must 
recognise that effective and rapid learning has become critical to success. In many 
cases, firms must rethink their strategies and become learning organisations. They 
must learn to organise all their activities to maximise their learning (generation and 
use of new knowledge and effective use of existing knowledge) since that is the basis 
for innovation. 
 
It is important to appreciate that ‘knowledge’ is different from ‘information’ because 
it requires understanding, ordering and recombining. Moreover, this understanding 
also involves appreciating that knowledge is of different types. Each type plays 
different roles in competitive success. This means that both firm and national 
strategies for generating and using knowledge must reflect the differences if they are 
to be effective. 
 
The four major types of knowledge are: know-what, know-why, know-how and 
know-who. These various types flow differently through sets of communication 
channels of communication. 
 
It is not enough, however, for firms to have access to knowledge. It is not enough to 
have an invention: firms must possess or be able to access in their environment 
additional  factors which ensure commercial success. Knowledge has to be allied to 
‘complementary assets’ both at firm level and at industry/national levels. These 
complementary assets include high level management skills, good marketing and 
distribution channels, manufacturing facilities and customer support capability. It is 
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the use of these assets that determines whether the original innovator or imitators win 
from innovation. 
 
Good management skills and labour relations are critical too. International work 
shows, for instance, the importance of training for all staff. It also emphasises the 
positive role played by Human Resource Management Programs in encouraging 
commitment by all staff to the success of the enterprise. This commitment and 
training are associated with higher labour productivity growth. 
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Chapter Five 
 
INTERNATIONALISATION & HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
 
 
Internationalisation and trade liberalisation have been dominant themes in the 
Western world for most of the post-war period. This has accelerated with more recent 
trade pacts (e.g. GATT/WTO) and most advanced economies are now responding to 
the increased competitive pressures generated by these processes. In this 
environment, the strength of a country’s innovation system will be a major 
determinant of success. This chapter examines some of the interactions among 
international trade, the domestic economy and the nature of the human resources 
available to firms. 
 
 
1. Trade Liberalisation and the Learning Economy 
 
The spread, especially among OECD economies, of trade liberalisation and the broad 
coverage of GATT/WTO agreements are radically changing the competitive forces 
facing firms and economies. 
 
Not only does trade liberalisation increase pressure on those industries directly 
competing against the exports of other countries, but as trade barriers are reduced the 
firms who supply exporters and import-competitors are themselves forced to react. 
Thus a major by-product of the current round of accelerated trade liberalisation has 
been the exposure of previously non-tradeable areas of the economy to the price and 
quality pressures increasingly facing the tradeables. In particular, the new situation 
pushes much of the non-tradeable sector towards a situation where it must become 
more innovative than it has been in the past. 
 
Indeed, it may well be the case that trade liberalisation has a greater impact on the 
non-tradeable sector than the tradeable, and in particular on smaller firms. In 
analysing divergent trends in stock market performance as between large and small 
firms in the United States, the Bank Credit Analyst observed: 
 
This recent divergence is consistent with the relatively poor trend in small 
company margins. Ironically, the large multinational companies have benefited 
from the most favourable trend in margins in recent years even though they are 
the most exposed to global competition. In other words, it is the small 
domestically oriented companies that have faced the biggest squeeze, implying 
that these companies have the least pricing power. (BCA 1997: 8) 
 
 
The ‘international’ innovation system is now dictating ever more adaptation and 
evolution by the various ‘national’ innovation systems of the countries trading.  
Indeed, trade liberalisation can be seen as bringing national innovation systems into 
direct competition with each other.  
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The OECD (OECD 1996e) has conducted an extensive statistical analysis of the 
determinants of export success, as measured by increase or decrease in a country’s 
share of total OECD exports. They have found a number of key factors (OECD 
1996e:111, 118-122): 
 
 First, the ability of a country to match its export commodity composition to 
changes in the composition of world demand, and to switch sales to the countries 
of greatest growth for those exports, have been the most important determinants 
of export success. These factors are related to the exporter’s industrial and trade 
structure and its adaptability to changing patterns of world demand. 
 
 Second, other technology and non-technology factors, including wages and 
exchange rates, explain 30-40 per cent of all export share variations. 
 
 Third, price/cost issues such as exchange rates and wages are more important for 
low technology exports. 
 
 Fourth, productivity and R&D are more important for high technology industries. 
 
The OECD is therefore highlighting the importance of an innovation- and learning-
based response to trade liberalisation. Firstly, the ability to adapt to changing patterns 
of world demand requires innovative firms and economies which learn rapidly and 
transform their knowledge into changed patterns of production and distribution ahead 
of their competitors. Secondly, there are two broad forms of response to trade 
liberalisation depending on the nature of the products and services which firms and 
countries export. For producers/exporters of knowledge-intensive goods and services, 
there is the high productivity, higher technology response characterised by the 
increasing importance of innovation and knowledge. For producers/exporters of 
standardised, low-tech goods and services, there is the low cost response 
characterised by the increasing importance of exchange rates and wages.  
 
The research of Branstetter (1996), referred to in Chapter One, supports the 
possibility of this ‘bifurcation’ of trade paths in the absence of policy intervention. In 
determining that the spillovers generated by R&D are more domestic than 
international in nature, he concludes that temporary advantages in a spillover-
intensive (and thus growth-enhancing) activity can become transformed into 
permanent ones by trade. This is because the technological lead of one firm (or 
country) can become cumulative as innovation and knowledge generate even more 
innovation and knowledge and the competitive gap between the firms (and countries) 
continues to widen. 
 
Trade liberalisation in a learning world economy will increase the pressures on 
countries to develop policies which will enable them to rapidly upgrade their national 
systems of innovation to enable local industries of all kinds to be able to withstand 
the success of other nations’ systems of knowledge production and diffusion. The 
alternative is likely to be competition via exchange rates and wages. 
 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
Australia’s Industrial Structure                                                                                              7.75 
Related research continues to point to the fact that, even in a globalising world, the 
state of the domestic market, economy and innovation system still matters, 
particularly in technological development. 
 
A recent study of patenting activity in the US by 569 of the world’s largest firms 
demonstrates, for example, that an ‘overwhelming majority’ of the patenting firms 
commercialised their innovations close to home base (Patel 1995: 141). Patel 
suggests that although globalisation of production and markets may be an escalating 
trend, most technological development still remains home-based.  While even more 
recent evidence suggests that 30 per cent of R&D carried out by European firms is 
now done outside their home base, this may be because the European Union as a 
whole is now seen  as the national ‘home’ base as well as the ‘home’ market 
(personal communication, Dodgson 1997).  Proportions of R&D carried out ‘abroad’ 
remain much lower for Japanese and US firms, as indicated by reports by the US 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA: 1994). The OTA reports that less than 13 
per cent of core US transnational firm R&D is conducted overseas, with the 
proportion likely to be lower for the transnationals of other countries, especially 
Japan. Further, much of the R&D that is conducted overseas is based around systems 
integration and customisation rather than major product or process development. 
(1994: 8) 
 
Similarly, Archibugi and Michie (1995) present evidence that, although transnational 
firms exploit technological opportunities in a global context and collaborate 
internationally, they also rely heavily on home-based technological infrastructure for 
the generation of technology. They conclude that national innovation policy remains 
an important determinant of the international competitiveness of nations, despite the 
globalisation trend. 
 
The findings of these studies indicate that individual countries can create their own 
areas of competitive advantage based on a range of factors including the provision of 
infrastructure, facilities and other tangible and intangible assets available for 
technological development. The success of nations in organising their domestic 
innovation systems remains crucial to their successful exploitation of new 
technologies. As Porter (1990) recognised, manufacturing advantage can indeed be 
manufactured. 
 
Further, although many aspects of firms’ strategies are influenced increasingly by a 
global view of their advantage, competitiveness remains to a large extent reliant on 
‘localised concentrations of skilled people and technology’ (Tegart 1995: 4).  
 
This reliance is partly due to the crucial importance of innovation ‘speed’ which 
reduces lead times for innovations to reach market if they are to be profitable. This 
speed is significantly affected by conditions in the home market which impact on the 
ease of creating and operating various technological partnerships which promote 
rapid technological development (Teubal et al. 1996). If the home market is not 
appropriate - in other words has the wrong industrial and especially customer mix, a 
poor R&D base, poor provision of finance, etc. - initial marketing, sales and product 
testing cannot be carried out effectively. 
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It is for reasons such as this that Porter concludes that: 
 
While globalisation of competition might appear to make the nation less 
important, instead it seems to make it more so. With fewer impediments to 
trade to shelter uncompetitive domestic firms and industries, the home nation 
takes on growing significance because it is the source of the skills and 
technology that underpin competitive advantage. (1990: 19) 
 
Quoting the work of Yoffie and his colleagues, Houghton and Flaherty (1997: 19) 
argue that domestic policies are of vital importance in shaping competitive advantage. 
Further, policies which appear sound using standard economic frameworks ‘can be 
destructive in a world of strategic players’. This is particularly the case in 
oligopolistic markets where deregulation in one country can be undermined by 
foreign governments which can effectively subsidise their industries and provide 
them with strategic advantages. 
 
Some aspects of globalisation, moreover, may be especially difficult for relatively 
small states, such as Australia, to deal with. These difficulties may demand particular 
national government responses.  
 
Glatz and van Tulder (1989) describe the problems of small nations as resulting from 
the operation of what they call a series of ‘races’. Small countries are 
disproportionately affected by the race towards the globalisation of production in 
certain key industries and by the race for dominance by large firms from large 
countries in various - often knowledge intensive - sectors. Small countries have small 
populations and thus small home markets, especially for specialised products, only 
relatively and absolutely small amounts of finance available for R&D and other 
innovation-related expenditure and little international market power (they are 
frequently price and product takers) in many sectors. Some international firms indeed 
spend more on R&D themselves than the entire national R&D budgets of countries 
such as Australia. 
 
Small nations have few large firms which operate as home based transnationals. This 
means that there are likely to be gaps in the availability of the ‘complementary assets’ 
- especially global scale distribution channels - available to domestic innovators and 
producers. In a globalising market place this can be potentially devastating for 
smaller economies in the absence of some forms of policy intervention, as the 
research reviewed so far makes clear. But the margins for such policy action are 
themselves being ‘squeezed’ by international agreements and the international races 
related to deregulation, internationalisation and emulation in core technologies, the 
international search for strategic partners and the race to attract foreign investment.  
 
For all these reasons, the structure of trade and of the domestic economy interact with 
each other and can reinforce existing patterns of specialisation. A trade pattern 
specialising in low-tech, homogeneous products can retard or even preclude the 
development of more knowledge-intensive, innovative and higher productivity 
industries. Trade patterns will influence industry patterns which will influence 
innovation and learning patterns. 
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2. Human Resources: Knowledge, Employment and Wages 
 
All of these factors impact on the nature of an economy’s innovation and learning 
potential. As Western economies shift direction in the new competitive environment, 
a number of trends are becoming apparent and a number of choices are possible and 
will have to be made. At present in relation to human resources three major trends 
can be observed in Western economies (Storper 1996): 
 
 the creation of high wage, high skill jobs; 
 the creation of low wage, low skill jobs; and 
 job loss. 
 
Storper further indicates the areas in which these different trends are apparent. It is 
most important to note the correlations between job growth and the presence of 
knowledge-intensive industries. As Storper says, most of the job losses ‘...are 
concentrated in manufacturing industries producing standardised outputs which are 
amenable to mechanisation and automation’. The creation of high wage jobs is 
‘...usually in value-intensive industries or activities’, while the creation of low wage 
employment ‘...is heavily concentrated in the consumer and retail services sector’ 
(1996: 256). Further, low wage, low skill jobs face the possibility of relocation to low 
wage countries as capital globalises. 
 
In order to avoid both the low wage route and the job loss route, Storper suggests that 
Western economies and their constituent firms must develop their learning 
capabilities so that they can compete in non-standardised, high knowledge industries. 
It is in these industries where the higher profit margins are likely to reflect the degree 
of innovation involved.  Storper’s observation does not mean that the same industries 
can be relied upon everywhere to carry the innovation torch, but rather that an 
economy must contain firms which continue to innovate and therefore grow or evolve 
into the non-standardised product fields which create the most wealth (1996:257). 
The present situation has to be seen by countries and firms alike as a constant race to 
stay ahead of the competition, in the full Schumpeterian tradition. As Storper says, in 
most existing product fields 
 
[once firms’ products] are imitated or their outputs standardised, then there 
are downward wages and employment pressures. They must become moving 
targets by continuing to learn. (1996: 257) 
 
Storper goes on to say that the issue is not one of knowledge-intensive employment 
being the dominant form of employment - it will always occupy a minority share - but 
one of the ‘propulsive effects on economies’ of such industries: 
 
...technological spillover effects can widen and lengthen the wealth-producing 
properties of learning (both upstream and downstream, and horizontally into 
technologically complementary activities), while the quasi-rents earned from 
imperfect competition can be channelled through the producing economy in 
the form of wages, investment and cumulative change’ (1996: 25 
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A Western economy’s long term capacity to produce jobs seems to be linked to its 
innovation capacity as measured even by R&D intensity alone. Within 
manufacturing, for instance, a recent OECD report indicates a strong positive 
correlation between employment growth and R&D intensity across all the G6 
countries (1996e). The same study reports a similarly strong relationship between 
employment growth and information technology intensity in the service sector in the 
1980s.   
 
At a lower level of aggregation, the figures show that sectoral knowledge intensity 
and sectoral job growth go hand-in-hand. The importance for sectoral employment 
and innovation performance of investment in human capital is also made clear. The 
OECD report went on to say: 
 
In conclusion, the sectors that invested more in research and performed more 
innovative activity are those that employed a larger share of higher skilled 
workers at the beginning of the 1980s and that continued to acquire human 
capital during the decade. Increased upskilling is thus not merely a 
consequence of some labour-biased technological shock. Sectoral human 
capital formation and innovative effort can be read as a mutually reinforcing 
and cumulative process which can have a lasting effect on industrial 
performance. (OECD 1996e: 99) 
 
Numerous studies have also shown a link between knowledge intensity and high 
relative wages. Alexander, for example, has recently analysed trends in US 
manufacturing and showed that ‘...both production workers and non-production 
workers experience significant wage premia in plants that employ a large number of 
advanced manufacturing technologies’. (1996: 317) 
 
A very recent OECD report has shown that this ‘technology wage premium’ - the 
premium which workers command in firms which are more technology intensive - 
varies enormously, ranging from as low as 1.6 per cent in the UK to as high as 30 per 
cent in Canada (1996f).  Three possible explanations for this premium and its 
variability are given.  The premium may result from: 
 
 unobserved improvements in human capital making workers more productive; 
 firms operating with advanced technology being more profitable and being able to 
pass some of this on to workers; 
 incentives to increase worker productivity (1996f: 94). 
 
An earlier study by the OECD (1994) found that industries with highly differentiated 
products and unfragmented markets (the kinds of industries typically requiring higher 
R&D intensity) had higher wage rates which were more likely to withstand the 
impact of rising import penetration than were wage rates paid in highly fragmented11 
                                                 
11 The OECD defines fragmented industries as being characterised by strong price competition, high 
substitutability among products, low concentration, low entry costs, small or no scale economies and 
low market power. Firms in these industries are very close to the ‘ideal’ neoclassical perfectly 
competitive firm. 
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industries producing undifferentiated products.  Importantly, the OECD concluded 
that the impact of the ‘Stolper-Samuelson effect’, identified in the first chapter of this 
report as the trend towards ‘factor-price equalisation’ consequent upon free trade, was 
more likely to be resisted in the less fragmented industries producing highly 
differentiated products.  
 
To re-quote Dodgson (1996): 
 
Within the factory, the use of advanced manufacturing technology is 
unequivocally associated with greater productivity, higher survival rates, 
higher wages and more rapid employment growth (US Dept of Commerce 
1994). At all levels of analysis, competitiveness and the ability to pay your 
way in the world depends on the effectiveness of technological innovation. 
(1996). 
These findings suggests that some sectors of an economy can withstand the new 
competition brought about by increasing trade liberalisation better than others. It 
further suggests that economies which specialise in the production of highly 
differentiated goods and services - the kind which also face less fragmented markets - 
are better able to generate the high incomes needed for their populations than are 
economies with the reverse industrial structure. 
 
 
In sum, the OECD research shows a strong link between high knowledge intensity, 
employment growth and relatively high wages.  Innovative firms tend to grow faster, 
employ more people, earn higher profits and pay higher wages. Sectoral knowledge-
intensity and sectoral job growth go hand-in-hand. 
 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
Trade liberalisation is placing enormous competitive pressures on national 
economies. It is bringing not only those firms in the tradeable goods and services 
sectors into competition with new market entrants, but is also extending the 
competition to the non-tradeable sectors which supply the tradeables. In many ways, 
entire national innovation systems are being brought into competition with each 
other. 
 
The OECD has identified a number of factors important to export success. These 
include, firstly, the adaptability to changing patterns of world demand and, secondly, 
the nature of responses via technology/innovation, exchange rates and wages. The 
technology/innovation response is more important in high knowledge industries, 
whereas competition in lower-tech goods and services will largely be played out via 
exchange rates and wage rates. This suggests that firms and countries have choices as 
to which route they wish to take. 
 
The OECD has also observed positive correlations between knowledge intensity, on 
the one hand, and employment and wage growth, on the other. It appears that the 
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prognosis for economies based around the production and export of knowledge 
intensive products will, on some criteria at least, be brighter than that for producers 
and exporters of standardised products in fragmented markets. 
 
 
Chapter Six 
 
CONCLUSIONS: INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE &  
    THE LEARNING ECONOMY 
 
The unambiguous implication of the research reviewed in this report is that structure 
matters for growth and living standards. This is so at several levels: 
 
 the national level - the mix of industries contained within national borders;  
 
 the industry level - the number, type, size and capabilities of the firms composing 
the industries and the ways in which they interact and ‘learn’; 
 
 the firm level - the ways in which firms internally structure their operations and, 
in particular, their generation, diffusion and take-up of knowledge. 
 
We summarise below the areas of the research which relate to the important issue of 
structure. 
 
 
1. The National Level 
 
At a national level it seems apparent from the literature that the mix of industries in a 
national economy matters. 
 
Some of the reasons for this are suggested by the economic theories outlined in the 
first chapter of this report.  
 
New Growth Theory suggests that activities which are rich in knowledge spillovers 
are important for growth. Further, such industries generally require a significant 
investment in both human capital and knowledge-embodying machinery and 
equipment in order to produce and diffuse that knowledge. Thus, knowledge-intensive 
industries re-generate and upgrade the stock of human and physical capital which can 
then be used for further knowledge generation and diffusion so that the knowledge 
production and distribution process is cumulative. 
 
Strategic Trade Theory takes this further. Nations can contain a high-productivity, 
knowledge-rich mix of industries which confer trading and development advantages 
or they can contain the opposite. Strategic Trade Theory is clear in arguing that ‘some 
industries provide greater national benefit than others’, to quote Grossman (in 
Krugman 1986: 66). There is thus the phenomenon of ‘knowledge feedback’ or 
cumulative causation where a high knowledge intensity facilitates further increases in 
the stock and flows of knowledge. One component of this is identified by Dowrick (in 
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IC 1995: 153) as ‘R&D feedback’, where ‘[T]he larger the stock of knowledge, the 
easier it is to increase it.’ 
 
Dowrick (1995: 158) has also found that the economic benefit that Australia could 
expect from an increase in foreign R&D activity is lower than for other countries, a 
result which he suggests could reflect, in part: 
 
...a different industrial structure from other OECD countries, reflecting 
Australian comparative advantage in resource intensive industries which may 
be less innovative than other industries... 
 
Thus even the domestic take-up of and benefit from overseas R&D is affected by the 
domestic industrial structure. 
 
As has been reviewed earlier, both theoretical and empirical work suggests that inter-
firm collaboration greatly improves firm performance and national outcomes through 
exports, productivity and employment. The BIE (1995) has shown that firms in higher 
technology industries, especially in capital goods industries, have a greater propensity 
to cooperate and thus generate these benefits12. 
 
A finding from neoclassical trade theory is also important here in relation to a 
country’s capacity to compete successfully in an era of trade liberalisation. 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, also reviewed earlier, predicts that trade liberalisation 
should lead to factor price equalisation (i.e convergence of returns to labour, capital 
and land). This is called the ‘Stolper-Samuelson effect’ and suggests that trade 
liberalisation could lead to downward pressure on wages in advanced countries (and 
upward pressure in developing countries) in some circumstances. Most economists 
have until very recently found little evidence of this phenomenon, but OECD research 
(OECD 1994) suggests that this is indeed happening in OECD economies in 
industries which produce relatively standardised products and where firms have low 
market power. The report states: 
 
... import penetration is associated with lower relative wages if firms have low 
market power and/or products are homogeneous...(OECD 1994: 146) 
 
In contrast, the same report makes clear that some industries are not subject to the 
same pressures or can withstand them better.  
 
In industries where competition takes place mainly through product 
differentiation, there is no evidence that increasing openness to trade leads to 
reduced industry relative wages’ (OECD 1994: 146). 
  
Thus an industry structure characterised by the predominance of standardised 
products and ‘atomistic’ competition is more likely to suffer negative wage effects of 
trade liberalisation, whereas ‘the impact of trade on income distribution in the 
presence of strong product differentiation and scale economies may be very different 
from the one predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson paradigm. In trade models 
                                                 
12 This is explored in greater detail in Part Two. 
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with imperfect competition it turns out that, when products are sufficiently 
differentiated, a reverse Stolper-Samuelson result can occur.’ (OECD 1994: 147)  
 
As also discussed earlier, OECD studies have shown a strong positive correlation 
between employment and productivity growth, on the one hand, and knowledge 
intensity as measured by R&D, on the other (OECD 1996e). Further, the literature 
also suggests that large transnational firms tend to conduct most of their core R&D 
and initial commercialisation close to ‘home’. 
 
In addition, the structure of domestic demand generated by a social and economic 
system is important. In particular, it is important that the industrial structure contain 
enough leading edge customers - especially exporters of leading edge products and 
services - because they can use their influence to push supplier industries to a higher 
level of innovation and to the generation and diffusion of extra knowledge, which 
then filters through to other industries. 
 
A nation’s industrial mix also determines the existence and proximity of the 
complementary assets that the literature suggests are critical to innovation in a 
learning economy - a patchy industrial structure deprives firms of the extra-firm 
resources which facilitate greater learning, experimentation and cooperation. 
Nowhere is this more important than with respect to the commercialisation and 
distribution of new products and processes - inadequate domestic critical mass tends 
to drive new ideas, which could be increasing domestic knowledge spillovers, 
offshore for commercialisation. 
 
The nature of the industries operating within an economy can also carry with it 
negative externalities such as terms of trade problems. Although these are discussed 
in greater detail in the next part of this research project, in Australia’s case the terms 
of trade problems associated with Australia’s industry and trade mix have been 
substantial.  
 
For countries concerned with competition in world markets via innovation a well 
functioning manufacturing sector is an important asset. OECD research (1996d: 31) 
suggests that most innovations are first developed in the manufacturing sector. 
Despite the increasing importance of services as both developer and user of new 
technologies - and as ‘outsourced’ resource for other sectors - it remains true that 
innovative effort is mainly concentrated in high-technology manufacturing industries. 
Roughly half of all business enterprise R&D expenditures take place within the high-
technology segment of manufacturing and more than 60 per cent within the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. This is confirmed by Australian surveys of 
innovation which will be discussed further in Part Two. 
 
 
2. The Industry Level 
 
At the level of the industry a number of features suggest that structure matters to 
economic success. There are several reasons for this. 
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Firstly, the New Growth Theory and Strategic Trade Theory literature clearly showed 
that much of the generation of the externalities required for growth originate in 
industries characterised by imperfect competition and scale economies. Large firms 
can also act as the focal points for cluster development that can lift the innovation of 
smaller companies. The neoclassical, perfectly competitive firm is unlikely to be able 
to devote the resources required to conduct extensive R&D and new product 
development, and its products are likely to be able to be imitated or copied relatively 
easily in low wage countries with the exception of resource-specific products. Thus 
perfect competition, as defined within neoclassical economics, is a suboptimal 
industry or market structure for growth and development. 
 
Secondly, all of the learning economy literature stresses the importance of linkages 
among firms, and among firms and other important institutions such as educational 
and regulatory institutions. The chains, clusters and complexes that drive innovation 
and learning are industry-level structures, and patchy ones impede knowledge flows 
and can lead to a cumulative import dependence which further erodes the linkage 
propensity of firms in an industry. 
 
Thirdly, the existence of large, domestically based and export-oriented transnationals 
can act as significant spurs to innovation and upgrading. These are regarded as one set 
of the ‘complementary assets’ that can constantly replenish the stock of innovation 
through leading edge procurement and providing markets for new ideas and 
inventions. This is not to say that all industries should necessarily be heavily 
concentrated, but rather that industries without such firms will find it difficult to 
locate those complementary assets. 
 
Fourthly, the OECD research mentioned above (1994) suggests that the structure of 
an industry (whether its market is fragmented or segmented) is one determinant of its 
resistance to relative wage declines in the face of increased import penetration. The 
wages of employees in perfectly competitive firms are likely to suffer in the event of 
trade with low wage countries. 
 
Most of the factors mentioned above do not suggest that there is a single ideal or 
typical industrial structure which policymakers should strive to attain. Rather, the 
argument of this report is that innovation and knowledge are key drivers of growth 
and development and that certain characteristics tend to promote rather than impede 
the production and diffusion of these important drivers. It is the capacity of different 
industrial structures to generate innovation which is critical. Improving that capacity 
should be the focus of policy attention. The characteristics of an effective learning 
structure can be identified and their creation and improvement facilitated by all 
participants in the learning economy, including producers, users, formal knowledge-
generating institutions and governments. 
 
 
3. The Firm Level 
 
The research also shows that the structure and organisation of the economy at the 
level of the individual firm is vital in a learning economy. This is so for a number of 
reasons. 
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Firstly, the quality of management is important to firm performance in general and to 
its ability to implement conscious ‘learning’ practices in particular. Firms with poor 
managers are not likely to innovate, form linkages with other companies, adopt the 
latest technology or introduce inclusive work practices. 
 
Secondly, and this is related to the first point, firms which actively harness their 
workforce’s energies and knowledge via such practices as human resources 
management programs are likely to be better able to adapt and prosper in a world 
characterised by an ever-increasing rate of change. Human Resources Management 
Programs appear to be substantial productivity drivers and seem to capture the 
commitment and participation required for firms to learn internally and process the 
knowledge it gains from customers and competitors alike. 
 
Thirdly, firm-level training practices will also contribute to the ability of firms to 
adapt and innovate. The structure of the processes within companies will determine 
training priorities and commitment. 
 
 
4. Moving to a New Economic System 
 
At the most general level, an industrial structure matters because it is the basis on 
which further development occurs. We know that history matters and that where an 
economy was yesterday enormously influences where it will be able to be tomorrow, 
unless direct intervention in some powerful form ‘shocks’ the system into changing 
course dramatically. 
 
It seems that successful economies now need to move further and faster toward the 
new production paradigm summarised in the literature as the ‘learning economy’ 
composed of ‘learning firms’. In such an economy, the diffusion of tacit knowledge 
(know-how and know-who) is crucial. An ‘ideal’ industrial structure is one which will 
support the production and diffusion of knowledge. Advanced core firms play a key 
role in promoting the diffusion of tacit knowledge. 
 
Knowledge distribution in an economy will also be maximised in the presence of: 
social norms of disclosure and openness; incentives for greater codification of 
knowledge; and appropriate intellectual property-rights legislation. 
 
A nation’s industrial structure should be such as to support the development and 
maintenance of localised, long-term relationships between industrial actors as a means 
of promoting rapid and effective learning. 
 
An ‘ideal’ industrial structure requires development of its technological infrastructure. 
In designing such infrastructure it is important to ensure that: 
 
 the distribution of knowledge is widespread and timely; 
 access to new findings must be easy and inexpensive; 
 wasteful duplication of research efforts must be minimised; 
 information must be put into the hands of a more diverse population of users. 
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An ‘ideal’ industrial structure is also one where: 
 
 chains of production are robust and complementary; 
 leading-edge firms act as a locus of networking activity for smaller firms; 
 complementary assets exist for commercialisation of new knowledge; 
 a diverse industrial base is maintained to keep options open. 
 
 
4. Where to Next? 
 
There are some common denominators that appear from the conclusions of the very 
broad range of literature on economic growth reviewed in this report. It is worth 
outlining them here as a prelude to examining the degree to which Australia ‘stacks 
up’ in relation to the demands which will be placed on the economy in coming years. 
 
The review of the literature permits a number of broader tentative conclusions 
regarding the requirements of a successful ‘learning-based’ economy and the 
importance for a nation of having a learning economy in the years ahead. These are 
summarised below. 
 
Firstly, both the new growth theory and evolutionary approaches stress the 
importance of learning and knowledge for productivity, economic growth and 
development. Although the two schools differ in the manner in which they derive this 
conclusion, these factors are vital to their analyses. 
 
This means that it is centrally important that the economy be one which encourages 
the generation and diffusion of knowledge. Ensuring a high level of learning capacity 
means examining the way a nation’s system of innovation operates, since institutional 
structures and policy environments can affect this knowledge generation/diffusion 
process positively or negatively.  
 
Specialisation through trade based on comparative advantage or factor endowment 
(the classical and neoclassical models) or through cumulative causation and path 
dependence (the evolutionary perspective) may not automatically maximise the 
opportunities to benefit from knowledge-based innovation. Indeed, the evolutionary 
school focuses our attention more on the significance of absolute, rather than relative, 
advantage based on technology and innovation gaps as an important determinant of 
both trade outcomes and national economic welfare.   
 
Both the strategic trade theory and evolutionary approaches now recognise that all 
industrial structures are not created equal and that some can cumulatively retard or 
cumulatively enhance innovation and growth. 
 
Further, the research suggests that although the process of internationalisation is 
creating increased competition in product and factor markets, much of the innovation 
driving the key transnational players is remaining location-specific, as is evidenced by 
the high degree of R&D and commercialisation that is still at least initially carried out 
in the home market. Factors which influence location will therefore influence 
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innovation and knowledge generation and diffusion.  Increasing international 
competition among countries for the latest technologies evidences awareness of this 
by those countries. The internationalisation of production and distribution is 
increasing the need for knowledge-based innovation across firms. 
 
 
Secondly, the structures of complex linkages among firms (networks, clusters or 
complexes in the literature) which an economy can engender and maintain will 
significantly influence both the willingness and the ability of firms to undertake and 
successfully exploit innovative activity. Economies with large gaps in these structures 
- such as breaks in important value chains - or with structures that have failed to 
develop a sufficient critical mass can, in the absence of remedial action, lead to 
permanent and negative consequences for long term productivity and export growth. 
Nowhere is this more important than in linking innovation to commercialisation, 
where ideas can not only be transformed into goods and services but distributed 
widely and rapidly to world markets. 
 
Thirdly, the shortening time between innovation, marketing and obsolescence means 
that firms must have sufficient size and financial wherewithal - or be able to link into 
that wherewithal - to take a concept to market very quickly.  Such speedy innovation 
requires access to significant amounts of finance, either externally or internally, as 
well as the ability to ramp up production volumes quickly and to penetrate global 
markets rapidly. Small players can become acutely vulnerable in a global marketplace 
where large competitors can take a concept, improve upon it very quickly and then 
saturate world markets. Complementary assets, like marketing capacity and 
distribution channels, are critical. 
 
This, in turn, raises the importance of access to scale as a complementary asset.  Scale 
of production and, especially, of distribution become critical in the globalised 
economy for all sectors of industry.  These factors will determine access not only to 
markets but also to the finance which is so essential to the funding of innovation and 
growth.  Scale can either be achieved internally to the firm or gained through linkages 
with other firms. 
 
Fourthly, knowledge- and innovation- intensive industries, being growth industries at 
the frontiers of technology, present entrepreneurs with short term monopoly profits, 
enabling them to pay higher wages than do low skill industries competing with low 
wage countries.  Thus, there are crucial issues related to living standards which attach 
to the nature of the industries operating and growing within an economy. 
 
Fifthly, the skill base of the economy becomes vital in the knowledge/innovation 
society. Not only must workers be well trained by formal educational institutions but 
they must be able to use their skills in the so-called ‘learning-by-doing’ that enables 
both the generation of original ideas and the absorption of recent innovations. This 
means that the education and on-the-job training systems must produce a wide array 
of skills.  But more than this, the industrial structure must be such as to provide 
trainees and workers with the opportunities to apply their skills and upgrade their 
knowledge.  An industry base which is too narrow will not provide such opportunities 
and a base which is of low knowledge intensity will provide neither the opportunity 
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nor the incentives for firms and their employees to acquire frontier knowledge 
applicable/diffusible across a wide range of industries. 
 
But it is not only technical skills which are important.  Managerial skills are perhaps 
more critical in that they determine the selection and application of those technical 
skills.  Poor managerial skills are likely to lead to failures between conceptualisation 
and commercialisation of new knowledge, or are likely to lead to poor integration of 
new technologies into existing practices.  Again, the existing structure and orientation 
of industry will influence management quality.  Managers networked via company 
linkages to leading edge firms with strong global distribution channels are more likely 
to learn positive management practices than those who are inwardly focussed and 
defensive. Indeed, only the better managers will perceive the opportunities associated 
with networking. Similarly, an industrial fabric with strong linkages and an export 
focus (requiring the scale prerequisites described above) may well be a precondition 
to the emergence of a cadre of effective managers. There is thus a feedback loop 
between management quality and industrial structure. 
 
Finally, one of the clear implications of all of this research is that the industrial 
structure of a nation matters to its potential growth and development. Both the mix of 
activities within the economy, as well as the structures of individual markets and 
firms, will influence knowledge production and diffusion and the rate of innovation. 
 
The next part of this report takes up the issues relating to Australia’s industrial 
structure which are raised implicitly by the literature surveyed above.  In particular, 
the next section begins the study of how Australia compares in relation to the critical 
issues raised by the need to become a learning economy.  These issues include the 
extent of the linkages which we already have both within and between industries, the 
distribution of knowledge-intensive industries and their contribution to the country’s 
system of innovation, to its wealth and job creation potential.   
 
Using these approaches, Part Two examines the Australian economy from a series of 
perspectives not usually included, so that a better assessment of areas of strength and 
weakness can be identified and better policies developed to deal with these.  Some 
suggestions for improved policies which derive both from the insights provided by the 
literature discussed above and the empirically-based analysis carried out in Part Two 
next are provided in Part Three.  These suggestions concern actions that could be 
taken by both public and private sectors, but it is clearly not within the purview of this 
report to do more than mention areas where attention needs to be focussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Part Two of this study examines the Australian economy in the light of a number of 
the features of a learning economy highlighted as important in Part One.  
 
In particular there is a focus on structure and on changes in structure - the industrial 
structure of the economy, the structure of employment and human capital, structures 
related to innovation and productivity and the structure of trade.  
 
As has been mentioned previously, many of the concepts rated as important in the 
learning economy literature are either difficult to quantify or, where they are not, 
there has been little data collected over the years. Thus, in some crucial areas such as 
the analysis of industrial clusters and complexes, there is almost no empirical material 
to analyse. This in turn means that the analysis must focus on more traditional and 
measured variables - especially economic aggregates - and this itself means that key 
concepts will escape scrutiny. Therefore the present analysis is necessarily 
constrained. 
 
This does not mean, however, that preliminary observations and conclusions cannot 
be drawn. Where this is possible such has been done. But it does imply that a more 
detailed evaluation of Australia’s national system of innovation will require better 
empirical tools. 
 
Part Two is broadly divided into four chapters. 
 
Chapter Seven examines trends in the industrial mix of the Australian economy over 
time. It also looks at cooperative linkages among firms which the research suggests 
are so important to knowledge generation, diffusion and use. The chapter further 
analyses some changes in the input-output structure of the economy over time, 
together with some data on industrial concentration. 
 
Chapter Eight focuses on human resources, and in particular trends in the skill and 
wage composition of Australian employment over time to see how they compare with 
the factors regarded as important in PartOne. 
 
Chapter Nine examines some of the data relating to industrial innovation. These 
include measures of research and development, innovation and productivity growth. 
Some of the factors which may lie behind the trends in the data are also discussed. 
 
Finally, Chapter Ten describes trends in Australia’s trade patterns over time and 
compares these with some of the points regarded in Part One as important for trade in 
an innovating world.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
ECONOMY 
 
The literature review presented in Part One indicated that the structure of an economy 
influences its ability to learn and to generate/diffuse the latest productivity-enhancing 
information. This is so at a number of levels.  
 
Firstly, the nature of the industrial activities within an economy will significantly 
influence the extent and type of ‘externalities’ or ‘spillovers’ (benefits which are not 
or cannot be captured by the entity which introduced them) which exist. Innovative 
industries which are knowledge intensive but also have economies of scale tend to 
carry more spillovers than others and are likely to show greater employment growth 
and pay higher wages. Also important is the existence of ‘complementary assets’ 
which facilitate the conversion of knowledge into marketed goods and services.  
These include adequate distribution channels. 
 
Secondly, the micro-level structure of each industry - its scale, its concentration, its 
degree of price and non-price competition - influences the ability of the firms in the 
industry to innovate (small firms producing undifferentiated products and competing 
mainly on price are not likely to be able to afford R&D and innovation experiments).  
 
Thirdly - and this is a related point - the structure of linkages among and within 
economic actors (firms, governments, regulators, capital markets, employees) also 
influences firms’ ability to learn and adapt to changing circumstances quickly and 
effectively.  
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the industrial structure of the Australian 
economy, both currently and as it has changed over time, with some discussion of the 
problems and benefits of that structure from a ‘learning economy’ perspective.  
 
 
1. Industry Shares 
 
The Australian economy has undergone significant compositional change over recent 
decades. Due to changes in data classifications - especially the introduction of the 
ANZSIC classification system - it is not possible to present a continuous picture of 
these changes at a detailed industry level over long periods, but broad level data is 
shown in Figure B.1 below. 
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Figure B.1 
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        Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
These can be tabulated as follows (Table B.1): 
 
Table B.1 
Broad Industry Shares of GDP 
% 
 
Year Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Dwellings13 Services 
      
1963 11 2 26 5 54 
1970 7 3 25 6 57 
1980 6 6 19 8 57 
1990 4 4 15 9 62 
1993 3 4 15 10 64 
      
Change -73% 100% -42% 100% 19% 
          
Note: Rows do not total 100 per cent due to omission of imputed bank service charges and import duties 
(combined 2-4 per cent of GDP). 
Source: Foster 1996 
 
These data show a picture of gradual decline in the share of agriculture and 
manufacturing industries and the growth of services. Importantly, the share occupied 
by ownership of dwellings has doubled over the last thirty years. Using the more 
recent ANZSIC classification it is possible to see a more detailed breakdown of 
industry shares from 1985 to 1995 as follows (Table B.2): 
 
 
                                                 
13 Ownership of Dwellings is a national accounts concept which essentially imputes rent to the 
households of owner-occupied housing. The larger the proportion of owner-occupied dwellings in a 
growing economy the higher this category. 
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Table B.2 
Industry Shares of GDP (ANZSIC) 
 
 1985 1990 1995 % Change '85-95 
     
Agriculture 4.5% 4.0% 2.9% -34.6% 
Mining 6.6% 4.3% 3.7% -44.1% 
Manufacturing 17.4% 15.2% 14.6% -16.3% 
Utilities 3.7% 3.3% 3.0% -18.2% 
Construction 6.8% 7.3% 6.2% -7.9% 
Wholesale 9.4% 10.4% 10.7% 14.0% 
Retail 6.9% 7.4% 7.5% 8.3% 
Accommodation 1.6% 1.9% 2.1% 31.2% 
Transport/Storage 5.8% 5.3% 5.6% -3.4% 
Communication 2.2% 2.3% 2.8% 27.5% 
Finance/Insurance 4.5% 5.4% 7.1% 59.7% 
Property/Business Serv. 6.3% 8.2% 8.1% 29.8% 
Govt/Defence 4.1% 3.5% 3.8% -7.3% 
Education 4.8% 4.4% 4.7% -1.6% 
Health/Community 5.1% 5.0% 5.6% 8.9% 
Culture/Recreation 1.9% 1.9% 2.3% 21.0% 
Personal/Other 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 9.2% 
Dwellings 8.3% 9.4% 9.5% 13.9% 
 
         Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
All of the goods-producing industries are declining in terms of their share of GDP, 
although the agriculture decline is exaggerated because of the effects of drought in 
1995. Some of these trends are likely to have been influenced, in part, by policy 
decisions: 
 
 There has been substantial growth in finance and insurance, reflecting the post-
deregulation boom in financial services. 
 Although this has been a feature of most advanced OECD countries, Australian 
manufacturing has contracted substantially, partly under the impact of import 
penetration and partly reflecting the growth, in the 1970s (see Table B.1), of other 
sectors such as mining (see Chapter 10 on Trade for the impact of trade on the 
manufacturing sector). The decline of manufacturing’s share of the economy has 
been quite marked14. In percentage terms, this sector’s share has fallen by almost 
                                                 
14 A significant portion of the analysis in this report relates to manufacturing industry. This is for a 
number of reasons: there is a greater volume and coverage of data for manufacturing industries both 
locally and internationally; manufacturing contributes most of Australia’s R&D which is viewed as an 
important driver of growth; trends in world trade suggest that high and medium-high technology 
manufactured goods are among the most rapid areas of world exports growth and such goods are high 
in innovation and ‘learning’ which are the focal points of this research; Australia’s manufacturing 
sector trade deficit - and in particular its structure - has a significant impact on Australia’s growth and 
innovation potential; survey data shows that Australian manufacturing has one of the highest 
propensities to innovate of all sectors, which make analyses of its dynamics important in a learning 
economy framework; within that framework, the structure of manufacturing is important because if, as 
is the case in Australia, manufacturing is biased towards the production of low technology goods then 
this will substantially influence the possibilities of the entire economy; finally, manufacturing is the 
most ‘linked’ to other sectors in an input-output sense, meaning that it has more sales to and purchases 
from other sectors. This means that any analysis which focuses on business linkages - and this is a key 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
Australia’s Industrial Structure                                                                                             7.93 
44 per cent since 1963. Figures comparing Australia’s manufacturing share 
decline with the changes in other advanced countries are presented in Figure B.2 
below. 
 
 
Figure B.2 
Percentage Change in Manufacturing Share of GDP 
Various OECD Countries 
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Source: OECD 1994a 
 
 The utilities are likely to have contracted in relative terms because of reduced 
demand from the goods-producing sector and also because of preparation for 
corporatisation and  privatisation (especially in relation to scaled-back capital 
expenditure). 
 Wholesaling is likely to have expanded through the increased distribution 
requirements of an economy more open to both exports and imports, together with 
the growth of retailing. 
 Tourism has expanded following sharp increases in inbound tourism promotion 
expenditure by the Commonwealth (see Chapter 10). 
 Dwelling expenditure has benefited from a taxation regime which favours 
property investment above investment in plant and equipment (see Table B.3). 
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
component of the ‘learning economy’ approach - needs to focus heavily on the most ‘linked’ sectors in 
order to measure and analyse linkage dynamics. 
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Table B.3 
Effective Tax Rates for Investment 
 
Ownership Asset Real Effective 
Tax Rate % 
   
Owner Occupied  Housing 11.4 
Negatively Geared Rental Housing -0.8 
Locally Owned Listed Company Machinery 42.5 
Locally Owned Listed Company Buildings 27.6 
   
         Source: Dowrick 1995 
 
 
 The communications sector has grown relatively rapidly as technological 
innovation in information technology and telecommunications industries has 
spread (largely from the United States) around the world, in response to the 
industry development obligations placed on telecommunications carriers by the 
Commonwealth through the Telecommunications Industry Development 
Authority, and as part of the roll-out of cable for fibre-optic communications. 
 
Thus government policy has influenced, and continues to influence, the industrial 
mix.  
 
When changes in industry shares in OECD countries and Australia are compared to 
those of other countries an interesting picture emerges. Many Asian economies appear 
to be taking the opposite developmental route to that of the OECD group - Table B.4 
below. 
 
Table B.4 
Percentage Increase in Manufacturing Share of GDP 
Selected Asian Countries 
1970-90 
 
Country Increase 
  
Indonesia 93% 
Thailand 72% 
Malaysia 55% 
Singapore 48% 
Korea 36% 
Philippines 0% 
 
Source: Derived from BIE 1995a 
 
The Asian economies have in general taken a different and more manufacturing-
intensive path over the post-war period to that of the advanced Western countries. 
Singapore has recently launched a program to prevent the manufacturing share of 
GDP falling below 20 per cent. 
 
Within the OECD there has been a general shift from low-technology manufacturing 
to higher technology manufacturing from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s 
(OECD 1994b: 59). This has not been paralleled by Australia which has maintained a 
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high share of investment (around 55 per cent) in low technology industries, especially 
food processing, paper processing and basic metals (1994b: 60). 
 
Within manufacturing it is also interesting to compare Australia’s industrial structure 
with that of the other OECD countries. DIST (1996: 72) dissects Australian and 
OECD manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP by R&D intensity 
grouping (high-tech, medium-high, medium-low and low-tech15). They find: 
 
 Australia’s manufacturing sector as a whole is smaller than the average OECD 
country profile. 
 The only areas where Australia’s manufacturing sector is relatively larger as a 
proportion of GDP are: 
 
 food; 
 non-ferrous metals; 
 shipbuilding. 
 
This manufacturing structure (which is not unexpected given our natural resources) 
gives Australia an inbuilt bias towards low-technology industries. This implies that in 
the absence of some external shock or policy intervention, Australia would be likely 
to continue to underperform in R&D (the data presented in Chapter 9 shows 
Australia’s relatively poor R&D performance) when compared to OECD averages. 
Fortunately, the 1983 policy intervention granting a 150 per cent tax concession for 
R&D expenditure, followed  by R&D syndication and various industry programs such 
as the Partnerships for Development program, have gone some way towards 
addressing the problem. 
 
2. Employment Shares 
 
In terms of employment, the following table shows the evolution of employment 
shares by industry (Table B.5). 
 
                                                 
15 A listing of high tech, medium high tech, medium low tech and low tech industries by OECD 
ranking is at Appendix One 
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Table B.5 
Employment Shares by Industry 
Selected Years 
% 
 
  1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1985(a) 1990 1995 
          
Agriculture  8.9 8.0 6.8 6.5 6.2 6.2 5.5 4.9 
Mining  1.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.0 
Manufacturing 25.5 24.5 21.6 19.7 16.7 16.3 14.9 13.6 
Construction 8.4 8.5 8.7 7.7 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.2 
Wholesale & Retail 20.6 20.2 19.8 20.3 19.8 19.8 20.6 20.6 
Transport & Storage 5.8 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.0 4.6 
Finance etc. 6.1 7.1 7.4 8.2 10.0 11.2 12.9 13.6 
Commun. Services 10.1 10.9 13.6 16.2 17.4 14.6 15.1 16.5 
Recreation  5.9 6.0 6.4 6.2 6.5 8.3 9.4 10.6 
Other  7.6 7.9 8.7 8.4 9.2 9.2 7.9 7.4 
 
(a) Change in industry classification 
 
         Source: Foster 1996 
 
The decline of manufacturing and agriculture is apparent, as is the growth of finance, 
community services and recreation. Tourism is included within recreational services.  
 
Within manufacturing industry it is interesting to see where most of the changes in 
employment have taken place. A tabular breakdown of changes over both the long 
term and more recently is shown in Table B.6. 
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Table B.6 
Changes in Manufacturing Employment by Subsector 
1970-94 
1970-94 1985-94 
  
Paper, etc. 20.2% 6.8% 
Wood Products 9.2% 9.8% 
Food, etc -12.9% 7.4% 
Other Manuf. -13.3% 20.0% 
Chemicals, Petrochem. -15.0% -1.0% 
Non-metallic Minerals -16.9% 0.0% 
Basic Metal Ind. -30.4% -3.4% 
Fabric. Metal Prod, Machinery & Equip -35.3% -13.5% 
TCF -48.1% -21.9% 
  
Total -20.7% -2.9% 
 
Source: Derived from OECD STAN database16 
 
The TCF sector is likely to be suffering the effects of increased import competition. 
Fabricated metal products includes motor vehicles and transport equipment, 
electronics, electrical equipment, aerospace and computers - many of the knowledge 
intensive manufacturing industries. This latter industry group has, as a whole, shed 
employment substantially more than has the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
 
When the 1985-94 subsectoral employment changes are plotted against R&D 
expenditure as a proportion of value added for these industries over the period an 
interesting picture emerges - Figure B.3. 
 
Figure B.3 
Changes in Manufacturing Subsector Employment v. Average Subsectoral 
R&D/Value Added Ratios 
1985-94 
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16 The OECD’s STAN database allows comparisons over time and across countries. Its classification 
system (ISIC) differs from the Australian systems (ASIC/ANZSIC). 
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The trends apparent in the major advanced OECD economies show a clear positive 
association in manufacturing between employment growth and R&D intensity. That 
is, the data points cluster so as to slope upwards and to the right. With Australia, 
however, there is not the strong positive correlation one would expect to see. While 
there has been stronger employment growth in the ‘other manufacturing’ category, 
which has a relatively high R&D intensity, there has been significant employment 
loss in the fabricated metal products category (which includes such industries as 
computers, electronics, electrical and non-electrical machinery and motor vehicles) 
which also has a relatively high R&D intensity.  
 
In a learning economy framework, the data points should hopefully slope upwards 
and to the right as per the OECD studies. Indeed, if ‘other manufacturing’ and TCF 
(which has its own trade-related dynamics) are excluded, the data points cluster quite 
closely so as to slope downwards and to the left - precisely the reverse of the desired 
picture. 
 
It is also possible that Australia’s faster decline in manufacturing share of GDP may 
have had employment consequences (Figure B.4). The graph shows evidence from 10 
OECD countries that the unemployment rate tended to increase more in countries 
where the manufacturing sector’s share of the economy fell the most17. 
 
 
Figure B.4 
Change in Unemployment Rate v. Change in Manufacturing Share of GDP 
Ten OECD Countries 
1970-90 
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Source: OECD 1994a 
 
 
                                                 
17 This is a small data set and strong conclusions cannot be drawn without further detailed and more 
extensive research. 
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This could possibly be related to several factors, including: 
 
 import penetration (see Chapter 10 on the effects of manufactured imports on 
Australian manufacturing and total unemployment); 
 failure of the services sector to grow at a rate sufficient to absorb employment lost 
from manufacturing; 
 wage/skill mismatches; 
 skill-biased technological change (i.e. technical change negatively affected 
economies whose manufacturing sectors were predominantly lower-tech). 
 
3. Cooperative Business Linkages 
 
The importance in modern economies of the nature and extent of linkages among 
economic actors is stressed in the literature reviewed earlier, as these linkages 
substantially influence the ability of firms to innovate, learn and adapt. In addition, 
networks of linkages are said by the international research to be better than simple 
alliances such as those in joint ventures. 
 
Unfortunately there is very little detailed national-level research on business 
networking across all industries either in Australia or overseas. This chapter therefore 
relies heavily on an extensive survey of business linkages among Australian 
manufacturing firms undertaken by the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) in 1994. 
The BIE conducted a mail survey of 5,000 Australian firms across five manufacturing 
industries. Of these firms 1,300 responded18.  
 
                                                 
18 The sample was structured to be broadly representative of Australian manufacturing industry. The 
table below  provides details: 
 
Sample Structure and Response Rate 
 
Industry Sample Sizea Returns Response Rate (%) 
 
Clothing & footwear 
 
1250 
 
291 
 
23.3 
Engineering 1694 578 34.1 
IT&T 343 131 38.2 
Sci. & Med. Equip. 330 122 37.0 
Proc. Foods & Bev. 477 156 32.7 
    
Total 4094 1286b 31.4 
 
a. The sample size is equal to the number of forms dispatched less the number of firm ‘deaths’ identified by                                 
returns. 
b. Industries could not be identified for 8 respondents. 
 
The response rate of 30% is considered by the BIE and ABS to be satisfactory for a non-compulsive 
survey. A response-bias check was also conducted. This involved a survey of 100 non-respondents. 
The results indicated the existence of one main problem, that only 22% of non-respondents were 
involved in cooperative arrangements, compared to 41% of respondents. Nevertheless, the entire data 
set has not been adjusted, largely because the bias is not evident when analysing the characteristics of 
cooperating firms. 
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(a) Cooperative Business Linkages in Australia 
 
The BIE’s survey focussed on the notion of ‘business cooperation’, which is 
interpreted as business linkages/networks in which ‘firms work together for a 
common aim and share information and resources and/or jointly undertake tasks’ 
(1995b: xvii).  
 
The BIE found that one third of respondents were involved in significant cooperative 
arrangements, where ‘significant’ forms of cooperation involve ‘core’ activities such 
as customer/supplier agreements, joint ventures, partnerships and business networks. 
Up to two-thirds of firms engaged in either core or marginal cooperation (where 
marginal cooperation includes activities such as forecasting and feedback). One third 
of firms were not in cooperative relationships. These figures are sample bias adjusted 
estimates. 
 
The BIE’s analysis refers only to those firms with core cooperative arrangements 
because most of the analysis is based on the mail-survey, in which firms mostly 
ignored marginal forms of cooperation. 
 
The information technology and telecommunications (IT&T) and the scientific and 
medical (sci/med) industries revealed above average propensities to cooperate, 
whereas the clothing and footwear industries and the food industry had below average 
levels of cooperation. Figure B.5 provides details. This is consistent with other 
indicators of innovation also favouring more knowledge intensive industries (see 
Chapter 9). 
 
 
Figure B.5 
Percentage of Cooperating Firms19 
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         Source: BIE 1995b 
 
                                                 
19 The BIE uses the figure of 41% for all industries. This is the survey response rather than the bias 
adjusted figure reported above. 
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Table B.7 reviews levels of cooperation by various characteristics. These figures 
show that the type of firm most likely to cooperate is a large, high-technology, high-
growth exporter. 
 
Table B.7 
Proportion of Firms Cooperating, by Characteristic 
% 
 
 Characteristic Per Cent of Firms 
Cooperating 
   
O/S Trade Exporters 54 
 Non-exporters 35 
   
Size Micro 36 
 Small 44 
 Medium 43 
 Large 63 
   
Technology Low 32 
 Medium 40 
 High 50 
   
Performance High 50 
 Low 35 
 
                Source: BIE 1995b 
 
 
A key  indicator of the intensity of firms’ cooperation is the number of arrangements 
per firm. It was found that 30 per cent of firms maintained only one arrangement, 46 
per cent had between two and four arrangements and 24 per cent had between five 
and ten arrangements. 
 
The type of cooperative arrangement most prevalent involves just two firms - such as 
a firm working closely with its major supplier/customer. The prevalence of single-
partner relationships, versus networks of activity, is examined by industry in Table 
B.8a. 
 
Figure B.8a 
Proportion of Cooperating Firms Involved in Business Networks 
% 
 
Industry Single-partner 
Relationships 
Only 
Involved in 
Multi-partner 
Relationships 
   
Cloth. & foot. 72 28 
Sci/med 72 28 
Engineering 64 36 
IT&T 63 37 
Food 58 41 
   
All Industries 67 33 
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       Source: Derived from BIE 1995b 
 
 
The clothing and footwear, and sci/med industries have the equal lowest involvement 
in networks, reflecting the reliance of firms in these industries on specialised 
relationships, primarily with customers and suppliers. 
 
The type of cooperative arrangement entered into by firms can also be examined in 
terms of the location of partner firms. Just over one third of all cooperating firms had 
links with firms located overseas. Table B.8b shows overseas linkages by industry. 
 
Table B.8b 
Overseas Linkages by Industry 
 
Industry % of 
Cooperating 
Firms 
  
IT&T 54 
Sci/med 50 
Engineering 38 
Food 29 
Cloth. & foot. 14 
  
All Firms 36 
         
         Source: BIE 1995b 
 
The IT&T and sci/med industries had much higher propensities to be in relationships 
with overseas firms than the other industry sectors surveyed. This may reflect the high 
levels of foreign ownership in these industries. These industries are also ones where 
the level of intra-industry trade is high. 
 
(b) Benefits of Cooperation 
 
As the international literature predicts, cooperation has led to a number of benefits for 
firms in Australian manufacturing. Eighty-eight per cent of firms received benefits 
from cooperation in the form of increased profits/sales, whilst 75 per cent  of 
cooperating firms claimed to have obtained ‘major’ or ‘critical’ benefits. The most 
common major/critical benefits were increased profits/sales and increased market 
knowledge, as illustrated in Figure B.6. 
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Figure B.6 
Proportion of Cooperating Firms Receiving Major/Critical Benefits from Cooperation 
% 
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Source: BIE 1995b 
 
These benefits are typical of the characteristics identified in the literature as being 
important to, and generated by, a learning economy.  
 
The BIE suggests that firms entered into cooperative arrangements in search of 
concrete benefits (such as increased profits/sales) while most also gained ‘invaluable’ 
knowledge. The BIE concludes that the very significant ‘market knowledge’ outcome 
is an unanticipated by-product of cooperation. This is precisely the kind of knowledge 
spillover predicted by the ‘learning economy’ literature as likely to flow from strong 
firm linkages. 
 
The benefits of cooperation can also be examined by industry. A benefit index (the 
total number of firms receiving major/critical benefits for the leading seven benefit 
categories above, divided by seven) was employed to compare results. Figure B.7 
indicates that the IT&T industry achieved the highest benefit index, whilst the 
clothing and footwear industries achieved a benefit index below the All Industry 
average. 
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Figure B.7  
Benefit Index, by Industry 
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         Source: BIE 1995b 
 
Figure B.8 reveals the most common benefits cited by cooperating firms for each 
industry. Of interest here is the IT & T industry’s emphasis on overseas 
customers/suppliers and the sci/med industry’s emphasis on market knowledge. The 
BIE also noted that for IT&T firms the arrangements gave local firms an increase in 
bargaining power which would not have been possible with normal arm’s length 
relationships. 
 
 
Figure B.8 
Two Most Common Benefits Cited by Cooperating Firms 
 by Industry 
(%) 
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       Source: Adapted from BIE 1995b 
 
The benefits of cooperation can also be examined by the technology intensity of a 
firm’s product and firm size, as shown in Table B.9 
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Table B.9 
Major/Critical Benefits of Cooperation by Characteristic 
Benefit Index 
 
  Benefit Index 
   
Technology Content of Low Tech 21 
Firms Product/s Medium Tech 28 
 High Tech 39 
   
   
Firm Size Micro 29 
 Small 32 
 Medium 36 
 Large 40 
            
           
       Source: Derived from BIE 1995b 
 
There appears to be a direct relationship between the proportion of firms reporting 
major/critical benefits and, firstly, technology content and, secondly, firm size. 
Larger, more high-tech firms had a higher benefit index. 
 
In addition to examining benefits across the breadth of cooperative arrangements, the 
BIE also focussed on performance/competitiveness outcomes of firms’ ‘key’ 
arrangements. Almost three-quarters of firms achieved higher turnover as a direct 
result of their key cooperative arrangement, while over half such firms experienced 
higher profits. 
 
Sixty per cent of firms reported an increase in customer service. This is likely to 
reflect the impact of key arrangements with major customers. 
 
Table B.10 looks at performance/competitiveness impacts by industry. Here, the 
sci/med industry stands-out in terms of very positive turnover, profit and customer 
service impacts. The engineering and IT&T sectors performed well in terms of 
turnover increases, whilst the clothing and footwear industry showed by far the lowest 
proportion of firms reporting increases in exports.  
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Table B.10 
Positive Impacts of Key Arrangements, by Industry  
Proportion of Cooperating Firms Reporting Positive Impacts 
% 
 
 Cloth. & 
Foot. 
Engin-
eering 
IT&T Sci/med Food All 
Ind. 
Performance Indicators       
Turnover 61 71 69 79 71 70 
Profits 53 61 63 67 67 61 
Productivity 58 50 43 55 48 51 
Employment 29 41 53 48 36 41 
Exports 17 25 44 42 41 30 
Competitiveness Measures       
Customer Service 61 62 62 65 47 60 
Quality 57 55 58 47 57 56 
Technology 36 60 68 44 31 52 
Price 36 40 43 40 37 40 
                   
Source: BIE 1995b 
 
(c) Location 
 
Location was clearly an important factor in the performance/competitiveness results 
of the key arrangements, again as the international literature predicts. The distribution 
of firms’ arrangements by partner location was as follows (BIE 1995b): 
 
 40 per cent had all of their partners within the same city/town 
 10 per cent had all partners within the same state (but none in the same city/town) 
 10 per cent had partners exclusively interstate 
 20 per cent had partners exclusively overseas; and 
 20 per cent had partners in a combination of the above groups 
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Figure B.9 
Performance and Competitiveness Indicators of Key Arrangements, by Partner 
Location 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Employment Turnover Profits Productivity Exports Technology Quality Price Customer
service
Same city/tow n Within ow n state Interstate Overseas Average all arrangments
 
                    Source: BIE 1995b 
 
The data suggest that the relative benefits of local arrangements were concentrated 
most in relation to technology, quality and customer service. 
 
The areas where domestic linkages provided greater benefits were: 
 
 turnover 
 profits 
 productivity 
 customer service 
 
The areas where overseas linkages generated higher benefits were: 
 
 employment 
 exports 
 technology 
 price 
 
(d) The Importance of External Assistance 
 
Firms may be assisted in their networking by government programs (such as 
AusIndustry’s Business Networks Program) or industry associations. Looking firstly 
at government assistance, the survey results yield a benefit index of 38 for assisted 
firms and 32 for non-assisted firms. The returns to assisted firms outstripped those of 
their unassisted counterparts most dramatically in the area of overseas 
customers/suppliers, as shown in Figure B.10 below: 
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Figure B.10 
Business Cooperation Benefits and Government Assistance 
Proportion of Cooperating Firms Reporting Major Benefits from Cooperation20 
% 
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         Source: BIE 1995b 
 
In the majority of cases firms using government assistance with their networking 
gained greater benefits than those which did not. With regard to industry associations, 
assisted firms generated a benefit index of 37, whilst unassisted firms yielded a 
benefit index of only 28. The returns to assisted firms outstripped those of their 
unassisted counterparts most in the area of market knowledge, as shown below in 
Figure B.11: 
 
                                                 
20 This is only a proxy measure of the effectiveness of government assistance. However, the BIE 
provides evidence supporting the usefulness of the measure (1995b: 237). 
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Figure B.11 
Business Cooperation Benefits and Industry Association Assistance 
Proportion of Cooperating Firms Reporting Major Benefits from Cooperation21 
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Source: BIE 1995b 
 
The BIE concludes that both government and industry bodies can improve the 
effectiveness of their networking programs and increase the reach of assistance. 
 
(e) The International Context 
 
There are few international studies covering factors that impinge on networking 
activity and so it is not possible to directly rate Australia’s networking propensity. 
One area, however, which is relevant to networking - or at least one of its facilitators - 
is that of technology utilisation. Communication technology is an important facilitator 
in networking as it allows timely exchange of the information so essential for joint 
decision-making. 
 
                                                 
21 Again, this is a proxy measure of the effectiveness of industry assistance. The BIE argues for  the 
usefulness of the measure (1995b: 239). 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
Australia’s Industrial Structure                                                                                             7.110 
Figure B.12 
Information Technologies, by Country22 
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Source: ftp://nic.merit.edu/nsfnet/statistics/1995/nsf-9502.country. In BIE 1995b 
 
The evidence from Figure B.12 suggests that business in Australia is a leading user of 
the information technologies reviewed is comparable with most of the countries 
surveyed. This at least provides some of the infrastructure required for firms to be 
able to network. 
 
4. User-Producer Relations23 
 
The literature review of Part One stressed the importance of inter-firm linkages. 
OECD (1997) shows that new product development across almost all industries has 
been significantly higher in industries where there has been research and development 
collaboration, and that sources of information for firms in the computer sector has 
been greatest from clients and customers. Strong customer relations are a major spur 
to product and process innovation. 
 
While much of the discussion in the literature has centred on relationships at the firm 
level, we believe it is useful to look at relationships at the national level as well.  This 
approach allows an understanding as to how a nation organises its production, and 
provides a ‘road map’ of a nation’s industrial structure. As most firms are not 
exporters, the structure of domestic user-producer linkages will be very important. 
 
The approach taken here is that of input-output analysis, which shows from which 
industries domestic industrial producers have sourced their supplies. It is important to 
bear in mind that these data measure flows of intermediate goods and services, not 
final output. 
 
                                                 
22 Other data from the Internet Domain Survey run by the Internet Society also suggest Australia is a 
lead user. July 1994 data, for example, suggested that Australia had the second highest levels of hosts 
per GDP in the world. 
23 Analysis for this section on user-producer relations was developed from conceptual work (including 
a seminar presentation at Aalborg University in May 1997) for a doctoral thesis by Brian Wixted at the 
University of Western Sydney. 
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Australia’s input-output patterns are discussed and compared both over time and 
across a small number of other countries. 
 
It should be noted that the current approach is novel - to our knowledge not having 
been conducted before either within Australia or overseas - and its conclusions must 
therefore be regarded as tentative despite their conceptual and intuitive appeal. 
 
(a) Input-Output Analysis 
Input-output measurement is a long established technique that analyses the 
transactional flows within an economy, registering them on a matrix,  simultaneously 
by origin and by destination. Here we present the tables diagrammatically for ease of 
understanding, with the unit of measurement being percentage of GDP (better for 
international comparisons than dollar values). The database used is the OECD's Input-
Output Database 1995.  The database contains data for the following industries: 
 
 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
 Mining & quarrying 
 Food, beverages & tobacco 
 Textiles, apparel & leather 
 Wood products & furniture 
 Paper, paper products & printing 
 Industrial chemicals 
 Drugs & medicines 
 Petroleum & coal products 
 Rubber & plastic products 
 Non-metallic mineral products 
 Iron & steel 
 Non-ferrous metals 
 Metal products 
 Non-electrical machinery 
 Office & computing machinery 
 Electrical apparatus, nec 
 Radio, TV & communication equipment 
 Shipbuilding & repairing 
 Other transport 
 Motor vehicles 
 Aircraft 
 Professional goods 
 Other manufacturing 
 Electricity, gas & water 
 Construction 
 Wholesale & retail trade 
 Restaurants & hotels 
 Transport & storage 
 Communication 
 Finance & insurance 
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 Real estate & business services 
 Community, social & personal services 
 Producers of government services 
 Other producers 
 
For some countries various confidentiality requirements restrict the information 
available in relation to some sectors. This means that data for these industries is 
sometimes not specifically itemised and is added to that of others, with zeros 
appearing in the tables in some industries’ rows and/or columns. Where this occurs 
the appropriate null categories have been removed. 
 
(b) Australia’s Input-Output Structure 
 
The following analysis compares input-output patterns in Australia over two periods - 
1975 and 1989 (the latest available from the OECD24). 
 
The graphical snapshot of Australia’s input-output matrix, or ‘landscape’, is shown in 
the following pages. The four charts show: 
 
 the ‘landscape’ as at 1975 
 the landscape as at 1989 
 increases in the peaks of the landscape from 1975-89 - i.e. industries where 
domestic interactions increased 
 decreases in the peaks of landscape from 1975-89 - i.e. industries where domestic 
interactions decreased 
 
The lower left hand axis in each graph records producing industries, while the lower 
right hand axis shows the consuming (user) industries. The height of the ‘peaks’ 
measures the intensity of trade between each producer industry and each user 
industry, expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
 
The ‘Increases’ graph shows the positive changes in each industry’s trade with each 
other industry between 1975 and 1989. The ‘Decreases’ chart shows the negative 
changes over the period but is inverted (i.e. multiplied by minus one) so as to be 
visible above the floor of the graph. 
 
                                                 
24 This will, of necessity, not capture some of the structural changes that have taken place in Australia 
since the 1990s recession but, due to timing differences in the recoveries of different countries from 
that recession, this may not be a bad thing for international comparison purposes. 
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The 1975 Landscape 
 
The 1975 landscape is dominated by strong peaks in the left and right corners of the 
matrix, representing trade in the resources and services sectors. The major linkages 
(defined here as being greater then 1 per cent of GDP) were as shown in Table B.11. 
 
 
Table B.11 
Main User-Producer Linkages 
Australia  
1975 
 
Producers Users % of GDP
 
Agriculture Food & Beverage manufacturing 3.8
Finance and Insurance Community, social and personal services 3.3
Real estate and business services Community, social and personal services 2.1
Food & Beverage manufacturing Food & Beverage manufacturing 2.0
Non metallic mineral products Construction 1.5
Community, social and personal services Community, social and personal services 1.5
Metal products Construction  1.3
Communication Community, social and personal services 1.3
Paper, paper products and printing Community, social and personal services 1.2
Textiles, apparel & Leather Textiles, apparel & Leather 1.1
Motor vehicles Motor vehicles 1.1
Wholesale & retail trade Wholesale & retail trade 1.1
Wholesale & retail trade Construction 1.0
 
Source: Calculations from OECD Input-Output Database 
 
 
The average peak across the entire 1975 landscape was 0.071 per cent. This measures 
the ‘density’ of inter- and intra-industry trade across the domestic economy and is 
thus one measure of the potential for linkages to be developed among firms25. It is also 
a measure of the level of domestic capability - lower values of this measure reflect a 
lower ability to compete with imports, or a higher dependence on imports. 
 
The diagonal of the matrix - running in the charts from left to right hand corners - 
represents each industry trading with itself. This ‘backbone’ of the matrix represents 
another dimension of the potential for linkages to develop. Inter-firm linkages should 
desirably grow both within and outside the value chains within which firms operate. 
The higher the average of the peaks along the ‘backbone’, the greater the intensity of 
interaction among firms within industries and the greater potential to build networks 
of producers. The average statistic for the intra-industry backbone for 1975 was 0.442 
per cent. 
 
                                                 
25 Note that these ‘linkages’ are exchange-based transactions rather than the cooperative linkages 
discussed earlier in this report. However it is likely that the more intense the exchange-based linkages, 
the greater the ability across the economy to foster cooperative networks. In the limiting situation of 
zero trade between sectors it is hard to imagine significant networking taking place. 
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The 1989 Landscape 
 
By 1989 a number of changes had taken place in Australia’s industrial landscape. The 
industries with trade above the 1 per cent of GDP level were as shown in Table B.12a. 
 
 
Table B.12a 
Main User-Producer Linkages 
Australia  
1989 
 
Producers Users % of GDP
 
Real estate and Business services Wholesale & retail trade 3.1
Agriculture Food & Beverage manufacturing 2.7
Real estate and business services Community, social and personal services 2.1
Real estate and Business services Real estate and Business services 1.5
Food & Beverage manufacturing Food & Beverage manufacturing 1.2
Electricity, gas & water Electricity, gas & water 1.2
Non metallic mineral products Construction 1.2
Finance and insurance Finance and Insurance 1.1
Electricity, gas & water Real estate and Business services 1.0
 
Source: Calculations from OECD Input-Output database  
 
 
Here the rankings have changed and the total number of interactions above 1 per cent 
of GDP have fallen. Further, the average density across the entire domestic matrix has 
fallen to 0.063 per cent (a drop of 11.3 per cent) while the average backbone density 
has become 0.373 per cent (a fall of 15.6 per cent).  
 
These data therefore show a reduction in the production and sale of intermediate 
goods within the economy as a proportion of domestic output, and thus a reduction in 
the strength of the domestic linkages - thus measured - within the economy. This 
reduction has been greater within industries than across industries.   
 
Major Specific Changes 
 
The major changes over the period were: 
 
 a rise of 3.0 per cent of GDP in real estate & business services supplying 
wholesale & retail 
 a rise of 1.5 per cent in real estate & business services supplying itself 
 a rise of 0.9 per cent in real estate & business services supplying finance & 
insurance 
 a rise of 0.8 per cent in finance & insurance supplying real estate & business 
services 
 a fall of 2.9 per cent in finance & insurance supplying community & personal 
services  
 a fall of 1.1 per cent of in agriculture supplying the food industry 
 a fall of 1.0 per cent in communication supplying community & personal services 
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 a fall of 0.9 per cent in community & personal services supplying itself  
 a fall of 0.9 per cent in intra-industry motor vehicle trade 
 
It is perhaps surprising - but consistent with the path-dependence thesis argued in Part 
One - to see that, in general terms, there was only a relatively small number of major 
shifts in domestic inter-industry trade density over the 1975-89 period. Clearly, the 
largest increase in inter-industry trade was based around the real estate and business 
services industries. The largest declines surrounded the community & personal 
services industries and the food industry. 
 
In intra-industry commerce, the major increases were related to the utilities, transport 
& storage, real estate & business services and communications industries.  Most intra-
industry categories contracted, moreover, thus contributing to the decline in the 
backbone density measure. The motor vehicle industry, iron & steel, electrical 
apparatus and food industries showed the greatest declines. 
 
The data also suggest that we have not done well in the area of adding value to our 
natural resources - it appears that the interactions between users and producers of 
agricultural products have decreased over the period (by just over 1 per cent of GDP) 
whereas for mining there has been an increase of 0.6 per cent. The former of these is 
significant in comparative terms across the matrix, whereas the latter is not a large 
increase (it is substantially smaller, for example, than the decline in intra-industry 
motor vehicle trade). 
 
Overall the picture presented here is somewhat disappointing. Firstly, over the period 
under examination Australia’s export intensity increased substantially (see Chapter 
10), yet we see a decline in average linkage density. This suggests that the drive to 
increase exports through increasing overall trade intensity has not resulted in a net 
positive effect on domestic linkages. It also suggests that many of Australia’s 
exporters may not have strong domestic inter- or intra-industry linkages. This may 
reflect the nature of our exports, being more resourced-based with fewer pull-through 
effects. 
 
Secondly, domestic transactions in domestically produced outputs of most of the 
highly engineered or fabricated products (machinery, motor vehicles, professional 
goods, radio & TV apparatus, other transport) have declined. Many of these are the 
‘knowledge intensive’ goods discussed elsewhere in this report as important to 
externalities and growth. 
 
Thirdly, the industries of greatest decline have been areas such as education and 
health which are activities which improve the level of human capital formation and 
improve innovative capability. 
 
The overall density of domestic user-producer relations - at least as measured by this 
input-output approach - has declined. This could be termed a ‘hollowing out’ of 
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domestic industry capability26 which the measure used - average input-output density - 
suggests was of the order of 11 per cent over the period. 
 
Fifthly, the ‘backbone’ density of input-output relationships has also decreased - by a 
larger 16 per cent. This means that intra-industry activity is contracting and doing so 
at a faster rate than inter-industry activity.  
 
In terms of the importance of inter-firm connections - both inter-industry and intra-
industry - for innovation and learning, this suggests that a key aspect of Australia’s 
linkage potential may be weakening through a decline in the domestic industrial 
‘critical mass’. 
 
A summary of the Australian intertemporal situation and the results of similar 
calculations for Denmark, Canada - two resource-based economies - and Japan are 
shown in Table B.12b below. 
 
Table B.12b 
Changes in Input-Output Densities 
Various Countries 
 
 1975 1989 Change
Australia Average 0.071 0.063 -11.5%
 Backbone 0.442 0.373 -15.7%
 
 1971 1990 Change
Canada Average 0.060 0.058 -4.3%
 Backbone 0.313 0.342 9.2%
 
 1972 1990 Change
Denmark Average 0.061 0.060 -1.2%
 Backbone 0.332 0.322 -3.0%
 
 1975 1990 Change
Japan Average 0.078 0.073 -6.5%
 Backbone 0.711 0.622 -12.5%
less steel Average 0.072 0.070 -3.5%
 Backbone 0.531 0.555 4.5%
  
 
Source: Calculations from OECD Input-Output Database 
 
On a comparative basis27 Australia’s aggregate measure of input-output density 
declined by substantially more than that of the other countries shown. This suggests 
that intermediate industrial transaction linkages weakened more in Australia than 
elsewhere. Further, ‘backbone’ or intra-industry linkages also appear to have 
weakened more in Australia than in the other countries. When adjustment is made for 
the decline of one industry in Japan - steel - then a poor input-output linkage 
                                                 
26 It is possible that input-saving technological change could also contribute to the reduction in the 
average values of these measures 
27 The small differences in start and end dates across countries may have some impact on the relative 
changes of these measures. 
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performance in that country (more particularly with intra-industry trade) becomes 
quite positive. This serves as an indication of the vulnerability of economies to the 
loss of particular sectors. 
 
Moreover, the table shows that, in absolute terms, despite the more rapid deterioration 
of intermediate linkages in Australia over the period, Australia still retains a relatively 
high input-output density in relation to some other resource-based economies. This 
suggests that Australia is still reasonably well placed to build these types of industrial 
linkages but may need to move to stem the more rapid rate of decline. 
 
5. Industry Concentration 
 
There has been much discussion in both political and journalistic circles about the 
importance of the growth of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). This has 
been emphasised by publications such as McKinsey’s Going Global report on SME 
exports and by comments from political leaders regarding the importance of 
employment growth in SMEs in solving the unemployment problem. If the small firm 
is in fact at the centre stage of economic analysis - which is the case for traditional 
microeconomics - then policy prescriptions for economic development will be very 
different to those which would apply if larger firms predominate. If large firms 
control significant sections of the economy and are responsible for much employment 
and investment, and if these large firms are relatively small in number, then policy 
prescriptions will need to adapt.  
 
This adaptation will need to recognise the importance to sectors and the economy of 
critical investors - both actual and potential - and also take into account the effects of 
economies of scale outlined in Part One of this document. In a world where 
information production and diffusion are paramount, where ‘spillovers’ drive growth 
and where larger firms are key producers of many of these spillovers, then policy will 
in many cases have to be more finely grained and tailored rather than broad and 
generic. 
 
Australian business is in fact quite heavily concentrated. An ABS report (ABS 
8140.0) shows that large businesses - defined for the purposes of the publication as 
employing more than 200 people or having assets above $200 million28 - constitute 
only 0.4 per cent of the total number of businesses in Australia, yet account for 
substantial proportions of employment, capital expenditure and gross product (Table 
B.13). 
 
                                                 
28 These thresholds (200 employees or $200 million) are small by international standards. 
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Table B.13 
Large Business Proportion of Total Business Employment, Capital Expenditure and 
Gross Product 
1995 
 
Year Employment Capital Expenditure Gross Product 
    
1991 38.3% 55.6% 47.9% 
1992 37.1% 63.9% 47.2% 
1993 37.0% 63.8% 48.8% 
1994 37.5% 61.6% 49.7% 
1995 38.5% 64.3% 49.7% 
          
Source: ABS 8140.0 
 
 
Interestingly these shares have not altered greatly over recent years for employment, 
but have increased for both industry gross product and, in particular, capital 
investment. This suggests that much popular discussion describing the small business 
sector as the primary driver of growth and employment may be misplaced. 
 
The 0.4 per cent of businesses described above also earns 61.1 per cent of all pre-tax 
profits and shows profit margins of 10.8 per cent versus 7.1 per cent for SMEs (ABS 
8140.0). This higher profit rate is likely to be important in allowing large businesses 
to provide better wages and benefits (despite employing 38.5 per cent of workers 
large businesses pay 49.5 per cent of labour costs (ABS 8140.0)), spend more on 
training and engage in higher levels of R&D expenditure (see Chapters 8 and 9 of this 
report). 
 
Very little concentration data is available for all industry sectors for long periods, but 
data for manufacturing extends back into the 1960s (Table B.14). 
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Table B.14 
Manufacturing Industry 
Largest Twenty Enterprise Groups’29 Share of Employment, Wages, Turnover, 
Value Added & Capital Investment 
 
 
Year Employment Wages/Salaries Turnover Value Added Capex 
      
1969 15% 17% 22% 19% 21% 
1973 15% 18% 21% 18% 28% 
1978 16% 19% 21% 18% 29% 
1983 16% 20% 24% 19% 23% 
1988 15% 18% 23% n.a. n.a. 
1989 17% 20% 25% n.a. n.a. 
1990 17% 20% 28% n.a. 27% 
1991 17% 20% 28% n.a. 32% 
1992 18% 20% 28% n.a. 30% 
1993 17% 24% 28% 22% 35% 
1994 18% n.a. 30% n.a. 35% 
1995 19% n.a. 30% n.a. 32% 
 
       Source: ABS 8140.0 and unpublished data 
 
 
The employment share of the 20 largest manufacturing businesses has increased over 
the last few decades but, importantly, the wages and salaries share has grown faster. 
This again shows that the margin between the wages paid by large firms and those 
paid by small firms is widening. Larger firms increasingly pay better than do small 
ones.  
 
By all of these measures the relative contribution of the top 20 businesses in 
manufacturing has increased over this period. This means that while as the Australian 
manufacturing sector has shrunk in relative size (see earlier chapters), the economic 
power and importance of large firms has increased. 
 
The contributions to employment made by large and small businesses across various 
sectors are shown in Table B.15. 
 
                                                 
29 The ‘enterprise group’ is defined by the ABS as ‘a unit covering all the operations in Australia of 
one or more legal entities under common ownership/control. It covers all the operations in Australia of 
legal entities which are related in terms of the current Corporations Law. These may be legal entities 
such as trusts and partnerships as well as companies. Majority ownership is not required for control to 
be exercised’. 
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Table B.15 
Contribution to Total Employment by Business Size 
Various Industries 
1995 
 
     
Industry  Total 
Businesses in 
Industry  
Large Businesses as 
% Total in Industry
Total Employment 
in Industry  
Large Business 
Employment as % 
Total 
     
Mining        3,000  3.6%                 81,000 76.5% 
Manufacturing       42,000  1.6%               960,000 50.4% 
Utilities        1,000  5.1%                 73,000 87.7% 
Construction       75,000  0.1%               289,000 16.6% 
Wholesale       44,000  0.4%               413,000 25.4% 
Retail     106,000  0.2%               908,000 45.0% 
Tourism       30,000  0.5%               380,000 25.3% 
Transp/Storage       26,000  0.5%               311,000 52.4% 
Communic        1,600  0.4%               124,000 94.4% 
Finance/Ins       20,000  1.6%               284,000 78.2% 
Property/Bus. Serv     107,000  0.2%               618,000 24.6% 
Priv Commun Serv       47,000  0.7%               534,000 32.6% 
Culture/Rec       15,000  0.5%               158,000 27.2% 
Personal/Other       30,000  0.2%               152,000 18.4% 
     
All Industries     663,000  0.4%            5,632,000 38.5% 
 
         Source: ABS 8140.0 
 
 
Again the picture of relatively high levels of concentration in key Australian sectors - 
mining, utilities, transport, communications and finance and insurance - is confirmed. 
 
Looking at the largest four enterprise groups by industry it can be shown that in some 
sectors a very small number of enterprises dominate the industry (Table B.16). 
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Table B.16 
Largest Four Enterprise Groups’ Contribution to Industry Employment30 
1995 
% 
 
Industry Share of Total Employment 
 
Communications 93.2 
Mining 31.3 
Finance/Insurance 30.0 
Retail 28.3 
Utilities 24.0 
Transport/Storage 16.1 
Tourism 8.8 
Manufacturing 6.7 
Personal/Other 4.8 
Construction 3.7 
Culture/Rec 2.6 
Private Community Serv 2.5 
Wholesale 1.6 
Property/Bus. Services 1.2 
 
All Industries 6.3 
 
        Source: ABS Unpublished data 
 
 
The data show that in a number of industries - communications, mining, finance, 
retail, utilities and transport - the top four groups account for a very sizeable share 
(above 15 per cent) of the industry’s employment. It is possible that these figures may 
actually understate the degree of concentration in some industries due to the level of 
aggregation involved in the presentation of the data. For example the aluminium 
production industry, the steel industry, computer manufacture, chemicals and 
shipbuilding are dominated by a very small number of companies, as are the banking 
and insurance industries. 
 
The implications of these trends are substantial.  
 
Firstly, notions of ‘perfect competition’ and perfectly competitive firm behaviour, 
which form an important part of the core of much of contemporary economic 
modelling, would not reflect the reality of these sectors. Perfect competition in the 
textbooks is characterised by homogeneous products, a single market-clearing price, 
no economies of scale, no barriers to the entry of competitors and perfect knowledge 
of market prices by producers and consumers. Armed with these assumptions, 
economic models generate highly advantageous projected outcomes from simulations 
of policy measures such as trade liberalisation and microeconomic reform. In the 
highly concentrated, scale-sensitive, product-differentiated world of much of 
Australian industry, it is likely that standard economic policy prescriptions will be 
                                                 
30 Excludes agriculture, forestry & fishing; education. 
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inappropriate or that real-world outcomes from policies based on perfect competition 
assumptions will diverge substantially from the forecasts31. 
 
Secondly, and related to this point, these highly concentrated industries are in general 
more likely to be associated with economies of scale and higher R&D and innovation 
activity. The New Growth Theory literature reviewed in Part One suggested that the 
expansion of such industries can often generate positive externalities and feedback 
loops. Conversely, when such industries contract there can be negative feedback 
loops and the loss of spillovers leading to reductions in productivity growth. 
 
Thirdly, policies aimed at these concentrated industries will need to recognise that the 
fortunes of a very small number of companies will determine those of their industry. 
Policy directions must take into account the dynamics of those companies rather than 
be built around idealised notions of market structure and supply-demand 
relationships. In some industries the loss of one or a few key firms could mean the 
loss of the entire industry, or the attraction/expansion of a few firms could trigger 
rapid industry growth. This is clearly the case in the automotive, steel and 
telecommunications industries. 
 
Fourthly, in the absence of networking and cooperative relationships, SMEs will 
increasingly find themselves at a disadvantage against larger firms. The pressure from 
dominant players will squeeze SME margins and put further downward pressure on 
wages, working conditions, training, R&D, innovation and profit within SMEs. This 
may, in the absence of policy intervention, reduce capital investment of SMEs relative 
to their larger counterparts, further increasing the concentration of those activities in 
larger companies. In an increasingly concentrated economy, linkages between smaller 
players and between smaller and larger firms become even more important.  
 
Fifthly, the role of cost-based microeconomic reform in such an industrially 
concentrated environment becomes more problematic. Increasingly, the performance 
of the highly concentrated sectors and networked SMEs will be driven by knowledge 
spillovers (internal and external to the firm) and scale of production and/or 
distribution. These innovation drivers lie largely outside the somewhat narrow focus 
of traditional microeconomic reform (reduction of input costs via trade liberalisation, 
real wage reductions, utilities price reductions and the like). The downward price 
pressures resulting from the squeezing of some sectors by enhanced microeconomic 
reform (which includes trade liberalisation) may themselves retard the allocation of 
company resources to R&D and networking because of the costs of such activities. 
Thus there is the risk that sectors most subject to microeconomic reform may be 
forced to scale back some of their innovation activity, at least in the short run, or may 
scale back their purchases of knowledge-embodying capital equipment. 
 
Finally, the existence of highly concentrated industries in Australia will not 
necessarily mean an absence of competition when the economy is open to high levels 
of foreign competition. In manufacturing, for example, an increase in concentration 
                                                 
31 In a recent economic modelling presentation to the Australian Business Chamber one of Australia’s 
most senior economic modellers noted that perfect competition was a standard assumption in such 
modelling. In a subsequent but unrelated discussion forum a member of a government economic 
advisory body noted that its economic modelling was not able to incorporate economies of scale. 
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over recent years has not been associated with increased pricing power as measured 
by differences between manufacturing input and output price indices, despite a period 
of economic upturn. 
 
The global importance of size and scale has been underlined by recent international 
merger and acquisition activity. In 1996 the total value of American mergers reached 
$US 659 billion, an all-time record and up from around $US 130 billion in 1991 (The 
Economist 4 January 1997). Figure B.15 shows the trend. Many of these mergers 
have themselves been between enormous corporations, thus increasing the power of 
strategic players in most markets very considerably. These mergers included, for 
example: 
 
 Boeing and McDonnell Douglas 
 British Telecom and CM 
 Raytheon and Hughes Defense Systems 
 
The international trend, then, is for increased industrial agglomeration. This means 
that the firms against which Australian companies are competing are not small, price-
taking entities but rather they will often dominate an industry. This implies a critical 
imbalance in the power relationships most Australian firms will face on the world 
market. This in turn means that the strength of Australian industrial complexes 
(relationships among firms, governments, educational institutions) becomes more 
important and, possibly, an object of policy. 
 
Figure B.15 
Trends in US Mergers 
1987-96 
$US Billion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Source: The Economist 4 Jan 1997 
 
 
The industrial concentration described here raises three sets of problems for countries 
such as Australia: 
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 how to ensure that the big players in an economy are also the best; 
 how to ensure new players can enter the market and stimulate better domestic 
industrial performance through technological and non-technological innovation; 
 how to ensure that Australia has the scale in world markets increasingly 
dominated by huge strategic players. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Recent research reviewed in Part One of this report suggests that the industrial 
structure of an economy can significantly influence knowledge generation and 
diffusion and thus the growth of productivity and of well-paid, skilled employment. It 
can do this at the macro level - via the mix of industries - and the micro level - via the 
structure of various markets and linkages.  
 
Like all OECD countries, the Australian economy has seen consistent reduction of 
manufacturing and the growth of services over the last three decades. Australia’s 
manufacturing sector has contracted in relative terms at the fastest rate across the 
OECD economies, and it seems that Australian manufacturing is not sharing in the 
employment trends in other OECD countries where employment growth is faster in 
more knowledge intensive sectors. Australian manufacturing has a relative 
predominance in the low-R&D intensive food, non-ferrous metals and shipbuilding 
industries, reflecting both government industry programs and a focus on resources 
industries. This structure biases downwards our level of R&D. 
 
As well, the share of the economy devoted to the ownership of dwellings has 
increased steadily, assisted  by a tax system which encourages property investment 
versus investment in machinery and equipment. 
 
As far as business linkages are concerned, within Australia up to two-thirds of firms 
engage in some form of cooperative business arrangement. However, only one-third 
of these networked with more than one other partner. Firms in higher technology 
sectors are more likely to form cooperative arrangements than firms in lower 
technology sectors. The propensity to cooperate also rises with firm size and export 
propensity and higher tech firms are more likely to have overseas linkages. 
 
Major benefits recorded through linkages included increased sales, improved market 
knowledge, new suppliers, new customers and higher productivity. Almost three-
quarters of firms achieved higher sales as a result of their cooperative arrangements 
and over half reported increased profits. Productivity benefits accrued more to higher 
technology firms than lower technology ones and to larger firms rather than smaller. 
The most positive impacts on exports and technology occurred when arrangements 
were with overseas partners. 
 
The main impediment to the formation of arrangements was management’s perception 
of the likely time involved with them. 
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Interestingly, benefits from network arrangements were higher when government 
assistance was involved (a benefit index of 38 versus 32 for non-assisted firms) or 
when industry association assistance was involved (37 versus 27). 
 
But these cooperative linkages are not the only ones present and valuable in an 
economy. The strength of relationships between suppliers and their customers forms 
part of the fabric of industrial linkages generally. Australia’s industrial structure 
appears to be ‘hollowing out’, at least as measured by the density of input-output 
linkages over time. One measure of this puts the contraction at slightly over 10 per 
cent between 1975 and 1989. This is higher than for a similar small sample of 
resource-based advanced economies. 
 
As well, there seems little evidence of any sustained increase in value adding to 
Australia’s natural resources, and some of the higher-knowledge manufacturing 
industries are seeing a weakening in activity. The density of transactions within 
industries is also declining - by more than for the economy as a whole - and this adds 
to the picture of  a declining potential for firms to form the linkages seen as necessary 
to a learning, innovative  economy. 
 
The degree of concentration in an economy is important in understanding industrial 
dynamics, and the economic logic of small numbers of large firms is different to that 
of large numbers of small firms (the textbook ideal). Many of Australia’s industries 
are very concentrated. A mere 0.4 per cent of businesses employ over 35 per cent of 
all business sector workers. The data suggest that large firms pay higher wages, 
engage in more training (see Chapter 8) and are responsible for an increasing 
proportion (now 64 per cent) of business capital investment. This industrial 
concentration seems to be increasing and the largest four enterprise groups account 
for more than 15 per cent of all industry employment in six major industries. 
 
This concentration raises a number of policy implications relating to the 
conceptualisation of firms as atomistic competitors and increases the importance of 
analysing individual industry and firm behaviour when formulating policy rather than 
relying on textbook notions of price signals. 
 
The increase in industrial concentration also means that SMEs’ position vis-a-vis 
large firms will deteriorate in the absence of greater networking and use of 
cooperative arrangements, and that wages, profits, investment and working conditions 
in SMEs are likely to come under increasing pressure. 
 
The industrial concentration evident in Australia is part of a global process, as large 
transnationals merge to gain economies of scale and scope as well as market share. 
This raises vital questions for policy in Australia, such as: how to attract the best; how 
to ensure entry of competitors or potential competitors; and how to gain and retain the 
scale needed to compete internationally. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
HUMAN RESOURCES: SKILLS, EMPLOYMENT & 
WAGES 
 
Human resources are vital to a nation’s economic development. This was shown in 
the literature review of Part One. The state of an economy’s human resources is both 
a contributor to and a barometer of its innovation and learning capability. Knowledge- 
and learning-intensive industries both require and produce skilled, capable workers 
and managers earning good wages and profits. How does Australia’s pattern of skills, 
employment and wages compare with the characteristics of a learning-based economy 
and with those of other countries? This chapter examines trends in some of the data in 
these areas over recent years. 
 
1. Management Quality 
 
The quality of management of a country’s firms is a vital determinant of the success 
of those firms and thus the success of the economy. Recent research has suggested 
that the proficiency of Australian management is low by world standards as measured 
by formal qualifications.  Karpin (1995) noted (: 32): 
 
...the adaptive capacity of our economy therefore depends on the flexibility of 
our managers and on adequate investment in management development, which 
is critical in shaping Australian managers’ responsiveness to change...  
 
but he feared that the level of investment in management training was not high. Until 
the mid-late 1980s the proportion of managers and administrators with degrees was 
increasing only slowly. This has improved since this period, as shown by Figure C.1, 
but still the proportion is barely 19 per cent, less than one-fifth of the entire 
management population. 
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Figure C.1 
Proportion of Australian Managers & Administrators with Degrees 
1979-96 
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        Source: ABS 6227.0 and 6235.0  
 
 
Despite this improvement, international data show that Australia’s performance on 
this measure of management training, at least for senior managers, is quite poor. 
Comparative figures are shown in Figure C.2. 
 
Figure C.2 
Proportion of Senior Managers with Degrees 
Various Countries 
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Source: Karpin Report 1995 from DEET data. 
 
This chart shows that Australian senior managers are poorly qualified when compared 
to those of other major advanced countries. In particular, in the USA and Japan 80-90 
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per cent of managers have degrees, with France and Germany above 60 per cent. The 
US and Japanese proportion is thus four times higher than Australia’s. After 
examining the proportions of various categories of managers with tertiary 
qualifications, Karpin (1995: 31) concluded that: 
 
... only a few Australian companies reach proportions similar to those of other 
countries. 
 
Karpin was also alarmed at the lack of formal training of front line managers - their 
research indicated that more than 50 per cent of such managers had received no 
formal training for that role (1995: 1069). 
 
A survey of 254 Australian production/operations managers by Monash University 
undertaken in 1997 suggests that these managers are rather more qualified than the 
data revealed earlier suggest (perhaps since many are engineers), as 33 per cent have 
a degree (Monash 1997: 9). Nevertheless, these figures still place us significantly 
behind the levels of educational attainment of managers in other advanced countries.  
 
This picture of poor Australian management quality has been consistently reinforced 
by studies such as the annual World Competitiveness Report, which on average over 
the four years to 1997 has ranked Australian management as 15th out of 20 OECD 
countries32. Similarly, further research conducted for the Karpin report (involving a 
survey of over 500 business executives internationally) concluded: 
 
‘The perception held by respondents was that Australian managers were 
weaker than their major competitors in all management qualities (except 
cross-cultural skills and adaptability)’ (1995: 598).  
 
These trends are reflected in the data in Table C.1. 
 
Table C.1 
Percentage of Respondents Who Ranked Managers of Each Country as Having the 
Best Education Levels 
 
Eduction Level Australia Germany Japan Taiwan UK US 
       
Formal Business 
Qualifications 
 
1 
 
16 
 
26 
 
4 
 
13 
 
40 
General Level of  
Education 
 
1 
 
16 
 
33 
 
2 
 
16 
 
34 
 
Source: Karpin 1995 
 
 
Australia was ranked worst of these six countries. Note that the rankings reflect those 
of the DEET data in Figure C.2. 
 
This poor level of Australian manager educational attainment can be contrasted with a 
better education performance, by international standards, across the entire population.  
                                                 
32 This has improved marginally to 12th in 1997. 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
 
Australia’s Trade Patterns                                                                                                 
10.133 
 
 
This is shown in Figure C.3, where the international average proportion of the 
population with degrees is 12 per cent and Australia’s proportion is 13 per cent. At 
least so far, the best educated of the population have not gone into business. 
 
 
Figure C.3 
Proportion of Population with University Education 
1994 
% 
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Source: OECD 1996g 
 
 
Some degrees may be seen as being especially relevant to business. Australia does 
none too well in these measures either. More particularly, data released in April 1997 
indicate that only 17 per cent of managerial staff have a business degree. A sectoral 
breakdown is shown in Table C.2. 
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Table C.2 
Share of Managerial Staff with Tertiary Business Qualifications 
by Sector 
1994-95 
 
Sector  Percentage      
 
Manufacturing 
 
19.9 
Wholesale trade 18.4 
Retail trade 7.7 
Property and Bus. Services 27.7 
Other  14.1 
 
Source: DIST 1997 
 
Only business services break the one-quarter barrier - manufacturing scores less than 
20 per cent. 
 
Once again, there is a difference between larger and smaller firms, as Table C.3a 
indicates. On the whole, the levels of education attained by managers are higher in 
large firms. 
 
 
Table C.3a 
Share of Managerial Staff with Tertiary Business Qualifications  
by Firm Size  
1994-95 
% 
 
Employment Size Percentage 
  
1 - 4 11.3 
5 - 19 15.0 
20 - 99 25.5 
100 + 28.6 
 
Source: DIST 1997 
 
The data thus suggest that, overall, the education level of Australia’s cadre of 
business managers does not appear to be strong in an international context. Indeed, it 
appears that many of Australia’s trading partners regard Australia as having the worst 
management skill levels when compared to those of Germany, Japan, Taiwan, UK 
and USA (Karpin 1995: 608). 
 
2. Science Skills 
 
A learning economy depends on both knowledge generation and its diffusion. In 
many ways it thus relies especially on its science and engineering capacity. The 
number of research scientists and engineers employed by Australian businesses has 
been steadily increasing over the years, as shown in Figure C.4. 
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Figure C.4 
Total Research Scientists and Engineers Employed in the Business Sector 
1976-1993 
Person Years x 1000 
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         Source: DIST 1996 
 
This most likely reflects the increase in research and development expenditure which 
followed the announcement of the 150 per cent tax concession in the 1983 Federal 
election campaign. 
 
In engineering - the profession from where much of the commercialisation activity of 
firms is driven - the employment situation is less positive. Figure C.6 shows the 
number of employed engineers for the period 1986-96. It appears that there has been 
almost no net growth in the employment of engineers in Australia for a decade. 
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Figure C.6 
Number of Employed Engineers 
Australia 
1986-9633 
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Source: ABS 6203.0 and unpublished data 
 
 
It may be the case that there is a high take-up of scientists at the research end of the 
R&D spectrum but less use of engineers at the commercialisation end. 
 
There may be some support for this hypothesis in the very high rate of patenting by 
Australian inventors combined with a relatively low rate of commercialisation of 
Australian inventions by Australian firms. The lodgement of patent applications by 
Australian residents accelerated sharply following 1983 and the growth rate of such 
applications has been one of the highest in the world over the last fifteen years (DIST 
1996). However Manley (1994) cites research by the IR&D Board (1991), the 
Australian Manufacturing Council (1990), CEDA (1992) and Block (1991) showing 
the ‘inappropriately high’ rate of offshore commercialisation of Australian inventions. 
 
Manley is worth quoting at length: 
 
‘...[W]e have been remarkably unsuccessful as a nation in turning the fruits of 
R&D into products and industries' (Lowe 1987, 1). Hence, Australia has failed 
to effectively capitalise on its stock of scientific information. Many 
institutional explanations have been proposed to explain the shortcomings of 
the system. Several acknowledge the absence of effective venture capital 
institutions (eg IR&D Board 1991b, ch. 2; Block 1991, ch. 3). Some highlight 
the lack of dynamism generated by private firms and the absence of large, 
internationally experienced firms in co-operative networks (eg Block 1991, ch. 
2; BIE 1991b; AMC 1991b). Others point to the need to improve the 
utilisation and efficiency of commercialising intermediaries. Poor links 
                                                 
33 The 1996 figure is to May rather than August as for other years. 
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between universities and government research organisations with industry 
have also been emphasised (eg Block 1991, ch. 4; BIE 1990a). Finally, 
attention has been directed to the need for prioritisation procedures within 
public sector research institutions (eg DITAC 1991b; Joint Committee of 
Public Accounts 1992). (Manley 1994: 137) 
 
 
3. Employee Skills, Wages & Employment 
 
This section discusses employee training, skills and wages and how these have 
evolved over recent years. In terms of training, both international and Australian 
historical data covering expenditure on training are scant but some figures are 
available. Figure C.6 ranks Australia’s private sector expenditure on formal education 
and training compared to a small number of other countries in the early 1980s. 
 
 
Figure C.6 
Private Sector Expenditure on Formal Education & Training 
Various Countries 
Early 1980s 
% GDP 
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         Source: Dawkins 1988 
 
This shows a relatively poor performance against these countries at that time.  
 
More recent data on workforce participation in job-related education and training 
gives another, and more recent, comparison - Table C.5. 
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Table C.5 
Proportion of Employed Population Participating in Job-related Education & Training 
Various Countries 
1993-95 
 
Country Proportion % 
  
France 72 
Finland 61 
Sweden 60 
Australia 53 
Switzerland 51 
Germany 43 
United States 36 
Canada 35 
 
 
         Source: OECD 1996g 
 
 
Australia ranks at about the middle of this table of countries in terms of employee 
participation in job-related education and training34. As Table C.6 shows, it also 
appears that, at least as far as the early 1990s are concerned, the training effort of 
Australian firms has increased: 
 
Table C.6 
Percentage of Gross Wages & Salaries Spent by Employers on Formal Training of 
Employees 
% 
 
Private Public Total 
   
1988 n.a. n.a. 1.7 
1989 1.7 3.3 2.2 
1990 2.2 3.2 2.6 
1993 2.6 3.4 2.9 
 
       Source: DEETYA Unpublished data 
 
Training expenditure has increased in the private sector over recent years, although 
figures beyond the termination date of the training guarantee levy (1994) are not yet 
available.  
 
Training expenditure increases with firm size. Table C.7 shows training expenditure, 
in terms of the amount spent and the number of hours per employee, categorised by 
firm (employment) size. 
 
                                                 
34 These data have come with some qualifications. 
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Table C.7 
Employer Commitment to Training 
1993 
 
 % Gross Salaries & Wages Per Employee (hours) 
   
Small employers 1.7 4.1 
Medium employers 2.7 5.3 
Large employers 3.2 6.2 
   
Total 2.9 5.6 
 
       Source: DEETYA Unpublished data 
 
 
The total number of hours spent on training per employee over the course of the year 
is not high, and is likely to be biased upwards by the larger firms.  
 
Thus the data on training in Australia - scant as it is - points to recent improvements 
and to a moderate ranking in international terms. It also shows that larger firms make 
a greater commitment to training than smaller ones. 
 
Research by Finegold and Soskice, cited in DEETYA (1996) suggests that the mix of 
industries in an economy can influence the propensity of that economy to train its 
workers. They use the terms ‘high-skill equilibrium’ and ‘low-skill equilibrium’ to 
define situations where economies can become locked into particular specialisation 
patterns without any autonomous tendency to move away from the low-skill path and 
onto the high-skill. These categories are particularly relevant to Australia: 
 
 A country relying on traditional ‘comparative advantage’ industries, while having 
pockets of very high skill in certain industries, ‘does not critically rely on the 
development of formal skills in the majority of the workforce.’(:15). Such 
economies principally compete by reducing input costs, adding relatively little 
value to commodities and relying on economies of scale. 
 A country which relies on continuous improvement in products and processes and 
a dynamic comparative advantage will require a greater incidence of formal 
worker training. (1996: 15) 
 
Thus the industrial structure - the nature of the industrial mix - can significantly 
influence the demand for skills and therefore the level of training. The report 
concludes: 
 
‘An economy in which the bulk of employment occurs in traditional mass 
production, simple extractive industries or routine personal services will be 
genuinely limited in its capacity to develop the effective skill levels of most of 
its population.’ (DEETYA 1996: 17) 
 
More will be said below in relation to Australia’s industrial training. 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics - using the ASCO classification system - prepares 
a skill-ranked occupational group series. These are, in descending order of skill: 
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 Managers and Administrators 
 Professionals 
 Para-Professionals 
 Tradespersons 
 Clerks 
 Sales and Personal Service Workers 
 Plant and Machinery Workers 
 Labourers 
 
Table C.8 splits these eight categories into two - the four highest skilled occupational 
groups and the four lowest skilled - and shows their respective growth rates over the 
period 1986-96. 
 
Table C.8 
Growth in Australian Employment by Broad Occupational Group 
1986-96 
% 
   
Skill Rank Occupational Group Change 86-96 
 
1 Managers & Administrators 7.8% 
2 Professionals 37.7% 
3 Para-Professionals 20.4% 
4 Tradespersons 3.9% 
 Four Highest Skilled 15.8% 
 Av. Growth p.a. 1.5% 
  
5 Clerks 13.2% 
6 Sales & Personal Service 51.2% 
7 Plant & Machinery Operators 2.6% 
8 Labourers 12.6% 
Four Lowest Skilled 21.1% 
Av. Growth p.a. 2.0% 
         
Source: Derived from Foster 1996; ABS Labour Force 
 
 
The table shows that over the period 1986-96 combined employment in the four 
lowest skilled occupational groups35 grew at a 30 per cent faster rate than combined 
                                                 
35 It should be noted that conclusions regarding relative growth rates of skilled versus unskilled 
employment are very sensitive to the classification methodology and the level of aggregation used. 
Karmel (1997), for example, uses a decile-based system and reaches different conclusions to those 
here. This is contra Gregory (1993, cited in Karmel 1997) who uses wages-based data to reach 
conclusions similar to the current analysis. The Karmel conclusion is perhaps more difficult - though 
not impossible - to reconcile with known shifts in employment towards lower wage industries (see 
over), with faster growth in part-time employment (and stagnant growth in full-time) and with the 
OECD skill data for Australia presented here in the following pages. Junankar et al (1997) examine 
industry and occupation employment changes from 1987-94 and conclude that higher tech and higher 
skilled employment have grown faster. However their tables aggregate two ANZSIC industries - retail; 
accommodation, cafes & restaurants - into other groups, thus not following the ANZSIC classification 
but using the earlier ASIC grouping. This has the effect of not separately identifying two industries 
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employment in the four highest skilled occupational groups36. This is further reflected 
in Figure C.7a which indexes the two broad groupings (higher skilled and lower 
skilled) to 1986 - the earliest start date for the first edition ASCO classification. These 
trends may be cycle-related, as the chart shows that as an economic upturn proceeds 
(both in the late 1980s following the growth slowdown in 1986, and now in the mid-
late 1990s) more lower skilled employees are taken on, while during downturns these 
employees lose their jobs at a faster rate. Relative growth rates of skilled versus 
unskilled employment are thus very cycle-dependent. Lower skilled employment is 
also more volatile than higher skilled. 
 
Figure C.7a 
Employment by Broad Occupational Skill Ranking 
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Source: Derived from Foster 1996 
 
Figure C.7b shows employment growth by industry between 1985 and 1995. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
likely to have a lower technology ranking. Significantly these two industries (see Figure C.7b below) 
have shown above-average rates of employment growth, and thus this aggregation shifts the data in 
favour of the higher-skilled conclusion. Further, their data set is closer to the 1990s recession than is 
that of the current analysis and does not pick up more recent job trends (see Figure C.7a). The addition 
of more recent data shows the decline in the growth of more skilled occupational groups versus less 
skilled. Interestingly Junankar et al use the same occupational skill ranking as the present paper, rather 
than Karmel’s. 
36 The first four (higher skilled) occupational groups listed above also have greater than 50 per cent of 
workers with post-secondary education, whereas the second four (lower skilled) have less than 50 per 
cent possessing a post-secondary education (ABS 6235.0). 
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Figure C.7b 
Employment Growth by Industry 
1985-95 
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        Source: ABS Labour Force 
 
The most rapid job growth has been in the tourism industry, while the areas of 
significant job loss were the utilities and mining. Manufacturing employment showed 
marginally positive growth. The tourism growth is likely to be associated with heavy 
promotion of inbound tourism funded by the Federal Government from 1984 onward 
and perhaps with changed household expenditure patterns. The relatively stagnant 
manufacturing employment growth reflects the overall contraction of manufacturing 
as a share of the economy (discussed earlier in Chapter 7 and later in Chapter 10) 
which has been accelerated via trade liberalisation (see Chapter 10). The utilities 
sector has shed labour as its share of GDP has fallen, due both to the wind-back of the 
domestic goods-producing sectors as well as the impact of microeconomic reform. 
 
Chapter 9 of this report discusses the concept of innovation. Broadly this is defined as 
new products and/or processes introduced by a firm or industry (technological 
innovation), or significant management and/or organisational improvements (non-
technological innovation). Using this definition, surveys of Australian innovation by 
the Bureau of Statistics have shown that a number of industries, including the two 
fastest growing employers - tourism and property & business services - can be 
categorised as showing below average levels of innovation propensity. 
 
The industries of greatest job loss - mining and the utilities - are well above the 
national average in innovation propensity, as is manufacturing. 
 
Figure C.7c plots industry employment growth against industry innovation propensity 
(proportion of industry survey respondents reporting either technological or non-
technological innovation). 
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Figure C.7c 
Industry Employment Growth 1985-95 v. Industry Innovation Propensity 
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Source: Derived from ABS Labour Force; ABS 8116.0, 8118.0 
 
 
The industries which have gained the most employment tend to cluster around the 
lower end of the innovation propensity scale, whereas those with relatively poorer 
employment growth are more concentrated at the higher end of the innovation 
spectrum. Clearly this is not the case with every industry but a broad picture does 
seem apparent. 
 
Figure C.8a below shows the growth in employment by industry, as above, plotted 
against each industry’s average weekly earnings relative to national average weekly 
earnings37. 
 
                                                 
37 AWE is for 1995. 
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Figure C.8a 
Industry Employment Growth 1985-95 v. Industry Wage Rate 
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       Source: ABS Labour Force; ABS 6302.0 
 
 
The graph shows that the areas of greatest job growth have been in industries where 
wage rates have in general been the lowest and the areas of greatest job loss have 
been those where wages have been relatively higher. This suggests the possibility that 
the Australian economy may be evolving in ways which favour job growth biased 
towards lower wages. 
 
DEETYA (1996) also examines trends in employment, but from a training 
perspective. In particular, they were interested in the response of industry to the 
training guarantee levy. They compared employment growth by industry with training 
performance by industry, both over the period of the levy and, more broadly, over the 
period 1986-94. 
 
One of their observations is worth quoting at length as it touches on the present 
discussion: 
 
The impression that jobs are being created in low-training industries, and lost 
in high-training ones, is reinforced by the aggregate growth figures over the 
full business cycle from May 1986 to August 1994. Growth was led by the 
hospitality industry, followed by Property & Business Services and 
Recreational, Personal & Other Services. In other words, two out of the three 
leading industries for long-term [employment] growth were among the worst 
trainers identified by both the surveys and the qualitative research for this 
evaluation. On the other hand, industries which trained actively over the 
whole period from 1989 onwards (Mining, Communications, Public 
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Administration, Electricity Gas & Water) generally experienced low or 
negative long-term [employment] growth. (1996: 119) 
 
 
The employment/training relationship for the 1985-95 period is shown in Figure 
C.8b38. 
 
 
Figure C.8b 
Employment Growth by Industry 1985-95 v. Industry Training 
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Source: ABS 6353.0, ABS Labour Force 
 
 
Once again the overall picture is similar: Australian employment growth has generally 
been faster in industries which have spent less time training their employees, while 
employment loss has taken place in the more training-intensive industries. From a 
‘learning economy’ perspective this must be regarded as an adverse trend. 
 
In summary, it appears that the Australian economy is broadly characterised39 by 
faster employment growth in: 
 
 lower skilled broad occupational groups; 
 lower wage industries; 
 industries with a lower measured propensity to innovate; 
 industries with a lower commitment to training. 
 
Trends in the OECD seem to be at odds with those in Australia. Across the OECD, as 
Figure C.9 shows, it appears that there has been faster growth in higher skilled 
occupations than in lower skilled ones, at least over the 1980s (OECD 1996e: 92).  
 
The OECD (OECD 1996e) groups occupations into four skill classes: 
                                                 
38 Excludes education, agriculture. 
39 It should be noted that the data used is at a high level of aggregation. 
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 white collar, high skill (WCHS); 
 white collar, low skill (WCLS); 
 blue collar, high skill (BCHS); 
 blue collar, low skill (BCLS). 
 
Research by the Organisation on changes in the skill distribution among OECD 
countries over the 1980s concludes that in both manufacturing and services sectors 
employment in higher skilled occupations has tended to grow faster than that in lower 
skilled occupations. 
 
The following charts (Figure C.9, C.10) are reproduced from an OECD publication 
(1996e) which compares ratios of WCHS to WCLS and BCHS to BCLS workers and 
their changes over the 1980s. The pale bar represents the ratio in the early/mid 1980s 
while the dark bar represents the ratio at the end of the 1980s40. 
 
Figure C.9 
Evolution of Skill Level Ratios During the 1980s 
Ratio of White Collar High Skilled to White Collar Low Skilled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 1996e 
 
                                                 
40 As indicated earlier, data on skill composition changes are very sensitive to the state of the business 
cycle and caution is required in their interpretation especially over shorter time periods. 
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Figure C.10 
Evolution of Skill Level Ratios During the 1980s 
Ratio of Blue Collar High Skilled to Blue Collar Low Skilled  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 1996e 
 
 
Although the time periods vary across the countries surveyed, the graphs show that 
Australia was the only country in the sample where the ratio of WCHS jobs to WCLS 
jobs actually decreased over the period. Further, at the end of the period Australia had 
the lowest ratio of BCHS jobs to BCLS jobs in the sample. This suggests that the 
Australian economy may have underperformed in international terms in the relative 
creation of high skilled versus low skilled employment. 
 
The OECD also demonstrates that an increase in the share of white collar, high skilled 
workers within industries is positively related to variables related to technological 
change (R&D, patent registrations). 
 
Further, their research points to growing disparities between wages in high-
knowledge industries and those in low-knowledge industries. Knowledge-based firms 
tend to produce products/services which are slightly more difficult to imitate and thus 
where ‘[t]he price-cost margin ...can rise, while market shares increase; the resulting 
rents41 can alleviate downward wage pressure’ (Storper in OECD 1996d: 256). The 
OECD (1996f: 98) also found that ‘the sectors that invested more in research and 
performed more innovative activity are those that employed a larger share of higher-
skilled people at the beginning of the 1980s and that continued to do so at an 
increasing rate.’ 
 
R&D intensity and employment growth have shown a positive correlation across the 
larger OECD countries (: 68), and further research suggests that there is a ‘technology 
wage premium’ enjoyed by employees who work with the latest technology. This 
premium varies in different studies, but estimates range from a low of 1 per cent to a 
high of 30 per cent (: 95). The figure in the US was estimated at 15 per cent. Figure 
                                                 
41 An economic ‘rent’ is a return in excess of that which would be necessary to induce a firm to 
continue to produce, and thus more than prevails in perfectly competitive market conditions. 
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C.11 shows employment growth versus measures of knowledge intensity across 
various OECD countries. 
 
Figure C.11 
G-6 Relative Employment Growth v. R&D Intensity: Manufacturing; 
OECD Employment Growh v. IT Investment: Services  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 1996e 
 
 
Interestingly one study (Card et al 1996, cited in OECD 1996f) compared labour 
demand and technology use across the US, Canada and France. They found that the 
nature of wage setting institutions - and in particular the existence of downward wage 
flexibility - was not an explanator of employment growth across the different 
economies but did impact on the level of wage inequality (the more institutionalised 
wage setting models had lower levels of inequality). Moreover the study found that 
both wage and employment growth were positively associated with computer use. 
This suggests that technology can contribute more to employment growth than 
changes in wage setting mechanisms. In the words of the OECD: ‘This preliminary 
finding calls into question the common notion that technological change in 
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conjunction with rigid labour markets would lead to higher unemployment’. (OECD 
1996f: 96)   
 
In a substantial study of US manufacturing firms, US Department of Commerce 
(reported in OECD 1996d) examined employment, productivity, advanced technology 
and wages in 10,000 companies over the period 1977-87. They found that: 
 
...regardless of the size of the plant, there is a strong positive correlation 
between the number of advanced technologies used and employment growth. 
For small plants, technology allows them to grow rapidly. In contrast, for large 
plants, technology adoption allows plants to avoid shrinking. (OECD 1996d: 
315) 
 
The report also noted that ‘the results are at odds with the conventional wisdom that 
efforts to increase productivity at large establishments result in reduced employment’. 
(: 322). 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The nature of the human resources in an economy both drive and reflect the state of 
innovation and technology of that economy. This is true of both management and 
workers. A successful ‘learning economy’ using advanced technology should be both 
generating and requiring highly skilled, highly trained management and staff. 
 
As far as Australian managers are concerned, it appears that their general standard of 
educational attainment is poor by world standards, despite overall levels of education 
across the entire population that are relatively high. Larger firms tend to have a higher 
proportion of well-educated managers than do smaller ones, reinforcing other 
observations made elsewhere in this report regarding differences in performance 
between large and small businesses. International surveys consistently rate the general 
quality of Australian management as poor on most criteria. 
 
With training, it appears that training expenditure has increased in recent years and 
may lie at about the average for advanced countries. As with management education 
levels, training commitment increases with firm size. 
 
As far as the take-up of science professionals is concerned, Australia has shown 
substantial growth in the business employment of scientists and engineers combined, 
but separate data specifically related just to engineers, the profession more 
traditionally associated with commercialisation, suggest a flat overall employment 
trend for this profession. This may be a reflection of a low rate of onshore 
commercialisation of ideas, a phenomenon which has support from other research, but 
could also be related to other factors. 
 
With respect to the overall workforce, the growth of employment over the last decade 
has tended to be highest in the lower skilled occupational groups and in lower wage 
industries with lower levels of productivity, innovation and training. Australia’s 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
 
Australia’s Trade Patterns                                                                                                 
10.150 
 
 
trends in the skill composition of employment appear to have been in contrast to other 
OECD economies where the ratios of high to low skilled employment have increased 
over recent years. OECD research also points, firstly, to technology as a primary 
driver of high wage job growth, with wage premia attaching to jobs using advanced 
technology and, secondly, to the possibility of technology being a more important 
determinant of relative job growth than wage setting mechanisms. The OECD 
research suggests that Australia’s trends in employment appear to be quite different to 
those in other advanced countries. 
 
There is the risk that Australia is heading towards - or may be already on - a low 
wage, low skill development trajectory. If this is the case, then the research discussed 
in Part One of this document suggests that such a path can become self-reinforcing. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY INNOVATION 
 
The literature review indicated that innovation is a primary engine of economic 
growth. It is a major driver of productivity and provides new products, processes and 
practices which create and maintain competitive positions. Through these factors 
innovation provides the potential for the expansion of well paid employment and the 
improvement of living standards.  
 
This chapter describes some aspects of Australia’s innovation performance, 
particularly in an international context.  
 
Innovation is a somewhat difficult concept to measure, although the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics is at the forefront of this enterprise. The OECD defines 
technological innovation as activity: 
 
‘...including new products and processes and significant changes in products 
and processes.’ (Quoted in DIST 1996: 11) 
 
The ABS is also leading the OECD in developing definitions of non-technological 
innovation. The survey defined non-technological innovation as activity involving 
significant management and/or organisational improvements. 
 
Much innovation includes business expenditure on research and development 
(BERD), and this is generally used in international comparisons of innovation. BERD 
is a measure of the commitment of the business sector to the development of new 
products and processes, and thus to innovation. In this chapter we commence with an 
analysis of Australian BERD and then return to innovation more generally. 
 
1. Business Research & Development 
 
Australia has a history of very low performance of business R&D when compared 
internationally. Australian BERD (as a percentage of GDP) was substantially higher 
in the early 1970s than it was in the early 1980s, despite an opening of the economy 
via trade liberalisation. However, following government policy initiatives in the 
1980s, business performance of R&D has increased greatly, as shown in Figure D.1. 
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Figure D.1 
Australian Business R&D as % GDP 
0.25%
0.35%
0.45%
0.55%
0.65%
0.75%
0.85%
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
150 %  Tax Concession Announced
 
          
Source: Derived from OECD ANBERD database; DIST 1996; ABS 5206.0 
 
Performance of R&D by business, as a percentage of GDP, has nearly trebled over the 
past 15 years after nearly halving in the prior 10. The increases from 1983 coincide 
initially with the introduction of the 150 per cent tax concession for R&D 
expenditure, then the introduction of the Partnerships for Development program, the 
R&D syndication arrangements, other business assistance measures (see Section E) 
and improved business profitability. A breakdown of this aggregate improvement 
reveals the growth trends shown in Table D.1a, and other comparisons with the 
OECD in Table D.1b. As shown in Chapter 8 previously, this R&D trend is paralleled 
by trends in the employment of scientists and engineers. 
 
Table D.1a 
Australian Manufacturing BERD 
by R&D Intensity Group42 
% Value Added 
 
 1973 1983 1992 % Chge ‘83-’92 
 Aus OECD Aus OECD Aus OECD Aus OECD 
         
High tech 9.4 19.7 5.9 21.5 16.5 22.3 179.7 3.7 
Med-high tech 3.3 7.3 1.9 9.8 3.8 10.5 100.0 7.1 
Med-low tech 1.5 2.3 1.0 3.4 4.4 3.5 340.0 2.9 
Low tech 0.4 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.6 1.1 433.3 10.0 
Food, etc. 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.9 1.0 1.1 233.3 22.2 
Non-ferrous metals 1.2 2 0.8 3.4 2.5 3.2 212.5 -5.9 
Petroleum refining 0.4 3.8 0.7 6.3 6.8 5.7 871.4 -9.5 
         
Total 1.6 4.3 1.0 6.3 3.2 6.8 338.6 4.4 
 
         Source: Sheehan 1995 
                                                 
42 For a listing of industries by technology ranking see Appendix One. 
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Table D.1b 
Australian R&D Intensity v. OECD Average 
Industry 
1992 
 
 R&D Intensity 
 Australia OECD 
 % % 
High-tech Pharmaceuticals 13.9 22.5 
 Electronics43 22.7 20.3 
 Aerospace 8.3 28.4 
 Total 16.5 22.3 
    
Medium-high tech Professional Goods44 7.9 13.3 
 Motor Vehicles 5.0 13.2 
 Chemicals 2.9 9.1 
 Electrical Machinery  2.7 6.8 
 Total 3.8 10.5 
    
Medium-low tech Non-electrical Machinery 4.2 4.5 
 Other Transp.Equip 16.3 6.5 
 Shipbuilding 15.2 1.6 
 Non-metallic Minerals 1.2 2.4 
 Other Manuf 12.0 1.7 
 Rubber & Plastics 2.8 3.2 
 Total 4.4 3.5 
    
Low-tech Iron & Steel 5.4 2.4 
 Metal Products 2.4 1.4 
 Paper & Paper Products 0.6 0.8 
 TCF 0.4 0.8 
 Wood Products 0.4 0.5 
 Total 1.6 1.1 
    
Resource-based Food, Beverages, Tobco 1.0 1.1 
 Petrol Refining 6.8 5.7 
 Non-ferrous Metals 2.5 3.2 
 Total 3.2 1.9 
 
        Source: Sheehan 1995 
 
 
 
The tables indicate that Australia’s growth in business R&D has been quite 
remarkable, and most pronounced in the medium-low and low R&D intensity sectors. 
Australia’s performance in these sectors moved towards OECD levels during the 
1980s and now exceeds them. Nevertheless, Australia’s performance remains below 
OECD averages in the high R&D intensive and medium-high R&D intensive sectors 
and overall. Significant improvement can be seen in the high R&D intensive sectors, 
                                                 
43 Includes computers. 
44 Includes scientific and medical instruments. 
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whilst performance in the medium-high sector has been very poor and remains at less 
than half the performance of medium and large R&D performing countries.  
 
In terms of the relative performance of specific industries, electronics, shipbuilding, 
non-motor vehicle transport and other manufacturing stand out as comparatively 
strong internationally. Some of these outcomes are likely to be related to government 
industry programs and are discussed further below. 
 
Table D.2a shows a more detailed breakdown of Australian business R&D 
expenditure. 
 
Table D.2a 
R&D Expenditure by Australian Business Enterprises by Industry of Product Field45  
1982-95  
% Total BERD, $M 
 
Industry of Product Field R&D Expenditure, Various Years 
 
 1981/82 1984/85 1990/91 1992/93 1994/95 
 % $M % $M % $M % $M % $M 
           
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.4 1.3 0.6 4.6 1.6 32.3  2.0 58.0 1.7 59.1 
Mining 10.3 35.0 5.3 38.1 6.0 124.6 4.8 133.4 6.1 205.3 
Manufacturing (Total) 85.3 290 80.4 581 61.3 1,277 65.8 1,836 65.4 2,214 
Food, TCF, wood, paper 7.5 25.5 6.3 45.5 6.1 126.6 6.4 178.9 6.9 234.2 
Pharm. & Vet. Products 4.1 13.9 5.0 36.4 5.3 111.1 4.9 135.6 5.5 185.0 
Other chemicals 13.6 46.3 9.1 65.7 8.0 166.0 7.5 208.4 5.9 200.9 
Non-metallic mineral 1.8 6.1 1.9 13.4 1.3 27.1 1.2 34.2 0.9 29.1 
Metals1 9.2 31.4 7.9 56.8 8.2 170.1 12.4 345.1 11.8 400.6 
Industrial mach & equip 7.9 26.7 8.0 57.9 4.9 101.9 3.3 92.7 3.5 117.0 
Computer hardware 2.3 7.8 2.9 20.9 2.0 41.1 2.0 54.9 1.8 59.9 
Electronic equipment 18.8 63.8 15.3 110.5 9.9 206.4 8.6 239.8 10.3 348.9 
Other elec. appliances 4.2 14.3 4.1 29.9 2.5 51.8 2.5 69 2.2 74.0 
Photo. & prof. equip. 3.4 11.4 3.8 27.8 2.8 57.3 1.7 47.5 2.2 75.9 
Motor vehicles & parts 9.6 32.7 11.7 84.7 7.4 154.9 6.0 166.3 8.3 280.3 
Ships & boats 0.1 0.5 0.7 5.3 na na 4.2 115.8 na na 
Aircraft na na na na 0.7 14.8 2.0 56.9 0.4 11.9 
Other transport na na na na na na 0.9 25.1 0.5 15.4 
Other manufacturing 2.0 6.7 2.1 14.9 1.0 20.1 2.3 65.4 3.0 100.0 
Other Industries (Total) 4.0 13.5 13.7 99.4 31.2 648.7 27.3 760.4 26.7 904.3 
Computer software na3 na 9.2 66.8 25.9 539.1 22.8 634.6 19.7 668.0 
Construction 0.1 0.4 0.3 2.1 na na 0.5 13.6 0.6 20.6 
Other n.e.c. 3.9 13.1 4.2 30.4 5.3 109.6 4.0 112.1 6.4 215.7 
           
Total 100% 340 100% 723 100% 2,082 100% 2,789 100% 3,383 
 
1 Ferrous, non-ferrous and fabricated. 
2 R&D directed at computer software for 1981-82 is included in the total manufacturing figure 
Source: ABS 8104 & Sheehan 1995 
 
                                                 
45 The classification ‘Industry of Product Field’ includes R&D done in one industry for the products of 
another - e.g. R&D performed by a services sector company for a manufactured product shows as 
manufacturing R&D. 
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This table reveals that the manufacturing sector has accounted for well over half total 
R&D performance over the period surveyed, although manufacturing’s share of total 
business R&D expenditure has fallen from 85.3 per cent in 1981 to 65.8 per cent in 
1995. There is evidence of strong growth in agricultural R&D, albeit from a low base. 
The mining sector similarly has witnessed growing expenditure levels, although as a 
percentage of total R&D expenditure there has been a decline over the period. Other 
highlights include generally strong growth in the areas of shipbuilding, aerospace, 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals, pharmaceuticals and, particularly, electronics and 
computer software. Shipbuilding has benefited substantially from the Royal 
Australian Navy’s frigate, submarine and minehunter programs, while the information 
industries have had the Information Industries Strategy. Shipbuilding R&D is plotted 
in Figure D.2. 
 
 
Figure D.2 
Australian Shipbuilding R&D as % GDP 
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Source: ANBERD, ABS 5206.0 
 
 
The upward spike as the naval contracts came on stream is clearly evident. 
 
It is also instructive to look at R&D expenditure at the level of the firm. Data at this 
level is provided by a recent survey commissioned by the Industry Research and 
Development (IR&D) Board. Table D.2b lists Australia’s top R&D spenders. 
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Table D.2b  
Ranking of Australian Firms by Total R&D Expenditure 
1996 
 
Rank Company Industry Sector R&D 
($m) 
 
1 Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunications 218 
2 Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited Metal Product Manufacture 208 
3 Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd Telecommunications 98 
4 CRA Limited Mining 91 
5 Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited Machinery and Equip. Man. 78 
6  Transfield Defence Systems Pty Ltd Machinery and Equip. Man. 65 
7 CSR Limited Non-metallic Mineral Man. 61 
8 Comalco Limited Metal Product Manufacture 49 
9 Optus Communications Pty Ltd Telecommunications 48 
10 CSR Pharmaceuticals 26 
 
Source: IR&D Board 1996 
 
 
Large telecommunications and manufacturing firms dominate this list. Six of the 
firms in these industries appeared in the top 10 ranked R&D spenders for 1995. A key 
point to be made about this data in terms of the current study is that the top two R&D 
spenders - Telstra and BHP - account for approximately 12 per cent of total business 
R&D expenditure in Australia. The top 10 firms account for nearly 30 per cent. 
Business R&D expenditure is highly concentrated - a few firms invest heavily in 
R&D, while most firms spend relatively little. 
 
Rankings for R&D expenditure per employee, and as a percentage of turnover, reveal 
the dominance of smaller firms in the areas of biotechnology, scientific and medical 
research and pharmaceuticals. 
 
2. Other Measures of Innovation 
 
As indicated earlier the ABS and, more recently, DIST and the Industry Commission 
have analysed other measures of innovation.  Table D.2c ranks each industry 
according to the proportion of firms undertaking innovation. 
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Table D.2c 
Proportion of Firms Undertaking Either Technological or Non-Technological Innovation 
by Industry 
199446 
% 
 
Industry Proportion Ratio to Highest 
(%) 
   
Utilities 46.4 100.0 
Manufacturing 42.8 92.2 
Wholesale 33.5 72.1 
Mining 31.8 68.5 
Cultural & Rec 30.6 65.9 
Education 26.4 56.9 
Tourism47 22.1 47.6 
Health & Commun. Serv 21.8 47.0 
Communic. Serv 21.4 46.1 
Prop & Bus Serv 20.3 43.8 
Personal & Other 19.9 42.9 
Retail trade 17.7 38.1 
Transp & Storage 17.4 37.5 
Construction 15.3 33.0 
Finance & Insur. 13.7 29.5 
 
Source: Derived from ABS 8118.0; 8116.0 
 
 
There appears to be a significant gap between the small number of high-innovation 
industries (as measured by the surveys) and the remainder whose relationship to the 
high-innovators falls away quite sharply. 
 
For technological innovation the ABS ranks the various industries’ innovation status 
as follows (Figure D.3): 
 
 
                                                 
46 For manufacturing the period was 1991-94. 
47 Accommodation, cafes & restaurants. 
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Figure D.3 
Proportion of Firms Engaging in Technological Innovation48 
1994 
% 
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Source: ABS 8116.0; 81180. 
 
Once again manufacturing ranks highly with a technological innovation propensity 
three times the non-manufacturing industry average. Communication rates higher in 
technological innovation than it does in overall innovation as measured by the 
methodology of Table D.2c. Within manufacturing it is interesting to see where much 
of the innovative activity is being conducted. Table D.4 presents a technological 
innovation breakdown for manufacturing industries. 
 
Table D.4   
Proportion of Businesses Undertaking Technological Innovation  
Manufacturing Subdivisions 
1991-94 
% 
Manufacturing Subdivisions Product Process Technological 
   Innovation 
% 
Innovation 
% 
Innovation 
% 
 
 
     
Food, beverage & tobacco 31.6 25.3 35.6  
Textile, clothing, footwear & leather 27.6 20.6 29.9  
Wood & paper product  12.6 11.4 15.1  
Printing, publishing & recorded media 22.3 29.6 33.5  
Petroleum, coal, chem. & assoc. product 46.1 29.5 46.4  
Non-metallic mineral product 35.4 25.2 36.7  
Metal product 28.8 21.9 32.0  
Machinery and equipment 39.4 25.0 41.9  
Other Manufacturing 26.6 20.5 31.0  
     
Total Manufacturing 29.9 23.1 33.7  
       Source: ABS 8116.0 
                                                 
48 The All Industries total excludes manufacturing. 
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The petroleum, coal, chemical and associated product industries stand out as having 
the highest share of innovative firms, closely followed by the machinery and 
equipment sectors, whilst the wood and paper product subdivision easily contains the 
least proportion of innovative firms. In all subdivisions, except printing, publishing 
and recorded media, product innovation was undertaken by a larger share of firms 
than process innovation. 
 
DIST and the Industry Commission examined the nature of innovation activity 
undertaken by Australian manufacturing businesses in some detail49. Some of their 
conclusions are expressed in Table D.5 below. 
 
Table D.5 
Proportion of Business Innovation Expenditure by Activity 
Manufacturing 
1994-95 
% 
 
  Proportion of Innovation Costs Used on:  
       
Industry R&D Training 
of staff 
Patents, 
trade-
marks; 
licenses 
Tooling, 
engineer-
ing, & 
start-up 
Market-
ing of 
new 
products 
Total 
       
Food, beverages, tobacco 43.2 1.4 0.9 21.5 33.1 100.0 
Text., cloth., foot., leather 23.4 3.7 1.8 65.6 5.6 100.0 
Wood & paper products 38.1 1.8 0.1 56.1 3.9 100.0 
Print., publish.., recorded media 14.7 2.0 0.1 28.9 54.3 100.0 
Petrol., coal, chem., assoc. output 55.7 1.1 2.2 27.1 13.9 100.0 
Non-metallic mineral products 49.9 1.0 0.7 41.6 6.8 100.0 
Metal products 22.5 0.9 0.5 75.0 1.0 100.0 
Machinery and Equipment 61.7 5.9 10.3 17.8 4.3 100.0 
Other Manufacturing 40.0 6.8 0.4 31.8 21.1 100.0 
       
Total Manufacturing 41.3 2.5 3.2 41.7 11.3 100.0 
                   
Source: DIST 1997 
 
Most manufacturing industries spent the largest portion of their innovation budgets on 
R&D and on tooling, engineering and start-up. Most industries spent the least on 
patents, trade-marks and licences. This excludes the petroleum, coal, chemical and 
associated industries as well as the machinery and equipment industries, both of 
which spent the least on staff training. 
 
Another dimension of the relationship between industrial structure and innovation 
activity is that of firm size. Figure D.3 indicates that there is a direct relationship 
between firm size and the proportion of firms undertaking technological innovation.   
 
 
Figure D.3 
                                                 
49 These data come from the Business Longitudinal Survey (BLS) and differ from other ABS survey 
data for a number of reasons, including a greater focus on SMEs in the survey sample. 
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Proportion of Businesses Undertaking Technological Innovation by Size  
1991-94 
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                       Source: Sheehan 1995 
 
The above chart reveals that technologically innovative activity by firms varies 
positively with firm size. While only 25 per cent of firms with less than 5 employees 
undertook technological innovation, 90 per cent of firms with over 1000 employees 
did so. 
 
The surveys also sought to identify the sources of ideas for innovation, together with 
the factors hampering it (Table D.6). 
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Table D.6 
Sources of Ideas for Innovation & Factors Hampering Innovation 
Composite Index Scores 
1994 
 
 
Sources of Ideas for Innovation 
 
  
 
Factors Hampering Innovation 
 
 
Source 
 
Score Factor   Score
Clients or customers 3.3 Lack of appropriate sources of finance  3.0
R&D area 2.9 Innovation costs too high  2.8
Within your industry 2.9 Legislation, regulations, standards, tax  2.5
Suppliers, materials & parts 2.5 Lack of skilled personnel  2.4
Other areas 2.4 Innovation costs hard to control  2.4
Suppliers, equipment 2.4 Pay-off period of innovation too long  2.4
Fairs/exhibitions 2.1 Excessive perceived risk  2.3
Outside your industry 1.8 Lack of information on technologies  2.0
Professional journals 1.8 Lack of information on markets  2.0
Conferences & meetings 1.7 Lack of customer responsiveness  2.0
Consultancy firms 1.4 Innovations too easy to copy  1.9
Higher education institutions 1.3 Uncertainty in timing  1.9
Patent disclosures 1.3 Few external tech. services  1.8
Government laboratories 1.2 Few opportunities for collaboration  1.8
Private research institutes 1.2 Internal resistance to change  1.8
 Lack of technological opportunities  1.7
 Effectiveness of earlier innovations  1.4
   
              Source: Sheehan 1995 and ABS 8116.0 
 
 
A number of important factors stand out in this data. Firstly, it is clear that most ideas 
are sourced from inside the firm, within the industry and from customers. This 
supports the conclusions of the literature review of Part One stressing the importance 
of linkages and of research and development for innovation and learning. Secondly, 
the most important factor retarding innovation is lack of access to appropriate finance. 
This supports much of the anecdotal evidence which has often been presented by 
small and medium sized firms that access to finance has been a problem for 
expansion. 
             
3. Innovation & Firm Performance 
 
The surveys also examine the relationship between innovation and firm performance. 
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Figure D.4 
Proportion of Businesses with Sales & Exports Growth of 50% or More 
Manufacturing Industries 
1991-94  
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          Source: ABS 8116.0 
 
 
The data reveal a positive relationship between innovation, on the one hand, and sales 
and export growth, on the other. In general, innovative firms were nearly twice as 
likely as other firms to achieve sales growth of 50 per cent or more over the period 
and 1.5 times as likely to achieve export growth of 50 per cent or more. 
 
The survey results show that the machinery and equipment industry contained the 
greatest proportion of technologically innovative firms which increased their sales by 
50 per cent or more (37 per cent), whilst the printing, publishing and recorded media 
industries contained the least (19 per cent). 
 
In terms of export performance, a higher proportion of innovative firms in each 
industry (except the ‘petroleum, coal, chemical & assoc. product’ and ‘non-metallic 
mineral product’ industries)50 achieved export growth of 50 per cent or more, 
compared to other firms. The most impressive results were recorded in the ‘food, 
beverage & tobacco’ and ‘other manufacturing’ industries where approximately three 
times as many innovative firms achieved export growth of over 50 per cent compared 
to other firms. 
 
The ‘metal product’ industry contained the greatest proportion of technologically 
innovative firms (54 per cent) which increased exports by more than 50 per cent, 
whilst the ‘wood and paper product’ industry contained the least (18 per cent). 
                                                 
50 In respect of these two industries Sheehan notes: ‘Especially for the former this may reflect both the 
cyclical nature of these industries and their dominance by multinational enterprises, which can 
geographically configure activities in such a way that relationships between technological innovation 
and export growth would more likely exist at a global than national level.’ (1995: 40) 
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Figures D.5 and D.6 examine sales and export growth by size of firm. 
 
 
Figure D.5 
Proportion of Businesses with Sales 
Growth of 50% or More, by Size  
1991-94  
 
Figure D.6 
Proportion of Businesses with Export 
Growth of 50% or More, by Size  
1991-94 
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                 Source: Derived from Sheehan 1995 
 
In the sales area, small technological innovators (0-20 employees) are more than 
twice as likely as other small firms to achieve growth of 50 per cent or more. The 
superiority of innovators holds for the 100-499 employee group, but performance is 
matched for innovators and ‘others’ in the remaining size categories. In the exports 
area, for the three smaller firm sizes, technological innovators are between 24 per cent 
and 60 per cent more likely to achieve growth of 50 per cent or more than other firms. 
 
4. Australian Innovation Compared 
 
International comparison of Australian R&D as a proportion of GDP reflects the 
findings of the first of the charts in this chapter - that Australian R&D spending has 
been below average but increasing rapidly. R&D spending levels have generally 
plateaued in the OECD countries. Between 1981 and 1992 R&D expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP rose by 15 per cent for the OECD as a whole, while in Australia it 
increased by 56 per cent. 
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Table D.7 
R&D Expenditure as % Share of GDP: Selected Countries 
(Government plus Business) 
% 
 
Country 1981 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
          
USA 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 
Japan 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 
Germany 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 
France 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 
UK 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Italy 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Canada 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Sweden 2.3 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 na 2.9 na 3.1 
Australia 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 na 1.4 na 1.6 
OECD 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 na 
China na na 0.7 0.6 na 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Sth Korea 0.6 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.4 
Taiwan 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.8 na 
India 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 na 
Malaysia na na na na na na na 0.4 na 
Indonesia na na na na na na 0.2 na na 
Singapore 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 
              
          Source: Sheehan 1995 
 
The table also evidences the high growth rates in R&D as a proportion of GDP for 
several Asian countries. Between the early 1980s and the early 1990s spending 
increased fourfold for South Korea and Singapore, whilst doubling in Taiwan. In the 
other Asian countries shown, spending remains at relatively low levels, however 
Sheehan (1995: 42) considers that it is likely to rise rapidly in the future. 
 
Table D.8 shows business spending on R&D as a percentage of GDP, ranked by 
country, and shows a ranking of R&D expenditure growth rates. 
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Table D.8 
Business Expenditure on R&D 
1981-93 
% GDP; Annual Growth Rate % 
 
Proportion of GDP Annual Growth Rate 
Country 1981  Country 1993 Country Growth %
     
Switzerland 1.72  Japan 2.00 South Korea (to 1990) 29.3
Japan 1.44  Switzerland (92) 1.81 Singapore (to 1990) 22.3
Germany 1.41  Sweden (91) 1.73 Chinese Taipei (to 1990) 16.4
Sweden 1.26  USA 1.60 Ireland (to 1992) 13.2
USA 1.18  South Korea (90) 1.56 AUSTRALIA 12.1
Belgium(83) 1.05  Germany 1.49 Spain (to 1992) 11.4
UK 1.00  Finland 1.26 Denmark (to 1991) 8.4
Netherlands 0.86  UK 1.14 Finland 7.5
France 0.81  France (92) 1.10 Japan 7.4
Finland 0.65  Belgium (91) 1.08 India (to 1990) 7.2
Austria 0.59  Netherlands (92) 0.93 Italy 6.5
Chinese Taipei 0.54  Chinese Taipei (90) 0.88 Austria 5.3
Norway 0.52  Denmark (91) 0.88 Sweden (to 1991) 5.2
Canada 0.51  Norway 0.86 USA 5.1
Denmark 0.47  Austria 0.79 Canada 4.9
Italy 0.44  AUSTRALIA 0.71 France (to 1992) 4.8
South Korea 0.35  Ireland (92) 0.68 Norway 4.7
Ireland 0.26  Italy 0.65 Germany 4.4
AUSTRALIA 0.22  Canada 0.63 Netherlands (to 1992) 4
Spain 0.18  Singapore (90) 0.49 New Zealand (to 1991) 4
New Zealand 0.18  Spain (92) 0.40 UK 3.8
Singapore 0.16  New Zealand (91) 0.29 Switzerland (to 1992) 2.9
India 0.16  India (90) 0.18 Belgium (to 1991) 2.9
    
Average 0.69  Average 1.01 Average 8.4
 
              Source: DIST 1996 
 
Australia has clearly improved its relative standing in terms of business expenditure 
on R&D as a percentage of GDP, however, as a proportion of GDP, Australian 
businesses still spend considerably less than most other countries. Australia’s 
spending has grown from 32 per cent of the average to 70 per cent of the average. 
 
Despite this rapid growth in business R&D spending, Australia has the lowest 
R&D/GDP ratio for manufacturing of the countries for which data are available. 
 
As shown in Table D.1 earlier, Australia’s manufacturing R&D growth has been 
concentrated in the low and medium-low R&D intensive sectors. This concentration 
is a reflection of Australia’s industrial structure. In addition to having a relatively 
small manufacturing sector, much of our manufacturing activity is in the low and 
medium-low R&D intensive sectors. The OECD country R&D data can be adjusted 
for country industry structure, and when they are it can be seen that it is very much 
the low-tech nature of Australia’s manufacturing industries which is responsible for 
our comparatively low R&D performance (Figure D.7). 
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Figure D.7 
Comparison of Australian Manufacturing R&D/GDP with 10 Nations  
Adjusted for Industrial Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: DIST 1996 
 
 
The graph shows that although adjusting for industry structure reduces the margin 
between Australia and the OECD average, our predominantly low-tech industrial 
composition accounts for a substantial part of Australia’s relatively poor R&D 
performance. To repeat the quote from DIST cited in Chapter 7 earlier: 
 
‘It is now true that the ‘low technology’ composition of our manufacturing 
sector is primarily responsible for our low ranking BERD/GDP ratio.’ (DIST 
1996: 75) 
 
Turning to the services sector, Table D.9 compares Australia’s services sector R&D 
standing internationally. 
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Table D.9 
Service Sector R&D 
Business Enterprises 
Selected Countries 
1976 - 1992 
 
Country       Level US$M 
 
Annual % 
Change 
 
Share of Total Business R&D (%)1 
 
Share of 
GDP 
(%)2 
        
 1984 1992 ‘84 - ‘92 1976 1984 1992 1992 
 
Australia 
 
93 
 
564 
 
25.3 
 
10.3 
 
14.7 
 
27.3 
 
0.24 
Canada 503 1461 14.3 14.3 21.5 33.3 0.18 
Denmark 90 267 15.3 17.0 22.1 27.6 0.16 
France 477 1478 15.2 5.7 5.6 9.3 0.06 
Germany 531 714 3.8 3.4 3.8 3.0 0.02 
Italy 368 1118 14.9 14.1 10.3 14.4 0.08 
Japan 874 1955 10.9 4.5 3.8 3.9 0.03 
Sweden 197 340 7.0 11.2 10.6 11.5 0.08 
UK 375 1330 17.2 7.9 4.4 10.6 0.06 
USA 4905 10918 10.5 3.1 6.6 na 0.07 
 
1. Shares of R&D are calculated in domestic currencies  
2. Level and shares of GDP are calculated in US$ using purchasing power parities 
 
Source: OECD ANBERD Database in Sheehan 1995 
 
 
Australia has the highest level of services R&D as a proportion of the economy and 
the third highest share of total business R&D devoted to the service sector. Between 
1984 and 1992 the level of Australia’s service sector R&D has increased sixfold, 
compared to an approximate fourfold increase in total business R&D expenditure. 
This growth performance in service sector R&D is unique among OECD countries, 
and is possibly linked to our strength in computer software. This may be further 
linked to the growth of software-intensive industries such as banking and tourism, the 
development of the Information Industries Strategy and the industry development 
conditions surrounding the telecommunications carriers. There will also be a 
connection with the 150 per cent R&D tax concession. 
 
The Institute for Management Development - publishers of the World 
Competitiveness Report - ranks countries annually for their performance over a range 
of criteria. One of these criteria is Science and Technology. The indicators used in 
this category are R&D expenditures, R&D personnel, technology management, 
science environment and intellectual property. Over the last five years Australia has 
ranked 19th out of the countries surveyed (currently 46 countries). This has recently 
deteriorated to 24th in 1997. As far as the advanced OECD countries are concerned 
IMD ranks Australia as 18th out of 20 for Science and Technology. 
 
5. Australian Productivity Growth 
 
Productivity can be measured in a number of ways. A popular measure increasingly 
used over recent years has been Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This measure seeks 
to quantify ‘[t]the difference between output and the weighted growth of factor inputs, 
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in this case labour and capital inputs’. This approach assumes that the weights can be 
approximated by ‘[t]he respective factors shares in total costs...following a Cobb-
Douglas type production function’ (OECD 1996h: 20).  
 
The TFP measure has a number of inherent problems (see MTIA 1995), particularly 
with respect to measuring the productivity of capital, and most agencies suggest 
caution when using TFP calculations. Other productivity measures are also used here. 
These include output per worker and output per hour worked. The advantage of using 
output per hour worked is that it is simple and captures all productivity gains arising 
from technical change or innovation within the workplace. Output per worker may not 
accurately reflect productivity (or, more precisely, technological change) in the 
situation where firms downsize and their employees work for longer hours (i.e. the 
amount of unit input time increases thereby increasing output with no actual 
efficiency increase)51. As indicated, in this report all these measures will be used. It 
should be noted that output per hour and output per worker tend to generate roughly 
similar results, whereas TFP estimations can sometimes be very different from the 
other two. 
 
It should also be noted that the measurement of productivity in the services sector is 
very difficult due to output measurement problems and so all measures of 
productivity may contain service-related errors. Moreover, as the services sector’s 
share of GDP rises, these measurement problems become more acute. 
 
One final caveat relates to comparisons of productivity growth over relatively short 
periods. Productivity is very sensitive to the business cycle and tends to rise very 
sharply in the early phase of recovery and then decline towards the peak. This means 
that shorter term cross-country and within-country comparisons of productivity 
growth rates should only be made from equivalent points in the business/productivity 
cycle - e.g. from peak to peak or trough to trough. In particular, international 
productivity performance comparisons after 1990 - particularly among the G7 
countries - are very difficult. This is due to the integration of East and West Germany, 
which sharply reduced Germany’s measured productivity growth; the tight monetary 
and fiscal policies in Europe designed to support the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism and meet the Maastricht fiscal deficit criterion of 3 per cent of GDP and 
debt of 60 per cent; and the bursting of the ‘bubble economy’ in Japan which has kept 
Japan in or near recession for much of the 1990s. 
 
Journalistic commentary on the superiority of the US model of economic 
development should therefore be discounted until longer term productivity data are 
available. 
 
Australia’s real GDP per worker (RGDPW) is plotted below against the G6 countries 
(Figure D.8). 
 
                                                 
51 The problem also arises with output per hour, as outsourcing will reduce the number of measured 
hours worked within a firm/industry despite output remaining constant. Outsourcing may also bias 
productivity measurement downwards by shifting activity formerly in the goods-producing industries 
into the service industries. 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
 
Australia’s Trade Patterns                                                                                                 
10.169 
 
 
Figure D.8 
Index of Real Output per Worker 
Australia v. G6 Countries 
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         Source: Datastream 
 
 
The chart shows, firstly, the well-known phenomenon of convergence, where 
productivity levels (among advanced countries) tend to move towards each other as 
income per capita levels also converge.  
 
Secondly, it shows that, despite an absolute superiority in the 1960s, Australia and the 
United States have not increased their productivity at the same rates as have the 
European countries and, in particular, Japan. Some countries are now showing 
absolute productivity levels higher than the US. Thirdly, the chart shows that the 
impact on productivity of re-unification of the German economy has been dramatic 
and negative as the inefficient East German economy has been absorbed. 
 
A comparison of productivity growth rates over this period can be made by indexing 
the data to 1960 - Figure D.9. 
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Figure D.9 
Real Output per Worker Indexed to 1960 
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         Source: Datastream 
 
What is clear again is the relatively strong performance of Japan over the period, 
followed by Italy and France. In contrast, Australia and the US have lagged. 
 
Including some of the smaller countries, as well as some of those commencing the 
period with substantial resource endowments similar to that of Australia, gives the 
following table of relative productivity performance (Table D.10). 
 
 
Table D.10 
Growth in Real Output per Worker  
1960-95 
 
Country Change 
  
Japan 340% 
Spain 303% 
Italy 232% 
Finland 201% 
France 179% 
Norway 165% 
Germany 126% 
Netherlands 123% 
Denmark 119% 
Sweden 116% 
UK 108% 
Australia 87% 
Canada 64% 
US 57% 
NZ 38% 
 
         Source: Datastream 
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Anglophone countries have performed relatively poorly over the long haul, while 
Japan and the European economies have achieved substantially higher rates of 
productivity growth. The Scandinavian countries show an interesting contrast with 
Australia. In particular, the once resource-dependent economies of Finland, Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark have moved their economies substantially away from heavy 
reliance on commodities. They are among the strong performers in productivity 
growth. It may be significant in this respect that the share of the economy occupied by 
manufacturing in Denmark, Finland and Sweden has fallen much more slowly than 
that of Australia - at about half the rate. 
 
Table D.11 shows growth in real GDP per worker for a number of Asian countries. 
 
 
Table D.11 
Change in Real GDP per Worker 
1960-90 
% 
 
Country % Change
Korea 493%
Hong Kong 447%
Taiwan 446%
Singapore 387%
Malaysia 205%
 
        Source: Penn World Tables 
 
 
The rapid productivity growth of the ‘Asian Tigers’ is apparent. There has been much 
debate on the source of this productivity superiority. This debate has polarised 
between two schools of thought, the one - led by Krugman - who believe that the 
explanation lies in technological ‘catch-up’, sound macroeconomic settings and rapid 
growth of factor inputs, and those of the opposing school who argue the importance of 
government intervention in shaping industrial development, (e.g. Wade, Rodrik, 
Prestowitz) on the other. 
 
MTIA (1995) examines these arguments, and in particular the Krugman thesis that 
Singapore’s rapid growth in productivity was due to more rapid accumulation of 
factor inputs (labour and capital). They cite Dowrick (1995) and conclude that the so-
called ‘unexplained’ or ‘miracle’ portion of TFP growth (i.e. unexplained by factor 
accumulation) is around 0.7 per cent per annum. This is quite high, as Australia’s 
average multifactor productivity growth between 1966 and 1995 was 1.4 per cent per 
year. An increase of 0.7 per cent per year would constitute a substantial increase in 
Australian productivity. MTIA concludes that the ‘miracle’ element of Asian growth 
is substantial. 
 
Investment is now recognised as a key driver of growth. What are not explained by 
those of the Krugman school are the reasons for the rapid increase in investment in 
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these countries. MTIA refer to policies that can keep the cost of capital low, such as 
exchange rate and interest rate regulation as well as taxation incentives. As mentioned 
elsewhere in this report the Australian taxation system, in contrast, appears to 
discriminate against investment in machinery and equipment and in favour of 
property. 
 
The international research relating to productivity growth indicates that there is a 
relationship between productivity growth and R&D intensity. Figure D.10 shows 
productivity growth rates in different industries across the G6 countries for the decade 
1981-91. 
 
 
Figure D.10 
Annual Growth in Labour Productivity 
G6 Countries 
1981-91 
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        Source: OECD 1994a 
 
 
As indicated earlier, another factor in productivity growth may be job tenure and 
stability of employment. Figure D.11a shows the relationship between productivity 
growth and job turnover across a number of countries. The graph shows a negative 
relationship. 
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Figure D.11a 
Productivity Growth 1980-90 v. Job Turnover 
Various Countries 
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        Source: BIE 1995a; Datastream 
 
 
Productivity growth has tended to vary inversely with job turnover - such that high 
job turnover has been associated with lower productivity growth - although clearly 
this factor may only be one of many influencing productivity growth.  
 
One possible link at the firm level between job turnover and productivity growth may 
be that it takes time for employees to learn how a firm operates internally and thus 
build the internal communication channels needed to maximise their own efficiency 
within the firm.  
 
Another might be that it also takes time to build relationships with customers and 
translate customer needs into changes in firm processes and products.  
 
In both cases it would appear that a high rate of job turnover could retard the learning 
capacity and internal operating efficiency of the firm, as well as wastes resources 
through repeated basic induction training and employee mistakes. High levels of 
labour turnover may also result in lost sales as personal customer relationships are 
continually broken. Should all of this take place at a sufficiently high rate throughout 
the entire economy then it is not difficult to see how national productivity growth may 
be impeded by high rates of staff turnover at the firm level.52  
                                                 
52 Knowledge spillovers (which are acknowledged as enhancing productivity) often result from highly 
trained staff leaving one firm - from which they gained new knowledge and developed networking 
relationships important in the dispersal of tacit knowledge - and taking that knowledge and those 
networking contacts to another firm which does not fully pay for them. In practice, there is likely to be 
a balance between the spillover effect when highly trained staff change firms without full 
compensation and the disruption caused by constant staff changes both for highly skilled and less 
skilled workers. At some rate of staff turnover it is likely that the latter (negative, disruptive) effect will 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
 
Australia’s Trade Patterns                                                                                                 
10.174 
 
 
 
Looking at the obverse of job turnover - job tenure - Figure D.11b shows median job 
tenure across a range of countries. 
 
Figure D.11b 
Median Job Tenure 1993 
OECD-12 
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         Source: BIE 1995a 
 
 
Research on human resource management programs (HRMPs) shows (see below) that 
productivity and profitability can be substantially increased using inclusive 
management-staff work practices which improve ‘intra-firm’ learning. It is possible 
that high levels of staff turnover may reflect weak ‘bonding’ between management 
and staff and weaker internal knowledge flows.  
 
Australia evidences a relatively low level of job stability. An examination of job 
turnover statistics also shows that Australian employees tend to move between firms 
much more quickly than is the case in many other countries. These features reduce the 
opportunity for relationships based on trust to develop (although job mobility will act 
as a means of knowledge diffusion). 
 
There may be a possible link between productivity growth and length of employment 
tenure. In the framework of this paper this would be expected to be a positive one, 
and this is evidenced in Figure D.11c53. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
overwhelm the former (positive, spillover) effect. This ‘equilibrium’ point is likely to vary with the 
degree of knowledge intensity of the industry and economy concerned, with a more knowledge 
intensive industry likely to be able to tolerate higher rates of job turnover (such as occurs in Silicon 
Valley). 
53 It should be noted that the job tenure data relates to 1993 only and earlier data is required in order to 
draw firm conclusions. 
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Figure D.11c 
Increase in Real Output per Worker 1980-90 v. Median Job Tenure 
OECD-12 
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Source: BIE 1995b, Datastream 
 
As would be implied by the section above on job turnover, this graph suggests that 
productivity growth may be positively associated with job tenure, or that they may 
both be associated with another factor. Holzer (1988) used data from a nationwide 
sample of US firms’ wages and employment characteristics to examine the 
determinants of employee productivity and earnings. The data included several 
measures of job experience, training, and both worker and firm characteristics as well 
as subjective employer productivity ratings and earnings of workers. The results 
showed that:  
 
 both previous experience and tenure in the current job have significant, positive 
effects on wages and productivity; 
 productivity and wage growth are positively related to hours of training. 
 
If job stability, then, rather than mobility, is a contributor to productivity growth 
(perhaps, for example, because job stability may encourage greater training 
commitment by employers) then this may call into question some of the likely 
productivity benefits of policies designed to move the labour market towards greater 
mobility across firms and regions. On the other hand, personnel mobility can enhance 
spillovers. It will largely depend on who moves and whether their skills are fully 
utilised and paid for. 
 
Yet another influence on productivity growth appears to be the degree of income 
inequality. Corry and Glyn (1994) cite World Bank research which demonstrates a 
negative relationship between economic growth rates and income inequality. The 
World Bank concludes: 
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If anything, it seems that inequality is associated with slower growth (World 
Development Report 1991 cited in Corry and Glyn 1994: 214) 
 
They also cite Alesina and Rodrik (1992) who examined economic growth rates for 
65 countries over the period 1960-85. Alesina and Rodrik found, after controlling for  
initial conditions such as starting productivity, that the higher the level of income 
share of the highest 20 per cent of the population, the lower the economic growth rate 
(defined as real GDP per capita growth). 
 
There are a number of theoretical reasons why this might be the case. Firstly, 
retaining a large share of income in the hands of people with a high marginal 
propensity to consume (i.e. the middle and lower income classes) tends to maintain a 
more stable consumption flow and reduce the volatility of economic cycles (Corry 
and Glyn 1994: 215 show empirical evidence supporting this thesis). This may mean 
more enduring long term economic growth via fewer periods of recession. 
 
Secondly, rising inequality is generally associated with rising unemployment, and 
there is ample evidence that rising unemployment reduces economic growth rates 
(e.g. Junankar and Kapuscinski 1992 for Australian evidence). 
 
Thirdly, rising income inequality may result in reduced access for the majority of the 
population to adequate health care and to higher education (see Business Week August 
15, 1994). This means a poorer quality of human capital than could have been 
possible in the absence of such inequality. 
 
Finally, rising inequality can reduce government revenue and increase outlays, thus 
reducing the ability of governments to fund such productivity-enhancing expenditures 
as infrastructure, education and research and development institutions. 
 
Figure 11.d shows the relationship between productivity growth over the 1980-90 
period and income distribution for 16 OECD countries. 
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Figure D.11d 
Increase in Real Output per Worker 1980-90 v. Income Inequality 
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Source: Datastream; UN Human Development Report 
 
 
This graph broadly reflects the conclusions reached in the literature. Note that 
Australia rates poorly on both income inequality measures and productivity measures, 
as does the United States. 
 
It must be noted that the measurement of income inequality is extremely difficult and 
controversial. In Australia, for example, it has been difficult to reach consensus as to 
whether income inequality has widened over the last decade or so. There appears to 
be consensus that market income inequality has increased, but less agreement as to 
whether the tax/transfer system has fully compensated for this. 
 
One measure of inequality is the Gini statistic. This measures the difference between 
the actual distribution of income and a totally equal distribution, where the latter is 
defined as each per cent of the population earning a per cent of total income (e.g. the 
lowest 20 per cent of income earners gain 20 per cent of income, the lowest 40 per 
cent of income earners gain 40 per cent, and so on). The Gini statistic ranges from a 
theoretical low of zero (total equality of income distribution) to a theoretical high of 
one (all income goes to the highest income group). Thus the higher the value of the 
statistic, the higher the level of income inequality. 
 
Gini statistics for Australia over recent years are shown in Figure D.11e below. 
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Figure D.11e 
Gini Statistic 
Australia 
1972-90 
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Source: Raskall unpublished data 
 
 
This suggests some widening in Australian income inequality, although the caveats 
registered above cannot be stressed strongly enough. If this increased inequality has 
in fact taken place, then the research suggests that this could have had negative 
implications for Australian productivity growth. Moreover, if market income 
inequality is rising in a context of substantial fiscal consolidation, then it is likely that 
the state may no longer be able or willing to balance these market outcomes through 
the tax/transfer system. This would tend to increase overall income inequality, which 
could, ceteris paribus, tend to depress long run productivity growth. 
 
Figure D.12 below plots changes in real output per worker versus changes in 
manufacturing share of GDP. As manufacturing is generally a higher productivity 
sector it would be logical to expect that a declining manufacturing share may be 
associated with declining aggregate productivity growth. 
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Figure D.12 
Change in Productivity v. Change in Manufacturing Share of GDP 
Various Countries 
1970-90 
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       Source: BIE (1995), Penn World Tables 
 
 
Only a limited group of countries is included in the figure, but the graph shows that in 
broad terms the higher productivity performers (above 100 per cent growth over the 
period on the vertical axis) are generally located on the right hand side of the chart, in 
countries where manufacturing sectors have increased as a proportion of GDP54.   
 
For Australia, growth rates - between cycle peaks - of indices of real non-farm output 
per hour worked are shown in Figure D.13. 
 
                                                 
54 This is a small data set and no conclusions should be drawn without more detailed analysis. 
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Figure D.13 
Average Annual Growth Rates of Australian Real Non-Farm Output per Hour Between 
Cycle Peaks 
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          Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
This clearly shows the declining trend in Australian productivity growth, although 
there has been some improvement in the 1990s. It is interesting to note that 
productivity growth rates were substantially higher in the decades before the 
acceleration of ‘economic reform’  in the mid-1980s55. Popular descriptions of that 
period of Australian economic history in very negative terms may well be misplaced.  
 
Within Australia, indices of real output per hour worked are available on a sectoral 
level from 1975 but, due to changes in industry classification, the data is only 
consistent across all industries from 1985. 
 
                                                 
55 Interestingly the later section on trade (Chapter 10) notes that the period before the mid-1970s was 
one characterised by increased manufactured exports growth and declining manufacturing trade 
deficits despite a strongly rising exchange rate and increasing real wages. 
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Table D.12 
Growth in Real Output per Hour 
by Industry 
1986-95 
Average % p.a. 
 
Industry Av. Ann. Growth
 
Communication 8.0%
Utilities 7.3%
Mining 3.4%
Manufacturing 3.3%
Transport 2.8%
Wholesale 0.7%
Agriculture 0.3%
Retail -0.3%
Construction -0.4%
Accommodation, etc. -0.8%
Recreation -0.8%
All Industries 1.0%
  
Source: Derived from Foster 1996 
 
The table shows that the above average productivity performers have been 
communications, utilities, mining and manufacturing. Interestingly, as earlier chapters 
of this paper have shown, much of Australia’s employment growth over the 1985-95 
period has been concentrated in retail and tourism, suggesting the possibility of a shift 
of resources into low productivity growth industries. 
 
The OECD also calculates TFP figures by industry. For Australia these are shown 
over the period 1970-94 (Figure D.14). 
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Figure D.14 
Indices of Total Factor Productivity by Industry56 
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         Source: STAN 
 
 
The chart shows that the industries which have performed better in terms of 
productivity growth have been, in order, transport communications and storage, 
manufacturing and the utilities. The underperformers have been community social and 
personal services and construction. This broadly confirms the picture presented earlier 
using ABS data. 
 
6. Machinery & Equipment Investment 
 
Both the New Growth Theory literature and OECD research conclude that since 
machinery and equipment embody the latest technology their accumulation is 
especially important for both the production and diffusion of economic knowledge. 
Research by De Long and Summers (quoted in OECD 1994a) suggests that the social 
rate of return to machinery and equipment investment is particularly high at around 20 
per cent per annum. In the words of the OECD: 
 
From a policy perspective, the embodiment of technology in capital is 
important as well. If technology is embodied in capital, policies designed to 
increase capital spending will promote growth not only directly, through 
increased investment, but also indirectly through increased total factor 
productivity. (OECD 1996e: 42) 
 
                                                 
56 Note that the industry classifications differ from those used in Australia. 
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MTIA (1995) also demonstrate a clear linkage between labour productivity and 
capital stock per worker.  
 
Australia’s level of machinery and equipment investment as a proportion of GDP is 
clearly on a downward trend (despite the current cyclical upswing) as shown in 
Figure D.15 below. 
 
 
Figure D.15 
Australian Machinery & Equipment Investment as % GDP 
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         Source: ABS 5206.0 
 
The secular trend shown in the graph is clearly down57. Importantly, Australia’s 
equipment investment record also appears to be poor in relation to many of the OECD 
countries for most of the post-war period. Figure D.16a shows, for most of the OECD 
economies, a proxy measure of equipment capital stock per worker calculated from 
the Penn World Tables. 
 
                                                 
57 Falling prices of computer equipment may have contributed to this decline but this effect should be 
relatively similar across advanced economies. 
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Figure D.16a 
Change in Equipment Capital Stock* per Worker 
1965-90  
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* Non-residential capital stock per worker, less non-residential & other construction.  
        Source: Penn World Tables 
 
 
In comparative terms Australia appears to have underinvested in machinery and 
equipment. Interestingly, there may be a relationship between changes in equipment 
investment and changes in manufacturing share of GDP - Figure D.16b. 
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Figure D.16b 
Change in Equipment Capital Stock per Worker v. Change in Manufacturing Share of 
GDP 
1965-9058 
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Source: Penn World Tables; OECD 1993 
 
 
Intuitively this has appeal. If much equipment investment is used in manufacturing, 
then a declining manufacturing share of GDP may reduce the growth rate of demand 
for machinery and equipment. As equipment investment is a recognised driver of 
productivity growth, this could perhaps be a factor behind the possible link between 
productivity growth and changes in manufacturing’s share of GDP noted earlier. As 
outlined before, however, any conclusions in this regard must be viewed as 
conditional on further analysis. 
 
All of these data suggest that if indeed machinery and equipment investment are 
important for productivity growth, then Australia is not well placed to capture 
productivity benefits from these sources. 
 
7. Infrastructure 
 
There is now a substantial body of research which links productivity growth to 
infrastructure investment. US research by Aschauer (1989a,b) suggests that as much 
as 40 per cent of the slowdown in US productivity growth since 1975 has been caused 
by reductions in public infrastructure provision, while Australian research (Otto and 
Voss 1994; Kearney et al. 1994) confirms that Australia has suffered from the same 
problem of declining public capital spending. Australia’s level of government capital 
expenditure is one of the lowest across the OECD (Figure D.17) and has collapsed 
since the mid-1980s (Figure D.18)59. 
 
                                                 
58 Change in manufacturing share is 1970-90. 
59 This discussion of ‘public’ infrastructure is not intended to imply a preference for the ownership of 
that infrastructure being in either government or private hands.  
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Figure D.17 
General Government Capital Expenditure 
% GDP 
1994 
0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0%
Japan
Switzerland
Portugal
Spain
Greece
France
Austria
Norway
Netherlands
Germany
Finland
Italy
Sweden
Ireland
Canada
Denmark
AUSTRALIA
UK
Belgium
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Figure D.18 
Australian Public Capital Expenditure as % GDP 
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Thus Australia’s trends in infrastructure provision are concerning from a productivity 
point of view. 
 
8. Human Resources Management Programs (HRMPs).  
 
The literature reviewed in Part One showed the importance of inclusive workplace 
practices in facilitating learning by firms. Such practices include human resource 
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management programs, or HRMPs (although some writers separate HRMPs covering 
remuneration and career development from other employee-inclusion practices). 
 
HRMPs encompass a wide range of workplace management-staff arrangements, 
including (from Pfeffer 1994: 82-86): 
 
 self-managing or work teams 
 quality improvement 
 job enrichment and re-design 
 profit and gain sharing 
 employee stock ownership 
 knowledge and skill based pay 
 work team incentives 
 
(a) International Research 
 
There is now a considerable body of evidence (e.g. Pfeffer 1994; Freeman 1993; Kato 
1995) that the use of HRMPs is vitally important to maintaining the innovation 
potential of firms. In the words of Pfeffer: 
 
‘The need for continuous innovation and rapid response to market and 
technological change virtually requires a work force that delivers superior 
performance.’ (1994: 7) 
 
Pfeffer uses the term ‘high performance work practices’ to describe the integrated use 
of the kinds of employee-employer processes listed above. International evidence on 
HRMPs includes the following (some of this research was also discussed in Part 
One): 
 
 Japanese case study research shows that Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs) are a pervasive Japanese business practice and that the overall impact of 
employee ownership is positive (Jones and Kato 1993). 
 
 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys in Britain indicate that employee 
participation ‘has grown considerably since the early 1980s to the extent that it is 
now part of the common parlance of most senior managers’ ( Marchington in 
Davis and Lansbury 1996: 231). 
 
 A survey of 600 SMEs in the US by Reish & Luftman reported in Weaver (1996) 
found that 93 per cent of respondents experienced lower absenteeism, 86 per cent 
experienced lower staff turnover (indicated earlier in this report as being relevant 
to productivity) and 79 per cent experienced improved morale after introducing 
ESOPs. 
 
 Coopers & Lybrand interviewed 400 high-tech, high-growth companies in 1994 
and reported that 80 per cent of America's fastest growing companies had an 
ongoing program to solicit employee recommendations to improve business 
operations. Companies that found their employee participation programs most 
valuable used similar approaches:  
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 90 per cent involved employee feedback on quality improvements and 
productivity 
 80 per cent used multidisciplinary teams.  
 80 per cent encouraged sales improvement suggestions 
 60 per cent encouraged participation in new product ideas and business 
planning strategies.  
 
These companies considered employee participation programs to be more than 
simple feedback to management.  Overall, 84 per cent of growth companies 
surveyed offered or plan to offer employee rewards: 52 per cent provided 
special awards and 41 per cent offered a financial share in proceeds from 
successful ideas. Special awards and cash bonuses were the keystone of these 
employee participation programs, rather than prospective ownership of 
company shares (http://www.colybrand.com/eas/trendset/106.html). 
 
 Douglas Kruse and Joseph Blasi of Rutgers University and Michael Conte of the 
University of Baltimore have found that the stock prices of publicly traded 
companies with 10 per cent or more employee ownership did consistently better 
than general stock indices (http://www.nceo.org/library.html). 
 
 The US Conference Board, in a recent paper, found that: 
 
‘Nontraditional factors, such as human resources and management practices, 
and production processes, which vary from firm to firm, play a large role 
determining performance differences among plants.’ (Conference Board 1997 
quoted at Conference Board web address http://www.conference 
board.org/products/frames.cfm?main=econ.cfm). 
 
The international research, then, suggests a positive relationship between the use of 
human resources management programs, on the one hand, and firm performance, 
stock price performance and employment growth, on the other. 
 
(b) Australian Use of Human Resources Management Programs 
 
In the Australian context, a sample of 47 Victorian companies from a 1984 Metal 
Trades Industry Association survey was analysed to determine the extent of middle 
management and supervisory training designed to enhance the ability of management 
to encourage employee participation in: 
 
 productivity improvement programs; 
 occupational health and safety programs.   
 
It was revealed that few companies provided specific training for middle managers 
and supervisors in personnel management skills relevant to participative management. 
(Gleeson et al 1988). 
 
More recent and comprehensive Australian studies in the area of HRMPs are not 
common. Important exceptions are the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations 
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Surveys (AWIRSs) conducted in 1991 and 1995. The 1995 data are embargoed as at 
the time of writing. The 1991 data are reported in a paper by Lansbury and Davis 
(1992) and in their edited collection, Davis and Lansbury (1996). Both reports 
investigate the state of employee participation in Australia and the discussion below 
draws on them. 
 
The AWIRS revealed that ‘with the exception of committees on occupational health 
and safety, fewer than 20 per cent of private sector workplaces had joint consultative 
or task force committees, quality circles or employee representation at board level’ 
(Lansbury and Davis 1992: 4). Moreover, in 73 per cent of workplaces trade unions 
were not consulted or informed about organisational changes which would affect 
employees. ‘On nearly every issue, the majority of workplaces did not regularly 
provide information to employees’ (Callus et al. reported in Lansbury and Davis 
1992: 5). Table D.13 shows the incidence of various types of employee participation, 
as reported by Callus. 
 
 
Table D.13  
Proportions of Workplaces and Employees Involved in Various Methods of Employee 
Participation 
Australia 
1991 
 
 Proportion of Workplaces (%)        Proportion of  
     Employees (%) 
 Private Public All   
Formal Committees   
Occupational health & safety 35 55 41 65  
Joint consultative 9 28 14 30  
Task force, ad hoc 18 43 25 41  
Quality circles 13 12 13 20  
Employee representation on  4 15 7 11  
management board   
   
Regular, Less Formal Meeting   
With senior management 65 78 69 72  
With supervisors/line managers 58 72 62 71  
Social functions 46 59 50 54  
   
Other Methods   
Newsletter/staff bulletin 45 66 51 69  
Suggestion scheme 26 30 27 33  
Daily 'walk around' 86 72 82 72  
               
 Source: Callus (1991) reported in Davis and Lansbury 1996. 
 
Only 9 per cent of private sector firms had formal joint management-staff consultative 
committees, while only 4 per cent had employee representation on the management 
board. Formal structures and processes were used far less frequently than informal 
ones. 
 
Figures in relation to affirmative action reflect the lack of consultation evident above, 
as indicated in Table D.14: 
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Table D.14  
Reported Consultation with Unions and with Women Employees over Affirmative 
Action Programs  
1992 
 
Company Size Number of 
Companies 
Consultation with 
Unions (%) 
Consultation with 
Employees (%) 
    
100-499 1347 52 77 
500-999 687 57 80 
1000+ 292 67 86 
    
Total 2326 58 80 
 
Source: Adapted from Davis and Pratt 1993 reported in Davis and Lansbury 1996. 
 
 
This table indicates that larger firms are more inclined to consult with employees in 
this area of industrial relations. 
 
The AWIRS data has also been used in regression analysis to determine the impact of 
employee participation on performance. Alexander and Green in Davis and Lansbury 
(1996: 76) found that ‘the role and impact of consultative schemes in improving 
workplace performance was found to be directly related to the ‘intensity’ of 
collaboration between management and workforce’. This result supports findings in 
the US literature which demonstrate the positive role of intensive collaboration in 
workplace productivity (e.g. http://www.colybrand.com/eas/trendset/106.html). 
 
Information-sharing and consultation appear to remain underdeveloped in most 
Australian workplaces, at least as far as can be measured by the available data. 
Effective means of redressing these problems are currently seen as rationalisation of 
trade union involvement in the workplace and changes to managerial attitudes. With 
regard to the latter: 
 
‘There continues to be indifference to employee participation on the part of 
many senior managers in Australian organisations, as well as often strenuous 
resistance on the part of middle and first-line managers’ (Lansbury and Davis 
1992: 4). 
 
And again: 
 
‘Australian managers have lacked adequate education and preparation in the 
management of people and the level of skill involved has often been 
underestimated’ (Lansbury and Davis 1996: 19). 
 
This is further confirmation that the relatively poor education levels of Australian 
management may be retarding firm - and overall economic - performance. 
 
A key study by Crichton and Chikarovski (1997) reveals that 74 per cent of the top 
350 Australian companies (in terms of market capitalisation) have some form of 
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Employee Share Plan (ESP) in place. However, option plans were found to be by far 
the most dominant form of ESP in Australia and 'in almost every case, option plans 
are only available to directors and/or a relatively small number of senior executives' (: 
26). 
 
Of the top 350 companies reviewed by Crichton and Chikarovski, only 65 companies, 
or 18 per cent had employee share plans that could be described as substantial (ie 
greater than 50 employee participants and/or representing greater than 2 per cent of 
company capital). These 'substantial' ESPs are effectively restricted to banks, 
insurance companies, major industrial companies, and a handful of others (1997: 26, 
30). 
 
Finally, data reviewed by Crichton and Chikarovski60 suggests that: 
 
Australia's ESP participation is well behind most of the other OECD countries 
and, it could be argued, 30 years behind  Japan [in terms of total dollars 
invested in shares by employees] (1997: 26). 
 
The evidence suggests that Australia may be underperforming in this area of the 
‘learning economy’ and that more cooperative workplace relationships - like more 
cooperative inter-firm relationships - should form part of strategies designed to 
improve productivity growth. 
 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
Australian business R&D expenditure is below OECD averages, but has grown faster 
than the OECD countries since the introduction of the 150 per cent tax concession 
was announced in 1983. Until the introduction of the concession, Australia 
manufacturing R&D was in decline. Most takeup in R&D has been in the medium-
low and low-tech sectors of manufacturing, reflecting Australia’s concentration in 
these industries. 
 
In electronics, Australia’s R&D intensity exceeds the OECD average, as it also does 
in metal products and shipbuilding. Australia’s R&D performance in medium-high 
tech industries such as automotive remains poor by world standards. In a number of 
the industries where R&D has grown rapidly, industry programs or government 
procurement have been significant in their impact on the industry. 
 
Manufacturing accounts for over half of all business R&D expenditure, despite 
accounting for only 14 per cent of national economic output, while services - 
especially communications - have shown the fastest growth rate. Australia’s services 
sector R&D intensity ranks as the highest in the OECD. 
 
                                                 
60 Refer to Crichton and Chikarovski (1995) which draws on a major article by Jones and Kato (1995) 
and OECD data contained in ‘Employment Outlook’ 1995. 
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Australia’s internationally poor R&D performance overall is largely the result of our 
industrial structure, as the Australian manufacturing economy is concentrated in 
industries which internationally have been shown to exhibit low R&D intensities. 
 
Australian corporate R&D expenditure is very highly concentrated, with just two 
corporations accounting for 12 per cent of the total and the top 10 firms accounting 
for nearly 30 per cent. 
 
On other (non-R&D) measures of innovation - e.g. non-R&D product and process 
change - wholesaling and manufacturing rank as having the highest innovation 
propensity. Technological innovation increases with firm size and the most important 
reported sources of ideas for innovation in Australia have been customers, internal 
R&D and intra-industry contacts. The most important reported impediment to 
innovation has been access to finance. 
 
Innovative firms have shown better performance in terms of sales and export growth 
than non-innovative firms, with innovators having been twice as likely to achieve 
sales growth greater than 50 per cent between 1992 and 1994 and 1.5 times as likely 
to achieve export growth greater than 50 per cent over the same period. 
 
As far as productivity is concerned, Australia’s rates of productivity growth have 
lagged those of most of the non-Anglophone countries over the post-war period. They 
have been declining since the mid-1960s, although they have improved in the 1990s. 
Most of the Anglophone countries have lagged many other economies in both Europe 
and Asia. There is much debate regarding the sources of higher productivity growth in 
the Asian ‘tigers’, but there does seem to be a small but significant element which 
cannot be explained by orthodox economic theory and which may be related to policy 
measures. 
 
Within Australia, the most dramatic increases in productivity over the post-1970 
period have been in communications, transport and storage, manufacturing and the 
utilities, but Australia seems to be shifting jobs into industries with relatively poor 
productivity growth rates rather than to industries with relatively high growth rates. 
 
Machinery and equipment investment is regarded as a primary carrier of embodied 
technological change and thus important for ongoing productivity growth. Australia 
shows a declining trend in such investment and rates poorly in international 
comparisons of growth in equipment capital stock per worker. There may be a link 
between equipment investment growth and changes in manufacturing’s share of GDP. 
If this is so then this may be one part of the explanation for Australia’s poor 
productivity growth. 
 
As evidenced in Chapter 7, the Australian taxation system contains an inbuilt bias 
towards property investment versus investment in machinery and equipment. This 
must be regarded as a significant impediment to increasing the embodied knowledge 
available to Australian industry and to raising productivity growth rates. 
 
Other apparent productivity drivers are also poorly represented in Australia. Public 
infrastructure has been shown to significantly improve productivity. Australia’s 
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public infrastructure expenditure has fallen sharply over the last decade and is among 
the lowest in the OECD. Also, human resource management programs appear to be 
significant contributors to productivity growth and it appears that Australian 
management has been slow to implement such practices. There appears as well to be a 
negative relationship between productivity growth and job turnover - countries which 
keep their employees for longer also tend to show higher productivity growth. 
Australia unfortunately has a relatively high rate of job turnover. Finally, the 
international research points to a negative link between income inequality and growth, 
and there is some evidence (although hotly debated) that income inequality in 
Australia is both high by advanced country standards and increasing. 
 
Thus, in terms of our record of productivity growth and our performance in relation to 
key productivity drivers, Australia’s position looks relatively poor. 
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Chapter Ten 
 
AUSTRALIA’S TRADE PATTERNS 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a detailed descriptive analysis of 
Australia’s trading patterns, taking into account: 
 
 the industry/commodity composition of imports and exports; 
 the countries with whom we trade; 
 the degree of trade concentration in terms of trading corporations; 
 externalities; 
 trade-employment linkages;  
 and the ‘innovation’ content of the trade mix.  
 
This is compared with the literature reviewed in Part One of this report and, where 
appropriate, with the trade status of a number of other advanced economies to see 
how Australia’s trade performance is likely to help or hinder the development of a 
‘learning  economy’ capable of competing successfully in the future. 
 
The discussion commences with a brief review and interpretation of the implications 
of Part One for trade. 
 
1. Trade & the Learning Economy 
 
The literature review of Part One of this report highlighted a number of important 
features of the new research regarding the ‘learning economy’. Many of these features 
are related to international trade and these relationships may be briefly summarised as 
follows: 
 
 A nation’s trade mix influences its learning ability and thus its ability to expand 
productivity and increase well-paid employment. The trade structure influences 
the makeup of the domestic economy by influencing the type of industries that 
will survive and prosper. Thus the expansion of net exports of the products of 
‘knowledge-intensive’ industries tends to increase the health and size of those 
industries. These industries are high in the ‘spillovers’ (e.g. skills and knowledge) 
that drive productivity growth and also employ higher skilled employees and pay 
higher wages. Conversely, a growing trade deficit in such goods exerts 
contractionary pressure on those sectors domestically and the ‘virtuous cycle’ 
described above becomes ‘vicious’. 
 
 In the absence of some external event (such as substantial exchange rate shifts) or 
policy intervention, trade and industrial specialisation are likely to be cumulative 
and path dependent. This means that what is produced and exported today tends to 
influence what is, and can be, produced and exported in the future. It is very 
difficult to create industries from nothing - in the absence of policy intervention, 
or some external shock, industrial activity generally tends to evolve incrementally 
from what exists. 
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 Learning is very much a function of the strength of linkages of various forms. 
That is, the stronger the linkages among the various economic actors (firms, 
educational institutions, governments, regulators) then the greater the knowledge 
flows and the greater the ability to capitalise on that information via innovation. 
Certain trade specialisations may be rich in these linkages, and may either 
encourage or require strong domestic linkages, while other trade specialisations 
may be linkage-poor. This is important especially in relation to linkages between 
leading edge exporters and their suppliers - the existence of a large number of 
leading edge exporters has very beneficial effects on ‘dragging’ its domestic 
suppliers up to international standards of product and process. 
 
 Trade liberalisation increasingly exposes domestic firms - in both tradeable and 
non-tradeable sectors - to increased competitive pressure and the need for more 
intensive innovation. If the tradeable sectors are not innovating then their 
suppliers will themselves not be upgrading and innovating and the overall national 
rate of innovation will be lower than otherwise possible. 
 
 The trade structure and outcomes effect and reflect the existence of the 
‘complementary assets’ outlined in Part One as vital to knowledge and its 
commercialisation. Important among these are the global distribution channels 
that provide outlets for domestic ideas and innovations. Access to global 
distribution is one of the major problems of Australian innovators in knowledge-
intensive industry, and contributes to low commercialisation rates, low export 
growth and  faster import growth. In the absence of policy action, increased trade 
deficits in these areas can further erode onshore production and overseas 
distribution of Australian inventions. 
 
This chapter will examine in some detail Australia’s trade specialisation in the light of 
some of these considerations. It commences with an analysis at both aggregate and 
sectoral levels of trade trends and then discusses the implications of the data for 
Australia’s learning economy. 
 
2. Australia’s Trade Patterns Described 
 
(a) The Composition of Exports & Imports 
 
Australia’s total exports of goods and services fell from above 25 per cent of GDP in 
1950 to around 14 per cent in 1969, and then increased to their current level of almost 
20 per cent (Figure E.1). Imports fell over the same period from 24 per cent of GDP 
to almost 8.5 per cent in 1973, rising to 21 per cent in 1996. 
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Figure E.1 
Australian Exports of Goods & Services 
% GDP 
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         Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
The composition of Australia’s exports for various years from 1970 to the present is 
shown in Table E.1 below. 
 
Table E.1  
Composition of Australian Exports 1970, 1986, 1996 
      
      1970  1986 1996  
 
  Primary Commodities  62% 60% 43% 
  Non-Travel Services  14% 13% 12% 
  Non-Metal Manufactures  12% 10% 18% 
  Metals    8% 10% 12% 
  Travel Services   2% 6% 12% 
  Other    1% 2% 3% 
 
  Total    100% 100% 100% 
        Source: Foster 1996 
 
A broad sectoral breakdown over the period is shown in Figure E.2, with a slightly 
more detailed description in Figure E.3. 
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Figure E.2 
Exports as % GDP by Broad Industry  
1969-96 
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Source: ABS 5302.0, 5206.0 
 
 
Figure E.3 
Exports as % GDP by Industry Sub-sector  
1969-96 
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Goods exports still predominate, occupying some 76 per cent of total exports (versus 
84 per cent in 1970), but the substantial changes that have taken place have been the 
growth of travel services (principally tourism), the contraction of the share of primary 
exports (which, while still the largest single category, no longer represent an absolute 
majority), and the growth of manufactures - particularly elaborately transformed 
manufactures (ETMs). 
 
Several notable features can be discerned from the data: 
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 the export shares of the broad industry classifications (primary, manufactures, 
services) were remarkably stable from the late 1960s till the mid-1980s; 
 from 1985-86 to 1996 the contribution of primary commodity exports to the 
economy declined from around 11 per cent to below 9 per cent;  
 growth from 1986 has been evident in manufactures and services, moving from 
less than 3 per cent of GDP to above 6 per cent in the case of manufactures and 
from less than 3 per cent to around 5 per cent for services; 
 the contribution of rural exports to economic growth has declined consistently 
since the late 1960s; 
 this has been considerably offset by mining exports which grew strongly during 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Their importance however has declined since the mid-
1980s; 
 metal manufactures exports increased sharply in the mid-1980s but failed to 
maintain that growth into the 1990s; 
 non-metal manufactures exports have grown strongly since the mid-1980s and 
have in general sustained their growth in terms of their contribution to GDP; 
 travel exports - largely tourism - have also grown strongly since the mid-1980s 
and continue that pattern. 
 
The data thus suggest a substantial change in Australia’s gross export composition 
commencing in the middle of the last decade. This ‘sea-change’ has shifted the 
economy’s gross export trade away from its ‘traditional’ export industries - 
commodities - towards income gained from manufactures (more recently ETMs) and 
tourism.  
 
Several factors could possibly explain this change in export performance across 
sectors since the mid-1980s. 
 
One factor may have been exchange rate fluctuations. In 1985-86 the Australian 
dollar fell sharply in real and nominal terms against all major currencies. It is clear 
that all exports responded to this fall. What is also clear, however, is that different 
sectors responded at different rates (Figure E.5a).  
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Figure E.5a 
Exports by Broad Commodity Indexed to 1986 
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         Source: ABS 5302.0 
 
 
The best performers were tourism and non-metal manufactures, followed by metal 
manufactures. Mining and rural exports growth have lagged.  
 
If the shift in export patterns was simply the result of the currency movements, 
then growth in the resource sectors should have been higher61. Moreover the 
exchange rate had been in secular decline from 1974 and so had relative 
manufactured export prices. Indeed, the latter showed an increase from the mid-
1980s to the present, thus raising the possibility that neither exchange rate nor cost 
factors were the main drivers of manufactured export growth (see Figure E.5b). 
 
 
                                                 
61 Indeed the more price-elastic primary exports should have shown faster increases for a given 
exchange rate decline. The average yearly growth rates of export volumes from 1986 to 1996 (quarterly 
data) are: Rural 3.6 per cent; Mining 4.8 per cent; Metals 10.4 per cent and Non-metal Manufactures 
15.8 per cent. (ABS 5302.0)  
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Figure E.5b 
Real Effective Exchange Rate & Relative Unit Labour Costs 
1970-96 
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A second explanation may be trade liberalisation and microeconomic reform. Figure 
E.6 plots the levels of various forms of industry protection since 1971. 
 
Figure E.6 
Levels of Industry Protection  
1971-95 
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There appears to be no particular tariff event around the time of the mid-1980s which 
would be likely to explain the sudden jump in exports at that time and, more 
importantly, the compositional shifts in favour of, in particular, ETMs and services 
(mostly tourism). With the exception of tariff reduction, the majority of reforms under 
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the banner “microeconomic reform” commenced in the very late 1980s and 
particularly the early 1990s (for details see IC 1996b). Moreover, the major economic 
modelling exercises undertaken by the Industry Commission have projected that most 
of the benefits of microeconomic reform- especially of tariff reduction - would accrue 
via increased rural and, particularly, mining exports (e.g. IC 1990). This has not been 
the case, as the data show that the greatest export growth has been in ETMs and 
tourism. Indeed, some of the IC’s modelling has forecast a contraction of 
manufacturing as a result of some microeconomic reforms.  
 
Another problem of the microeconomic reform explanation is that microeconomic reform 
is essentially about cost reduction62. If cost reduction were the answer, then exports of 
manufactures should not have increased over the decade prior to 1973, as they did, in 
the face of sharp increases in relative prices of Australian manufactured exports. 
Further, manufactured exports should have increased substantially in the period 1973-
86 when the relative prices of Australian manufactured exports fell considerably on 
world markets, but this did not occur. Also, Australian manufactured exports 
increased substantially over the post-1986 period, despite no decline in relative export 
prices. Clearly, relative price differentials on world markets (and thus issues related to 
production costs) have not been a major determinant of Australian manufactured 
export performance, and thus microeconomic reform is unlikely to be able to explain 
these sectorally divergent patterns of export growth. 
 
A third potential explanation may be government policy intervention. A number of 
government programs were put in place during the 1980s and were enhanced during 
the middle years of that decade. The Hawke government, elected in 1983, took an 
active approach to industry development, and government concern was intensified 
after the terms of trade and currency collapse of 1985-86 (Capling & Calligan 1992). 
By the end of 1988, industry development programs were in place for steel, heavy 
engineering, automotive, textiles clothing and footwear, chemicals and plastics, 
fertilisers, processed food, non-ferrous metals, information technology, 
biotechnology, communications, medical dental and veterinary equipment, 
shipbuilding and aerospace (Capling & Calligan 1992: 131-133; Sheehan 1994; 
DITAC 1987, 1988).  In the case of tourism, the rapid increase in export income 
followed a doubling in real terms of Commonwealth funding for tourism promotion in 
1983-84 and a further doubling by 1990 (Budget Papers, various years).  
 
As a further indicator of the growth of industry assistance in the mid-1980s Table E.2 
shows industry program expenditures in 1985 and 1986. 
 
 
                                                 
62 This point was made by a Federal Minister in an ABC radio interview when he said “Microeconomic 
reform is just an umbrella expression for reducing costs in a number of operations...” (PM, 20 July 
1997) 
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Table E.2 
Commonwealth Government Expenditure on Technology & Innovation Programs 
1985, 1986 
($) 
 
Program 1985  1986 % Change 
    
Information Technology 430,840 1,321,630 207 
Manuf Extension 196,068 695,980 255 
Manuf Technology 687,353 1,505,104 118 
Innovation 1,487,488 3,143,046 111 
    
Total 2,801,749 6,665,760 138 
 
          Source: DITAC 1987 
 
 
Government programs appear to have been very important stimuli of export growth in 
a number of sectors. Trade data show that ETM and tourism exports grew most 
rapidly from the mid-1980s. These two broad categories were those most heavily 
targeted by industry assistance and industry development programs from this time. 
Sheehan (1994) examined the export performance of a number of policy-assisted 
ETMs and compared them with unassisted ETM exports. His results (updated to 
the present) are shown in Table E.3 below. 
 
 
Table E.3 
Increase in Exports of Policy-Assisted ETMs v. Non-Policy Assisted ETMs 
June 1986-December 1996 
 
   Policy ETMs  Non-Policy ETMs 
 
      600%                        332% 
 
Source: Derived from Sheehan 1994 (data updated, source: DFAT) 
 
 
Sheehan concludes (1994:128) that: 
 
The detailed listing again confirms the dominance of the policy group in ETM 
exports after 1985. 
 
Several other government initiatives, not targeted at particular sectors, also seem to have 
affected industries differently and contributed to a differential rate of export growth. 
These included Austrade and the Export Market Development Grants, which tended 
to focus more on higher value goods and services; the 150 per cent research and 
development tax concession which was taken up more by some manufacturing 
industries (DIST 1996); the Development Import Finance Facility which subsidised 
the exports of aid and infrastructure related manufactures; and the National Industry 
Extension Service which provided training and quality improvement advisory 
services. 
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In reviewing business participation in government industry programs, DIST and the 
Productivity Commission (1997: 19) noted that: 
 
Manufacturing firms dominate in the uptake of most government programs - 
reflecting their role in exporting and innovation, and the orientation of the 
programs. 
 
Manufacturing participation in government programs was larger than that of any other 
sector for all of the 10 specific programs listed in the DIST report with the exception 
of NIES and the New Enterprise Incentive Scheme where manufacturing was ranked 
second (: 105). 
 
Thus the ‘policy intervention’ explanation may have greater success in accounting for 
the sectorally different export performance of the Australian economy from the 
middle of the 1980s than the alternative explanations discussed above. 
 
In relative terms, however, despite Australia’s strong growth in manufactured exports 
our share of total OECD exports has actually declined by around 17 per cent over the 
last decade or so (Figure E.7). 
 
 
Figure E.7 
Change in Countries’ Shares of Total OECD Exports  
1980-93 
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        Source: OECD 1996e 
 
 
The OECD calculates that most of this decline was due to the fact that the commodity 
composition of our exports did not match the trends in world trade growth. (OECD 
1996e: 184). This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Placed in the context of OECD manufactured export growth, Australia’s performance 
also looks unimpressive. Despite improving over the 1970-73 period by nearly 40 per 
cent, over the 1973-93 period Australia’s share of total OECD manufactured exports 
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declined by nearly 55 per cent - from 1.8 per cent to 0.8 per cent (OECD 1996e: 110) 
- see Figure E.11b below, taken from OECD (1996e). This was the largest market 
share decline across the OECD. 
 
 
Figure E.11b 
Australian Share of OECD Manufactured Exports 
1970-93 
 
 
         Source: OECD 1996e 
 
 
 
Gross exports, however, show only half of the trade picture. Australia’s overall net 
export position - i.e. exports minus imports - can be seen in Figure E.8, which shows 
the merchandise balance and the services balance as a proportion of GDP since the 
end of the 1950s. 
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Figure E.8 
Merchandise & Services Balances as % GDP 
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Source: ABS 5302.0, 5206.0 
 
Three trends are visible: 
 
 the overall deterioration in the merchandise balance from the early 1970s till the 
early 1980s, reversing the substantial improvement from the mid-1960s; 
 this has been followed by essentially trendless performance thereafter; and 
 there has been a trend improvement in the services balance since 1986. 
 
Breaking down the merchandise balance into exports and imports produces Figure 
E.9a. 
 
 
Figure E.9a 
Merchandise Exports & Imports as % GDP 
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Source: ABS 5302.0, 5206.0 
 
The graph shows that exports began a trend improvement in 1969 which has 
continued, with fluctuations and some acceleration from the mid-1980s, until the 
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present. Imports declined until 1973 and then grew quite rapidly thereafter, possibly 
reflecting the substantial trade liberalisation which commenced in 1973. Average 
export and import ratios to GDP are shown in Table E.8. 
 
Table E.8 
Average Ratios of Merchandise Exports & Imports to GDP 
 
     1960-85   1986-96 
 
  Exports    12.8%     12.0% 
  Imports    12.0%   14.4% 
  Export/Import Ratio 108.2%   98.0% 
 
Source: Derived from Foster 1996 
 
 
For services exports and imports the figures are shown in Table E.9. 
 
 
Table E.9 
Average Ratios of Services Exports & Imports to GDP 
 
     1960-85   1986-96 
 
  Exports    2.3%      3.7% 
  Imports    3.8%    4.3% 
  Export/Import Ratio 61.0%   86.4% 
 
Source: Derived from Foster 1996 
 
 
It is again important to note that the total export/import ratio (i.e. for goods and 
services combined) has shown little improvement since the 1950s, despite accelerated 
‘economic reform’, falling relative unit labour costs and a substantially lower 
exchange rate63 - see Figure E.9b. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 For 1950-85 the average export/import ratio was 110.5 per cent. (Foster 1996) 
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Figure E.9b 
Australian Export/Import Ratio 
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Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
As a measure of economic ‘competitiveness’ or economic success, these trends in 
Australia’s aggregate export/import ratio do not give cause for celebration. 
 
There are two further features of Australia’s trade pattern which need emphasis, as 
they also constitute some cause for concern. 
 
The first is that Australia’s merchandise imports consist overwhelmingly of 
manufactures. Manufactured exports and imports are shown in Figure E.10 with the 
net position in Figure E.11. 
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Figure E.10 
Manufactured Exports & Imports as % GDP  
& 1964-73 Trends Extrapolated to 1996 
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Source: Derived from ABS commissioned data 
 
 
The chart shows that, despite decades of trade liberalisation and ‘economic reform’, 
the current level of manufactured exports is still well below the level that would have 
been reached if the trend growth rate of the decade prior to 1973 had continued. The 
increases in exports prior to 1973 occurred in a period where the exchange rate 
appreciated by over 35 per cent and real wages rose significantly, while since 1974 
the exchange rate has declined by nearly 50 per cent. More importantly, however, is 
the observation that a continuation of the ‘pre-reform’ trends of 1964-73 would have 
seen a manufacturing sector trade surplus develop by 1986, and that by 1996 this 
surplus would have been 4 per cent of GDP. This would have had a substantially 
positive effect on economic growth and employment (see later section on negative 
externalities). 
 
Figure E.11a 
Manufactures Trade Balance as % GDP 
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Source: ABS commissioned data 
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Interestingly these two charts show that the increase in exports of manufactures since 
1986 has had only a relatively modest impact on the overall deficit. The export/import 
ratio, while improving since the mid-1980s, is still below that of the early 1970s. 
 
 
Table E.10 
Manufactures Export/Import Ratio, Selected Years 
 
   1964  1973  1986  1996 
   
   22%  48%  22%  37% 
   
Source: Derived from ABS commissioned data 
 
 
Extrapolations of the last 30 years’ trends in the manufacturing trade deficit suggest 
that it could increase from its current level of 8.5 per cent of GDP to around 10 per 
cent or above by the year 2020, depending on the state of the business cycle. If the 
trend is extrapolated from the commencement of trade liberalisation, or if there is a 
strong cyclical economic upswing around 2020, then the deficit could grow to 13-14 
per cent of GDP. 
 
It also appears that the surplus on non-manufactured goods and services is essentially 
offsetting the deficit on manufactured goods (Figure E.12). 
 
 
Figure E.12 
Non-Manufactures Trade Surplus v. Manufactures Trade Deficit  
% GDP 
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Source: ABS commissioned data 
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The second point concerning Australia’s trade structure is that Australia is a large net 
importer of machinery and equipment. As has been discussed earlier in this study, 
capital equipment carries with it embodied knowledge and is both a direct and 
indirect contributor to growth. 
 
The commodity composition of Australia’s merchandise imports is set out in Table 
E.12 below. The combined share of total imports occupied by machinery and 
equipment increasing from 40 per cent in 1970 to 46 per cent in 1996. 
 
 
Table E.12  
Composition of Australian Imports 1970, 1986, 1996 
      
      1970  1986 1996  
 
  Food, drink, tobacco   5%  5%  4% 
  Crude materials    6%  3%  2% 
  Fuels, etc.    7%  6%  6% 
  Chemicals    9%  9% 11% 
  Manuf. materials   19% 16% 14% 
  Machinery   25% 31% 33% 
  Transport   15% 13% 13% 
  Miscellaneous    9% 13% 14% 
  Other     5%  5%  2% 
  Total    100% 100% 100% 
        Source: ABS 5302.0 
 
 
 
Trends in Australia’s net composition of services trade are shown in Figure E.13. 
 
 
Figure E.13 
Services Trade Components as % GDP 
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Source: ABS 5302.0, 5206.0 
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The graph shows another area of concern in that it illustrates another instance of the 
fragility of Australia’s trade pattern - the sharp improvement in the services trade 
balance from 1986 has been almost entirely due to improvement in the net travel 
component of services exports, which is principally tourism income. As mentioned 
earlier, this is largely the result of both the exchange rate depreciation (although, from 
the discussion earlier, this should not be overstated) and the substantial increase in 
Commonwealth-funded inbound tourism promotion from 1983-84 onwards. This 
tourism-dependence adds to Australia’s export fragility in that exchange rate and taste 
shifts, as well as natural or humans disasters can have dramatic effects on tourist 
movements and are largely beyond the influence of domestic firms. 
 
(b) The Corporate Distribution of Exports 
 
Understanding Australia’s trade situation requires a more detailed look at who 
exports, how and where. Firstly, it should be noted that only a relatively small number 
of companies are exporters. Less than 4 per cent of Australian firms export and of 
those over half export less than 10 per cent of their output (DIST 1997)64. Moreover, 
the exports of Australia are concentrated in a relatively small number of corporate 
groups.  
 
In particular, the Japanese trading houses account for over 20 per cent of all exports 
(BRW 1997). These institutions act as conduits between Australian suppliers and 
customers around the world, using their vertically integrated corporate structures and 
also their global distribution networks to ‘wholesale’ goods. Such activity contains 
both advantages and disadvantages from a ‘learning economy’ perspective. It allows 
smaller firms to gain access to markets which would otherwise require substantial 
marketing expenditure and where the degree of difficulty may be high (such as 
Japan). On the other hand, it may retard the building of strong direct producer-
customer links that can drive innovation and networking and reduce the pressure on 
management of domestic firms to establish sound marketing and distribution 
channels. Trading houses themselves are unlikely to be leading edge customers. The 
reliance on such trading houses increases further Australia’s reliance on Japan for our 
export success. 
 
Chapter 7 earlier referred to the concentration of Australian industry, and although the 
presence of the Japanese trading houses tends to distort the trade statistics, it is clear 
that Australia’s export effort is also concentrated in a relatively small number of 
companies. These figures are supported by other data such as that in Table E.5 
showing the proportion of total exports broken down by firms’ size as measured by 
employment. 
 
Table E.4 sets out the proportion of exports occupied by the top 50 corporate groups65. 
 
 
                                                 
64 Note that this survey was weighted towards SMEs. 
65 Excluding the largest eight Japanese trading houses, the top 42 corporate groups accounted for 55 
per cent of total exports. 
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Table E.4 
Share of Australian Exports by Corporate Group 
1996 
 
   Top 10    43% 
   Top 20    58% 
   Top 30    66% 
   Top 40    71% 
   Top 50    75% 
 
         Source: BRW 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
     Table E.5  
Proportion of Total Exports by Firm Employment Size 
1994-95 
 
  Employment    Proportion of Australian Exports 
 
     1-4       2.7% 
     5-9       1.9% 
     10-19      10.4% 
     20-49        8.4% 
     50-99      13.1% 
     100-199     10.2% 
     200-499     14.3% 
     500+      39.1% 
   
        Source: DIST 1997 
 
The same clear link between exports and firm size is apparent from data on the 
proportion of firms exporting, as shown in Table E.6. 
 
 
    Table E.6  
Proportion of Firms Exporting by Employment Size 
1994-95 
 
  Employment    Proportion Exporting 
 
     1-4       1.8% 
     5-9       3.6% 
     10-19       8.2% 
     20-49      11.0% 
     50-99      19.6% 
     100-199     33.2% 
     200-499     33.4% 
     500+      45.6% 
 
        Source: DIST 1997 
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It should also be noted here that the larger, more export-intensive firms - accounting 
for most of Australia’s exports - engage in substantially more intra-group exporting 
(see Table E.7). 
 
 
    
  Table E.7  
Proportion of Firms Engaged in Intra-Group Export by Employment Size 
1994-95 
 
  Employment   Proportion Engaged in Intra-Group Export 
 
     1-4       8.0% 
     5-9      16.2% 
     10-19      15.7% 
     20-49      15.9% 
     50-99      23.8% 
     100-199     21.2% 
     200-499     45.3% 
     500+      32.4% 
 
         Source: DIST 1997 
 
 
Part One discussed the concept of ‘complementary assets’. These are assets - which 
may lie inside or outside a particular firm or industry - which are necessary to enable 
knowledge to be successfully turned into products and services. One of the most 
important complementary assets identified was adequate distribution capability. 
Without fast, effective and wide distribution channels, the speed of imitation by 
competitors who do have such channels can destroy an innovative product or service 
within months by capturing the market. The importance of intra-firm and intra-
industry trade for knowledge-intensive trade, then, cannot be overstated. 
 
(c) Australia’s Trading Partners 
 
Broad level dissections of the destination of Australia’s exports and the sources of its 
imports are shown in Figures E.14 and E.15 below. 
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Figure E.14 
Merchandise Exports by Destination as % Total 
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         Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
 
Figure E.15 
Merchandise Imports by Source as % Total 
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         Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
The main features of the exports graph are: 
 
 the sharp decline in the share of Australia’s exports going to the UK and Europe 
over the entire period; 
 
 the rapid rise in the importance of Japan until the mid-1970s, then its subsequent 
decline; 
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 the almost exponential growth in the importance of non-Japanese Asian export 
destinations, accelerating particularly from the end of the 1970s. This partly 
reflects the growing importance of Korea;  
 
 Japan, however, still remains overwhelmingly our single largest export market. 
 
With respect to imports, the salient trends have been: 
 
 the sustained decline in the UK’s share; 
 
 the rise of Japan until the mid-1980s followed by a relative decline; 
 
 the trend reversal in Other Asian imports from the early 1970s and their steady 
increase thereafter. 
 
The net merchandise trade balance with each of the major country groups is shown in 
Figure E.16 below. 
 
 
Figure E.16 
Merchandise Balance per Major Trading Partner 
% GDP 
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         Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
Standing out in this chart is the improvement in, and the growing importance of, the 
trade balance with non-Japan Asia which went positive in the early 1960s and has 
continued to improve thereafter. On the negative side, our largest trade deficit is with 
the US, while the most substantial deterioration in net trade outcomes has been with 
the non-UK European Union which moved from a position of net surplus exceeding 4 
per cent of GDP in the early 1950s to one of net deficit of nearly 2 per cent in 1996. 
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Data covering the geographic distribution of services exports is less comprehensive, 
but a 1992-93 snapshot is presented in Figures E.17, E.18 and E.19. 
 
 
Figure E.17 
Services Credits by Country Share 
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Figure E.18 
Services Debits by Country Share 
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         Source: ABS 5354.0 
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Figure E.19 
Net Service Balance by Country Group 1992-93 
% GDP 
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The credits graph shows that Japan and the US are our largest single-nation sources of 
services income, while ASEAN is the largest identifiable group of nations. On the 
debits side, the US, ASEAN and the UK predominate as identifiable groups. With the 
net balance, it is clear that Australia relies heavily on Japan and the non-UK European 
countries with the US and UK constituting deficit countries. 
 
A slightly more detailed breakdown of major services categories by country, both for 
credits and debits, is shown in Figures E.20 and E.21. 
 
 
Figure E.20 
Services Credits by Broad Category: Country Shares  
1992-93 
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         Source: ABS 5354.0 
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Figure E.21 
Services Debits by Broad Category: Country Shares  
1992-93 
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From these charts it is obvious that Australia’s most significant net services export - 
travel - is dominated by the Japanese market. Japan accounts for around 25 per cent of 
Australia’s total merchandise exports and around 20 per cent of services export 
income. 
 
3. Australia’s Trade Patterns in a ‘Learning Economy’ 
 Context 
 
In this section we discuss Australia’s trading patterns in the context of some of the 
factors highlighted as important to a ‘learning economy’ by the literature survey in 
Part One. In the process we compare Australia’s trends with those of other countries, 
principally some of the OECD countries. 
 
Much of the detailed data and most analyses surrounding world trade performance 
relates to manufactures, with relatively little attention devoted to primary 
commodities and services. This must be regarded as something of a limitation on 
comparative trade analysis, but an interesting picture still emerges. 
 
As indicated in Part One, the OECD (OECD 1996e) has conducted an extensive 
statistical analysis of the determinants of export success, as measured by increase or 
decrease in a country’s share of total OECD exports. They have found a number of 
key factors (OECD 1996e:111, 118-122): 
 
 First, the ability of a country to match its export commodity composition to 
changes in the composition of world demand, and to switch sales into countries of 
greatest growth for those exports, have been the most important determinants of 
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export success. These factors are related to the exporter’s industrial structure and 
its adaptability to changing patterns of world demand. 
 
 Second, other technology and non-technology factors, including wages and 
exchange rates, explain 30-40 per cent of all export share variations. 
 
 Third, price/cost issues such as exchange rates and wages are more important for 
low technology exports. 
 
 Fourth, productivity and R&D are more important for high technology industries. 
 
This research has significant implications for Australia and these will be discussed 
further below. If Australia is to choose the knowledge-intensive export path, then 
R&D, technology, and innovation-driven productivity will become more important. 
Alternatively, if we are to choose the low-tech path then competition will be via 
exchange rates and wages. Given that in the event of the latter choice we have little 
control over the exchange rate, the burden would need to fall on wages. This is 
consistent with the literature reviewed in Part One. 
 
In discussing Australia’s trade, attention will focus on six key questions/issues: 
 
 Knowledge intensity and technological innovation. Given the greater economic 
benefit attaching to domestically performed rather than imported R&D, is 
Australian trade reflecting and encouraging a shift towards higher knowledge 
intensity and technological innovation? What is happening to internal trade in 
these industries? 
 
 Linkages. Does Australia’s trade reflect or reinforce greater linkages between 
firms and among firms, R&D and training institutions that will facilitate the 
exchange of economically useful knowledge? Do we have sufficient linkages in 
domestic knowledge-intensive industries to enable the pull-through effect on 
domestic suppliers flowing from the success of key knowledge-intensive 
exporters? 
 
 Skills and wages. Does the trade structure encourage the use of high skill, high 
wage labour which is likely to further develop innovation and productivity? 
 
 Machinery and equipment. How does trade affect the takeup of new machinery 
which has been demonstrated as important in embodied knowledge generation and 
transfer? 
 
 Market adaptation. Is the destination and composition of Australia’s exports 
matching trends in world demand? 
 
 Externalities. Does Australia’s trade pattern contain any positive or negative 
externalities? 
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(a) Knowledge Intensity and Innovation 
 
(i) Knowledge Intensity 
 
The term ‘knowledge intensity’ is generally taken to refer to research and 
development expenditure as a proportion of sales or value added, while innovation is 
used to refer to either: 
 
 technological innovation, which is new products and processes and significant 
changes in products and processes; or  
 non-technological innovation, which is significant management and/or 
organisational improvements. 
 
In this subsection these concepts will be used to assess the links between knowledge, 
innovation and trade in Australia. 
 
Within merchandise trade, the most significant features of recent world trade patterns 
have been, firstly, the relatively rapid growth in manufactures versus commodities 
and, secondly, the rapid growth of knowledge-intensive exports. These trends are 
shown in Figure E.22 and Table E.13 below. 
 
Figure E.22 
Proportion of World Merchandise Exports 
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        Source: GATT via NIEIR 
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Table E.13a 
Average Annual Growth in World Manufactured Exports by R&D Intensity 
1985-93 
   % 
  High R&D    14.3 
  Medium High      9.9 
  Medium Low      8.0 
  Low       9.4 
  Total Manufactures     9.9 
 
        Source: Sheehan 1995 
 
 
Table E.13b shows a ranking of OECD manufactured exports in terms of their annual 
average growth rates over the period 1980-90. 
 
Table E.13b 
Average Annual Growth in World Manufactured Exports 
1980-90 
% 
Rank Product Av. Growth 
% p.a. 
   
1 Computers/office machines 16.2 
2 Electronics/components 12.4 
3 Scientific instruments 11.1 
4 Automobile industry 10.3 
5 Pharmaceuticals 9.7 
6 Plastics 9.4 
7 Paper/printing 9.4 
8 Electrical machinery 9.3 
9 Aerospace 8.1 
10 Basic chemicals 7.9 
11 Wood, furniture 7.8 
12 Textiles 7.1 
13 Stone, clay, glass 7.1 
14 Non-electrical machinery 7.1 
15 Food, beverages. tobacco 6.3 
16 Fabricated metal products 5.3 
17 Non-ferrous metals 5.3 
18 Ferrous metals 3.0 
19 Shipbuilding 2.8 
20 Other transport equipment 1.6 
21 Petroleum refining -1.4 
 
Source: OECD 1994d 
 
High-tech exports have increased as a proportion of total OECD exports from 16 per 
cent in 1976 to 26 per cent in 1993. (OECD 1996e: 103) The fastest growing 
technology classification of exports has been high-tech followed by medium-high 
tech, while the product rankings broadly reflect this classification.  
 
For Australia, the rate of export growth in the high-tech category has been extremely 
high over recent years. Between 1986 and 1993 these exports increased by 26.1 per 
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cent per annum in US dollar terms (Sheehan 1995: 76) - almost twice the rate of the 
US, Japan and the EC7 countries. He notes, however, that this was from a very low 
base and that the proportion of such exports in the total remains small. A breakdown 
of manufactures exports by OECD R&D intensity category is shown in Table E.14. 
 
Table E.14 
Australian Export & R&D Intensity v. OECD Average 
1992 
 
 Export Intensity R&D Intensity 
 Australia OECD Australia OECD 
 % % % % 
High-tech Pharmaceuticals 14.3 16.1 13.9 22.5 
 Electronics66 27.6 30.3 22.7 20.3 
 Aerospace 18.5 40.8 8.3 28.4 
 Total 21.2 30.2 16.5 22.3 
      
Medium-high tech Professional Goods67 22.9 33.5 7.9 13.3 
 Motor Vehicles 10.4 30.4 5.0 13.2 
 Chemicals 12.6 29.5 2.9 9.1 
 Electrical Machinery  7.4 21.0 2.7 6.8 
 Total 11.2 28.6 3.8 10.5 
      
Medium-low tech Non-electrical 
Machinery 
19.4 26.8 4.2 4.5 
 Other Transp.Equip 3.1 36.8 16.3 6.5 
 Shipbuilding 19.0 27.2 15.2 1.6 
 Non-metallic Minerals 2.8 10.3 1.2 2.4 
 Other Manuf 27.1 15.3 12.0 1.7 
 Rubber & Plastics 3.3 11.0 2.8 3.2 
 Total 9.6 19.8 4.4 3.5 
      
Low-tech Iron & Steel 12.5 13.3 5.4 2.4 
 Metal Products 5.7 13.0 2.4 1.4 
 Paper & Paper Products 2.7 9.8 0.6 0.8 
 TCF 27.2 20.9 0.4 0.8 
 Wood Products 8.4 11.3 0.4 0.5 
 Total 10.3 13.4 1.6 1.1 
      
Resource-based Food, Beverages, Tobco 22.9 10.5 1.0 1.1 
 Petrol Refining 14.4 7.9 6.8 5.7 
 Non-ferrous Metals 35.4 18.6 2.5 3.2 
 Total 23.8 10.7 3.2 1.9 
 
        Source: Sheehan 1995 
 
In broad terms the data suggest that in the high and medium-high technology 
categories Australia underperforms in both export and R&D intensity.  
 
                                                 
66 Includes computers. 
67 Includes scientific and medical instruments. 
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For the high technology, category Australia’s export propensity is around two-thirds 
that of the OECD, and in the medium-high technology category, it is less than one-
half. The R&D performance is similarly poor, with the sole exception being 
Australia’s electronics industry. Sheehan (1995: 99ff) demonstrates that the increase 
in R&D intensity over this period preceded the increase in export intensity for high-
tech exports. This is important because it shows the importance of technological 
upgrading and innovation occurring before exports improve. 
 
The shipbuilding industry is an interesting case study as far as the data in this table is 
concerned. Australian shipbuilding has benefited greatly from the late 1980s due to 
the decision by the Defence Department to source locally for a number of its 
requirements - in particular the frigates, the Collins class submarines and the 
minehunters. As was demonstrated in an earlier chapter, this greatly enhanced the 
R&D performance of that industry to the stage where it is well above OECD 
averages. 
 
Sheehan’s analysis also shows that for a number of high technology sectors 
(especially electronics and pharmaceuticals) the rapid export growth rates occurred in 
sectors where government industry development programs were in place. For 
electronics and the information technology industries, the Information Industries 
Strategy and telecommunications carrier industry development obligations have been 
substantial influences, with export/import ratios improving rapidly since their 
introduction (Table E.15). Calculations on BIE data (BIE 1994: 98) show that exports 
by information technology and telecommunications (IT&T) companies that were 
facilitated by the Partnerships for Development Program grew by 29.4 per cent per 
annum compound between 1989-93 whereas total IT&T exports grew at a compound 
annual rate of 12.5 per cent. 
 
 
Table E.15 
Export/Import Ratios for IT&T Industries and ETMs 
Selected Years; Constant 1992-93 Prices 
     
   Year  IT&T Sector  ETMs 
 
   1983-84     13.8%   15.1% 
   1988-89     16.6%   13.1% 
   1992-93     30.6%   21.7% 
    
   Change     143.5%  43.7% 
          
        Source: BIE 1994; ABS 8143.0 
     
 
For 1996 the current price export/import ratio for IT&T is 33.6 per cent, while that for 
ETMs as a whole is 31.0 per cent.  
 
Government industry programs have played a substantial role in increasing exports in 
a number of the more knowledge-intensive manufacturing industries. Moreover, 
industries with relatively high R&D intensities (e.g. pharmaceuticals and electronics) 
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were largely beneficiaries of sectoral industry policies or government procurement as 
well as R&D incentives. 
 
More recently, however, the annual rate of growth of exports of some of these 
products has declined. Computer export growth has fallen sharply - it has now turned 
negative for the first time since 1988 (Figure E.23 below). 
 
 
Figure E.23 
Yearly Growth Australian Computer Exports 
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         Source: ABS 5432.0 
 
As we move down the R&D intensity ladder, the disparity between Australian and 
OECD performance narrows. Indeed, as far as the averages are concerned, in 
medium-low technology, low technology and resource-based manufacturing 
industries, Australia outperforms other developed nations in both export intensity and 
R&D intensity (though not trade balance, with the exception of low-tech). 
 
As suggested above, much of the growth in knowledge-intensive exports has been 
from a very low base and as that base grows so the growth rate may decelerate (see 
the computer exports chart above as evidence). Australia’s manufacturing trade 
deficit, dissected by technology classification, is shown in Figure E.24a. 
 
AUSTRALIA IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD  
 
Australia’s Trade Patterns                                                                                                 
10.225 
 
 
Figure E.24a 
Australian Manufacturing Trade Balance by Knowledge Intensity  
(% GDP) 
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        Source: DIST unpublished data 
        
 
Clearly Australia’s high-technology deficit has expanded considerably faster than that 
for manufactures as a whole and represents the largest proportion of that deficit. 
Extrapolation of trends in the high and medium-high technology trade deficits will see 
their combined total increase from 5.5 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 7 per cent in 2005.  
 
The export/import ratio of high technology goods over the last two decades is shown 
in Figure E.24b. 
 
Figure E.24b 
Export-Import Ratio for High Tech Goods68 
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Source: Derived from OECD STAN database 
                                                 
68 Aircraft; drugs & medicines; computers & office equipment; radio, television & communication 
equipment.  
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The first point to note about this chart is the sharp improvement in the ratio over the 
early 1970s. This is further evidence of the point made elsewhere in this paper that 
this period should not be dismissed out of hand as one of industrial inefficiency. 
Secondly, the ratio plummeted from 1973 and deteriorated until the mid-1980s, from 
where it improved in a sustained fashion. Thirdly, the ratio in 1993 was still below 
that of the early 1970s. 
 
Our trade balances by technology classification relative to other OECD countries are 
shown in Figure E.25 below. 
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Figure E.25 
Manufactures Trade Deficit by Technology Classification 
Various OECD Countries 
% GDP 
1992 
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Source: DIST Unpublished data 
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Source: DIST Unpublished data 
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It is clear from the data that Australia has the largest deficit in high and medium-high 
technology trade across the countries shown. It is only in lower technology 
manufacturing where Australia’s trade balance improves. Of particular importance in 
this context are the trade deficits in electrical machinery, motor vehicles and 
chemicals, which fall into the medium-high tech categories. These deficits continue to 
deteriorate and are paralleled by comparatively low R&D levels, despite showing 
signs of improvement (Bryant et al. 1996). 
 
These conclusions seem at first sight to require some qualification. Australia’ net 
trade performance in the metals sector is far superior to that in other manufactures, for 
example. The metals industries - especially iron and steel and metal products - and 
shipbuilding have also shown very high R&D intensities by OECD standards (DIST 
1996). They are well above the levels of R&D intensity for these sectors for the 
OECD as a whole. These examples, however, only prove the point. Even after 
adjusting for these differences, the correlation coefficient relating exports and R&D 
intensity for Australia in 1992 was only 0.25 compared to an OECD average of 0.62. 
 
These data also indicate a further worrying factor. It may be the case that trade 
liberalisation could be having a perverse (i.e. restraining) effect on R&D in those 
sectors most exposed to that process. OECD data show that some of the sectors in 
Australia most exposed to trade liberalisation (e.g. motor vehicles, chemicals, textiles 
clothing and footwear) have substantially lagged overall manufacturing in R&D 
expenditure (Figure E.26). One possible explanation for this could be that import 
penetration is reducing the perceived benefit of substantial investment in R&D. 
 
Figure E.26 
Manufacturing R&D v. Total, Motor Vehicles, Chemicals, TCF 
% GDP 
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        Source: ANBERD 
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As far as the knowledge intensity of services trade is concerned, the global growth 
rates of various services exports are shown in Table E.16. 
 
Table E.16 
Average Annual Growth in World Services Exports 
1985-92 
        % 
   Travel, transport, official services  11.9 
   Other private services   16.9 
 
   Total Services    13.6 
 
         Source: Sheehan 1995 
 
Sheehan (1995: 7) categorises ‘Other Private Services’, including business, financial, 
research, advisory and other services as being knowledge-intensive. The ‘Travel and 
Transport’ sector is less knowledge-intensive. 
 
As with manufactures trade, it appears that across the OECD the knowledge-intensive 
components of the services sector are also showing the most rapid trade expansion. 
The data for Australia, however, suggest that our gross and net trade improvement in 
the services sector has been confined largely to travel - mainly tourism. This is at the 
lower end of Sheehan’s knowledge spectrum. 
 
Australia’s pattern of services trade thus overall favours low-knowledge industries. 
 
Examining Australia’s trade patterns in the light of the data presented above suggests 
three significant observations: 
 
 The highest concentration of R&D activity is in the broad industry sector 
(manufacturing) which has the largest and most rapidly deteriorating trade 
performance. As sectoral trade deficits reduce the domestic growth rate of those 
sectors, and as manufactures represent the fastest area of world merchandise trade 
expansion and one of the greatest contributors to knowledge intensity, this is of 
some concern. 
 
 Within manufacturing, the industries which across the OECD are in the medium-
high and high R&D categories (motor vehicles and electronics) show very large 
trade deficits in Australia. Once again the data suggest a growing Australian trade 
deficit concentrating in knowledge-intensive products. Importantly, those areas of 
fastest gross export growth in knowledge-intensive industries have generally 
benefited from policy intervention. 
 
 In services, Australia’s most rapid improvement in net trade outcomes has been in 
tourism. This sector has a relatively low knowledge intensity rating. Thus 
Australia is expanding net trade in services with a low knowledge intensity, 
contrary to world trade trends. As with manufacturing - albeit in reverse as the 
tourism trade balance is positive - Australian net trade outcomes appear to be 
biased against knowledge-intensive industries. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
 
 
Policies and Pathways                              
11.231 
 
Overall these data do not suggest that Australia’s trade pattern is optimal from a 
knowledge intensity standpoint. Importantly, as earlier data suggested, it appears that 
the problem with manufacturing trade would have been substantially worse had there 
not been the widespread use of industry assistance and development plans during the 
1980s (some of which are now being scaled back or terminated). 
 
(ii) Innovation Intensity 
 
Table E.18 shows the proportion of firms in each industry which were engaged in 
innovation in 1995. 
 
Table E.18 
Proportion of Firms Undertaking Either Technological or Non-Technological Innovation 
by Industry 
199469 
% 
 
Industry70 Proportion Ratio to Highest 
(%) 
   
Utilities 46.4 100.0 
Manufacturing 42.8 92.2 
Wholesale 33.5 72.1 
Mining 31.8 68.5 
Cultural & Rec 30.6 65.9 
Education 26.4 56.9 
Tourism71 22.1 47.6 
Health & Commun. Serv 21.8 47.0 
Communic. Serv 21.4 46.1 
Prop & Bus Serv 20.3 43.8 
Personal & Other 19.9 42.9 
Retail trade 17.7 38.1 
Transp & Storage 17.4 37.5 
Construction 15.3 33.0 
Finance & Insur. 13.7 29.5 
 
Source: Derived from ABS 8118.0; 8116.0 
 
 
Again, it is clear that manufacturing is one of the most innovative sectors - standing 
out along with the utilities a long way ahead - while mining has an innovation 
propensity two-thirds that of the highest (and 74 per cent that of manufacturing). 
Tourism ranks 7th of the 15 industries, at 48 per cent of the highest score and slightly 
over half that of manufacturing. Tourism’s rank is even lower for technological 
innovation (not shown in this table).  
 
                                                 
69 For manufacturing the period was 1991-94. Survey excludes agriculture, forestry, fishing. 
70 An All Industries total has not been produced by the ABS from these surveys. 
71 Accommodation, cafes & restaurants. 
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Australia, then, with the possible exception of mining, is operating trade surpluses in 
industries with a lower innovation propensity and (large and growing) trade deficits in 
industries with a higher innovation propensity. 
 
(b) Linkages 
 
Linkages were explored in greater detail in Chapter 7 earlier. Unfortunately, there are 
no historical data enabling a complete picture of trends in linkage propensity over 
time to be monitored, nor are linkage data available for mining, agriculture and 
services industries, except for input-output data which only measure buy-sell 
transactions. Thus the present analysis is necessarily qualified. 
 
As far as the input-output material is concerned, Table E.19 shows the domestic 
inputs required by each industry from other industries in order to produce 100 units of 
output. 
 
Table E.19 
Domestic Inputs Required by Each Industry  
to Produce 100 Units of Output 
1993 
 
Producing Industry Domestic Inputs 
 
Manufacturing 55.1 
Agriculture 43.4 
Services 35.4 
Mining 34.6 
 
       Source: IC 1996 
 
 
This shows that the manufacturing sector is the most ‘linked’ into the domestic 
economy in the sense that it requires more domestically produced inputs to produce 
each unit of output72. The mining sector is the least linked. This means that the 
stimulus to domestic production due to expansion of the mining sector is less than that 
from stimulating manufacturing, agriculture or services. What happens to 
manufacturing is therefore especially important. 
 
Input-output data, however, only show purchase-sale relationships between sectors - 
they do not capture the types of cooperative non-price linkages which the BIE has 
identified as being important to firm and economic performance. 
 
As indicated earlier, Australia’s trade pattern is heavily biased against the type of 
industries likely to be rich in these non-price cooperative linkages - Australia is 
running large and increasing deficits in knowledge-intensive goods. Such deficits 
reduce the growth rate (and indeed can reduce the absolute size) of these industries. 
This in turn reduces the level of critical mass, reduces growth in investment capital 
and skilled jobs, reduces the number of companies available for linkages and 
                                                 
72 Manufacturing also has a higher import propensity. 
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increases the geographic distance between firms. All of these factors tend to reduce 
the likelihood of cooperative business linkages. In other words, in the absence of 
some form of external intervention, persistent large and growing trade deficits can 
tend to ‘hollow out’ the industries affected and reduce their ability to link with each 
other. This was discussed earlier in Chapter 7 where evidence of hollowing out was 
presented using an input-output framework. 
 
(c) Skills & Wages 
 
Chapter 8 dealt in detail with skill and wages issues. In particular the data showed 
evidence of a trend towards the more rapid growth of employment in lower skilled 
broad occupational groups, in lower wage industries and in industries of lower 
innovation propensity. 
 
Australia’s trade structure is, as described earlier, one characterised by: 
 
 declining surpluses (as a percentage of GDP) in rural and mining products, which 
contribute generally high wages in the case of mining and a mixture of high and 
low wages in rural industries; 
 large and growing deficits in manufacturing, and in particular high and medium-
high technology manufacturing which employs more skilled, high wage workers; 
 rapidly growing surpluses in tourism income, where the workforce is largely 
lower skilled and low wage in accommodation, cafes and restaurants. 
 
Although a high-wage industry, mining employs a relatively small and static share of 
the workforce. Rural employment is similarly small and relatively stable, and its mix 
does not seem to be one which would engender substantial shifts towards high-skilled 
labour. For manufacturing, the ‘knowledge’ trade deficit exerts a restraining effect on 
the demand for higher skilled, higher wage employment. 
 
Thus trade trends would not appear to be those which would, in the absence of some 
external shock or intervention, increase the requirement within the domestic economy 
for high skilled, high wage employment versus low skilled, low wage employment. 
 
A further difficulty in this context is the corporate concentration of Australia’s 
exports. Of the fifty largest corporate exporters (accounting for 75 per cent of 
exports), none are in the high technology classification used in this report73. Only two 
- GM Holdens and Kodak - may be in the medium-high technology classification and 
they rank, respectively, 45th and 47th with combined total exports amounting to 0.8 
per cent of Australia’s total. As is detailed elsewhere in this document, Australia is 
grossly under-represented in knowledge-intensive exports. 
 
This means that Australian innovators in more knowledge-intensive industries have 
access to very few home-based world distributors of their goods and services. This, 
ceteris paribus, predisposes Australian innovators to sell, or in some cases license, 
their intellectual property to transnational firms. In this process much of the export 
                                                 
73 The Japanese trading houses may export on behalf of some high-tech firms, but aggregate 
commodity-level data suggest that, if this occurs, it is very minor in dollar or volume terms. 
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income, knowledge-intensive job creation, advanced manufacturing technology and 
follow-on R&D associated with these products goes offshore. 
 
Thus the lack of indigenous firms in knowledge-intensive industries generates a 
negative feedback loop - in this case a lack of quality global distribution channels - 
which, in the absence of some policy intervention, further restricts the development of 
such industries in Australia. This is also an example of the path dependence discussed 
in Part One. 
 
(d) Market Adaptation 
 
One indicator of the adaptability and therefore learning capacity of domestic industry 
is its ability to change in line with changes in world market conditions. An export 
sector which does not change as its markets change is likely to generate nationally 
suboptimal trade and growth outcomes. 
 
The OECD has conducted some research in this area (OECD 1996e). It divides the 
improvement/deterioration in a country’s share in total OECD exports into the 
following component effects: 
 
 Market share effect. This is the change in a country’s OECD market share that 
would have occurred in the absence of any change in its export product or 
destination mix - i.e. growth in a country’s traditional markets for its traditional 
exports. 
 
 Market distribution effect. This is the change in a country’s market share due to 
the growth of its destination economies’ share of total OECD imports. 
 
 Commodity composition effect. This is the change in market share that results 
from alterations in the rate of growth of world demand for a country’s particular 
basket of export products. 
 
 Relative market adaptation effect. This is the degree of success of the exporting 
country in adapting the country distribution of its exports to the total change in the 
market distribution of world imports. For example, if growth in world imports is 
fastest in Asia, then a high score on this measure would reflect a high ability of a 
country to shift its exports into Asian markets. 
 
 Relative commodity adaptation effect. This is a country’s ability to adapt its mix 
of exported products to changes in the commodity demand of world imports. For 
example, if world demand shifted in favour of higher-tech goods then a high score 
on this indicator would reflect the success of a country in shifting its exports into 
higher-tech goods. 
 
A zero statistic for each of these components would suggest that a country’s exports 
have grown exactly in line with the growth in world imports, both by commodity and 
by country. The first three statistics show the contribution to export share of total 
growth in commodity and trading partner demand, while the last two statistics show 
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the contribution of the adaptability of the exporter to changes in demand both by 
product and country.  
 
When analysed according to these criteria the OECD provides the following table in 
respect of Australia (Table E.20). 
 
Table E.20 
Market Share Analysis of Australian Exports 
1980-93 
% 
 
   
Market 
Share 
1980 
% 
Market 
Share 
1993 
% 
Market 
Share 
Effect 
Commodity 
Composition 
Effect 
Commodity 
Adaptation 
Effect 
Market 
Distribution 
Effect 
Market 
Adaptation 
Effect 
       
1.8 1.5 -0.38 -0.47 0.30 0.15 0.06 
 
         
         Source: OECD 1996e 
 
 
As indicated above, Australia’s overall share of total OECD merchandise exports 
declined by nearly 17 per cent over the period 1980-93 (from 1.8 per cent to 1.5 per 
cent). The primary contributors to the decline have been the market share effect and 
the commodity composition effect. The relative growth in demand from 1980-93 for 
Australia’s 1980 mix of export products by Australia’s 1980 mix of trading partners 
has been negative - demand for Australia’s 1980 mix of  products and markets has not 
grown as fast as overall world demand.  
 
The table also shows, however, that Australia is in fact in the process of changing its 
exports more into line with changes in trends in world demand. The adaptability of 
our mix of products has been the third best across the OECD. Our adaptability to 
changes in the country demand for imports has been positive, but quite low by OECD 
standards. This latter point underlines the earlier finding regarding continued heavy 
dependence on a few export markets such as Japan. 
 
In summary, Australia’s mix of exports has been suboptimal - and this has cost us in 
terms of export growth - but is improving more rapidly than most OECD countries, 
while our destination mix has also been suboptimal but is showing some very minor 
signs of improvement. The country with the greatest adaptation over the 1980-93 
period (not shown) has been Japan, with a commodity adaptation effect of 0.46 and a 
market adaptation effect of 0.59. 
 
(e) Externalities 
 
Australia’s trade pattern appears to carry with it a number of important negative 
externalities. These include the terms of trade and negative employment, R&D and 
real wage implications of the trade structure. 
 
(i) Terms of Trade 
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The terms of trade measures prices received for a country’s exports compared to 
prices paid for its imports. It can be measured using implicit price deflators or via unit 
export and import values (the former use volume weights as well as price weights). 
Australia’s terms of trade (using implicit price deflators) is shown in Figure E.27 
below. 
Figure E.27 
Australian Terms of Trade  
1950-96 
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         Source: Foster 1996 
 
 
Changes in other advanced countries’ terms of trade over the 1964-92 period, using 
unit export and import values, are shown in Figure E.28. 
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Figure E.28 
Changes in Terms of Trade 1964-92 
OECD Countries 
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Source: IMF Financial Statistics 
 
 
These graphs show both an absolute and relative decline in Australia’s terms of trade 
over most of the post-war period. This indicates that Australia’s trade mix has been 
penalised in world markets (again confirming the analysis presented earlier), with the 
prices of our (mainly commodity) exports falling in relation to those of our (mainly 
manufactured) imports. Declining terms of trade reduces national welfare as it 
reduces the purchasing power of domestic economic output. It is possible to compare 
real GDP, adjusted for changes in terms of trade, with the unadjusted figure - the 
adjustment is made by deflating exports by the import price deflator and the adjusted 
aggregate is called Real Gross Domestic Income. The two are plotted in Figure E.29 
below. 
 
Figure E.29 
Real GDP(A) v. Real Gross Domestic Income (RGDI) Indexed to 1960 
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         Source: ABS 5206.0 
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The difference between the two measures over the 36 year period is now 10 
percentage points - i.e. the international purchasing power of Australian output is 10 
percentage points lower than it would have been had it not been for the composition 
of Australia’s trade. 
 
(ii) Employment & Unemployment 
 
The structure of Australia’s net trading position is one characterised by the following 
employment characteristics: 
 
 The primary sector employs directly about 6.1 per cent of the Australian 
workforce, whereas manufacturing employs 13.6 per cent and tourism 
(accommodation, cafes and restaurants) 4.7 per cent (ABS Labour Force). 
 
 Reflecting Australia’s trading patterns, from 1966-96 the growth of employment 
in the agriculture sector was 4 per cent, mining 23 per cent, manufacturing 
negative 19 per cent and the category which includes tourism (recreational 
services) 145 per cent (Foster 1996)74. 
 
Our trading pattern seems to be having an influence on the structure of the labour 
market. A proliferation of low-wage employment has important cumulative effects. In 
particular it attracts investment to low-wage industries which are typically of lower 
knowledge intensity and which often produce standardised products. The OECD 
(1994c) has demonstrated that these industries (low wage, relatively undifferentiated 
products) are the most susceptible to the ‘factor price equalisation’ - downward 
pressure on wages - predicted by Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. Thus low wages can 
beget lower wages, with a parallel shift down the knowledge intensity and 
productivity ladders. This constitutes a significant negative externality of the trade 
structure. 
 
But it is not just the nature of employment that is influenced by the trade structure. 
Using the approach of Krugman (1994) it is possible to estimate the impact of the 
manufactures trade deficit on unemployment in the manufacturing sector: 
 
 
Table E.21 
Effects of Manufacturing Trade Deficit on Australian Employment 
(after Krugman 1994) 
 
 Manufacturing Sector Trade Deficit 1993     $33 bill 
 Reduced by Services Component of Manufactured Exports (40%) -$13.2 bill 
 Net Effect of Manufacturing Deficit     $19.8 bill 
 Total Manufacturing Value Added      $66.2 bill 
 Percentage Reduction in Manufacturing Sector (19.8/66.2)   29.9%   
 Manufacturing Workforce 1992-93      1.05 mill 
 Therefore potential Employment Cost of Deficit (29.9% x 1.05m)  314,000 
 Total Australian Unemployed 1992-93     916,000 
 
                                                 
74 Note that industry classifications have previously included personal services with tourism. 
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 Potential contribution of Manuf. Trade Deficit to Unemployment   34% 
 
 The manufacturing trade deficit, adjusted for the services sector contribution to 
manufactures, could have contributed as much as one-third of total Australian 
unemployment. As there does not appear to be any stable causal relationship between 
the manufacturing trade deficit and the exchange rate (the latter being driven by 
commodity prices), it is difficult to argue that the deficit contributes to increased 
exports and therefore employment on the part of the other key tradeable sectors. It is 
therefore unlikely that the employment loss in manufacturing has led to employment 
gains in other sectors except, perhaps, via lowering wage rates in those sectors. 
 
The unemployment resulting from our trade structure itself constitutes a substantial 
negative externality. This is the case at three levels.  
 
 Firstly, increased unemployment reduces government revenue, increases outlays 
and thus directly expands the fiscal deficit. If an expanded fiscal deficit increases 
interest rates then this adversely affects the entire economy. 
 
 Secondly, unemployment actually reduces national output below what would have 
been the case in the absence of that unemployment. Junankar and Kapuscinski 
(1994: 42) quote Okun’s Law to the effect that each percentage point increase in 
the unemployment rate reduces national output by 3 percentage points. 
 
 Thirdly, unemployment reduces the sum total of tacit knowledge available to other 
members of the workforce and to firms in the economy. Part One of this report 
stressed the importance of tacit knowledge for the generation and transfer of ideas 
for innovation. It also appears that in a more ‘flexible’ labour market high 
unemployment is often paralleled by higher levels of job turnover, which, from 
the preceding analysis, is associated with lower levels of productivity growth. 
 
(iii) Declining R&D 
 
The manufacturing sector is one of the largest contributors to business research and 
development expenditure in most advanced countries. This is equally so in Australia. 
It follows that, in the absence of some external shock or intervention, a declining 
manufacturing share is, ceteris paribus, likely to reduce the overall R&D intensity of 
the business sector. It should be noted that both the United States and Japan have had 
substantial ‘intervention’ that has shifted their economies further towards high-tech 
industry, although this has occurred in different ways. In Japan, MITI guided much 
post-war industrial development in a deliberate and successful attempt to absorb and 
then enhance the most advanced Western technology (see Johnson 1982). In the US, 
government military procurement led to the development of such critical 
technological platforms as the computer, the internet and the satellite. 
 
(iv) Environment Policy Vulnerability 
 
Australia’s economy is particularly vulnerable to international regulations relating to 
environmental protection. Nearly 17 per cent of Australia’s merchandise exports are 
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hydrocarbon related. A further 8.1 per cent are heavy direct users of fossils fuels - see 
Table E.22 
 
Table E.22 
Energy Related/Intensive Exports as Proportion of Total Merchandise Exports 
1996 
 
Commodity Proportion 
  
Coal, coke and briquettes 10.1% 
Petroleum, petroleum products etc. 4.5% 
Gas, natural and manufactured 2.2% 
Non-ferrous Metals 6.0% 
Iron & Steel 2.1% 
  
Total 24.9% 
 
         Source: ABS 5432.0 
 
 
As world environment policy shifts inexorably towards the control of greenhouse gas 
emissions, Australia’s export mix exposes the economy to the increased risk of export 
reductions due to the introduction of energy conservation and carbon reduction 
policies. This is a ‘latent’ negative externality in that the introduction of anti-
hydrocarbon policies will reduce demand for Australia’s energy-based exports and 
reduce the growth rate of the economy. Thus the structure of our exports exposes the 
entire economy to likely negative, policy-induced growth shocks over coming years. 
 
(v) External Costs of Productivity Improvement 
 
The ‘fabricated metal products’ trade category contains the machinery and equipment 
in which businesses invest - electrical and non-electrical machinery, computers, 
aircraft, telecommunications. Figure E.30 shows the trade balance for these goods 
excluding motor vehicles. 
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Figure E.30 
Balance of Trade 
Fabricated Metal Products less Motor Vehicles 
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          Source: STAN 
 
 
This shows a consistent long term trend deterioration, accelerating from 1973 and 
only interrupted by the recession of the early 1990s. Australia’s reliance on imported 
machinery is increasing over time, which means that, both cyclically and structurally, 
investment growth by Australian firms increases the trade deficit beyond what would 
otherwise be the case. In the light of what has been noted earlier regarding the 
importance of investment - and in particular machinery investment - for increasing 
productivity, this places a cost on that investment process which is external to the 
individual firms involved but which impacts on the entire economy.  
 
Thus the machinery trade structure carries with it a negative externality whereby 
increased equipment investment - necessary in order to increase productivity - leads 
to trade deterioration and therefore first-round (and possibly substantial) reductions in 
GDP growth (as GDP includes net exports). 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The literature reviewed in Part One of this report noted the importance of trade as one 
of the factors retarding or expanding economic growth and welfare. A nation’s trade 
structure influences its ability to create and sustain innovation and economic 
knowledge, in particular through influencing (and reflecting) the economy’s industrial 
structure. Certain trade patterns are rich in knowledge and spillovers and support high 
wage job creation, while certain other trade specialisations contain negative 
characteristics.  
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The OECD research suggests that export growth is a function of the product and 
country composition of the export mix and the ability of that mix to adapt to changing 
world trade demands. It points, on the one hand, to competition in standardised, low 
wage commodities being increasingly driven by price and thus exchange and wage 
rates and, on the other, to competition in knowledge-intensive industries being driven 
by technology and innovation. Countries will have to make choices as to their trade-
related development paths. 
 
Looked at from this perspective, Australia’s trade trends show some recent 
improvement but, overall, some disappointing facets. 
 
Firstly, despite substantial trade liberalisation and economic reform, Australia’s 
export/import ratio is below that of decades long past. This is in the face of a long 
period of exchange rate decline and with it, declines in the relative prices of both our 
products and our labour. Australia’s share of OECD exports - both total and 
manufacturing - continues to slide and extrapolations of current trends in the 
manufactures trade deficit suggest the possibility of a deficit as high as 13-14 per cent 
of GDP by the year 2020 in the absence of policy action or some substantial external 
shock. 
 
Secondly, had the trends in manufactured exports and imports in the decade prior to 
the mid-1970s continued, then by now Australia could be enjoying manufacturing 
sector trade surpluses approaching four per cent of GDP instead of deficits of twice 
that magnitude. This must be regarded as a failure of policy. In the years prior to 
1973, when the exchange rate was rising strongly, real wages were increasing and 
high levels of protection were in place, Australia was sharply increasing its share of 
OECD manufactured exports. This defies conventional economic wisdom and 
suggests that contemporary approaches to policy advice may need to be revisited. 
 
Thirdly, Australia is heavily engaged in the net export of primary commodities and 
tourism, on the one hand, and the large net import of manufactures, on the other. 
Moreover, the trade deficits are increasingly concentrated in more knowledge-
intensive industries, while the surpluses are increasingly in less knowledge-intensive 
industries. This is precisely the opposite of the route recommended by the literature.  
 
Further, this trade structure carries with it negative employment and living standard 
implications, declining terms of trade and a significant exposure to greenhouse gas 
emission targets which are likely to be inevitable. This trade structure is also, in the 
absence of policy intervention, likely to undermine the formation of linkages in key 
sectors of the economy which are rich in knowledge spillovers. This paper has 
continually stressed the importance of linkages in upgrading industrial capability. 
 
Fourthly, the areas of significant trade improvement from a ‘learning economy’ 
perspective have generally been in industries where some form of government policy 
intervention has been in evidence. The ‘sea change’ in the mix of gross exports from 
the mid-1980s is difficult to explain by other factors such as exchange rate shifts and 
microeconomic reform. Moreover, with funding for a number of these programs now 
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under threat, there is no guarantee that recent export performance will continue. In 
this context, recent export data in the computer sector is of great concern. 
 
Fifthly, the majority of Australia’s exports are concentrated in a very small number of 
corporate groups. Therefore the actions and decisions of some firms can have an 
inordinate influence on Australia’s trade outcomes. This means that policy-makers 
will need to ‘get their hands dirty’, as it were, and deal one-on-one with specific firms 
and sectors rather than simply take a generic approach to trade policy. Moreover, the 
makeup of this group of exporters is such that it contains no high-technology 
exporters and perhaps two medium-high technology exporters. This means that 
domestic innovators in higher knowledge industries lack adequate global scale 
distribution channels, which means the loss of intellectual property, production, 
follow-up R&D and high-skill jobs that could flow had such channels existed. 
 
Sixthly, Australia is too heavily dependent on one country - Japan - for its net trade 
income. A major setback in diplomatic relations between the two countries, a severe 
accident involving Japanese tourists, a shift in Japanese buying patterns, a resurgence 
of racism in Australia - even a madman running amok and attacking Japanese tourists 
- would expose the economy to substantial declines in export revenue and growth. 
 
Finally, improved trade outcomes in knowledge intensive industries are likely to 
require better global distribution channels than exist at present. This must be regarded 
a priority area of policy. 
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Chapter Eleven 
 
PART THREE: POLICIES AND PATHWAYS 
 
The main message from this study’s broad assessment of Australia's capability, 
against the backdrop of the literature on the benefits of being an innovation-rich, 
knowledge-intensive learning economy, is that Australia has a major challenge to 
face. If growth and living standards are being driven largely by knowledge production 
and diffusion and a nation's ability to capture the value of innovation and 
technological development, then Australia risks being left behind. 
 
Our study suggests that traditional approaches to policy development in this area are 
poorly suited to the task. Many of the issues raised as important by the new research 
cannot be well integrated into current economic paradigms, which means that policy 
responses based on the current wisdom are likely to be inappropriate at best, and 
possibly even detrimental. 
 
A new mindset is required. We must move beyond the current obsession with 
national, non-discriminatory policies which make no distinction between sector or 
size or type of firm, and the total opposition we seem to have to all initiatives which 
tend towards ‘picking winners’.  More sophisticated, deft and balanced approaches 
are needed.  It is time to recognise that there can be sensible ‘meso-level’ approaches. 
 
We should move away from the idea that we have one industry policy and recognise 
that we need many industry policies. Only then can we see what we need to do as a 
nation is to devise ways of leveraging our strengths to overcome or minimise our 
weaknesses. 
 
Thus governments, businesses and all other players must now recognise the two 
elements that the OECD quotes at the start of this report emphasise.  
 
It is worth re-quoting them here.  
 
Competitiveness in high-technology industries is mainly driven by technology factors and 
much less by wage and exchange rate movements, while the reverse is true in low-
technology industries. (OECD 1996e: 12 
 
And, 
 
...[I]f economic performance is to improve, additional structural reform, which can 
increase innovation and the diffusion of technologies within and among national 
economies, seems necessary (OECD 1997: 4  Emphasis added) 
 
We offer ten key pathways for action. 
 
Running through each set of policy pathways is the theme that we must improve our 
firms’ capability to compete in the knowledge-intensive areas rather than take the low 
technology, low wage route in the future. 
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Pathway One: Acknowledge the importance of the structure of 
the Australian economy 
 
A fundamental point to arise from this study is the importance of industrial structure 
for economic development and living standards, at the national, industry and firm 
levels. This structure determines what we make and trade, together with how we make 
them. These structural factors determine the nature and extent of the knowledge 
spillovers that permeate through the economy and in turn both the rate of job creation 
and the quality of those jobs. An economic structure built around innovation and 
knowledge will facilitate more rapidly rising living standards and prevent the need to 
compete globally via a ‘race to the bottom’ in wages and social infrastructure. 
 
Until this point is recognised and fully integrated into policy analysis and 
development, Australia runs the risk of exacerbating a number of existing problems to 
the detriment of future generations. 
 
Commonwealth and State governments must collectively recognise the vital 
importance of industrial structure for the welfare of Australians and ensure, via a 
whole-of-government approach, that all major policy changes are assessed for their 
impact on the industrial structure. Governments should also take a longer term 
perspective on these matters and be prepared to devise policy settings with durations 
longer than one electoral cycle.  
 
 
Pathway Two: Integrate trade and industry policies 
 
Another feature arising from this study is the interconnection between trade and 
industry. The nature of existing firms and industries will determine what can be 
exported and what must be imported. If this industrial composition is biased too 
heavily in favour of low knowledge and low innovation exports, and high knowledge 
and high innovation imports, then a negatively reinforcing trade and industry pattern 
will emerge. Because of the issue of path dependence, reviewed earlier in this study, 
there is unlikely to be any automatic mechanism which shifts the economy away from 
one characterised by industries poor in knowledge and linkages towards one with a 
higher development path. 
 
Trade patterns and industrial specialisation develop their own momentum, and in 
Australia’s case there is evidence that, in the absence of policy intervention, this may 
be to our detriment. 
 
It is therefore important that trade and industry policies be either jointly 
formulated, or developed from an integrated perspective incorporating equal 
consideration of likely impacts in both areas.  
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Pathway Three: Shift the economy towards greater knowledge 
and innovation intensity 
 
The literature reviewed in Part One and the data analysis presented in Part Two both 
showed the growing importance - in both world trade and domestic economic 
development - of innovation and knowledge generation and distribution.  
 
Knowledge intensive industries are those where research and development investment 
is a critical component of the competitive process. R&D, and its commercialisation, 
are key drivers of growth and should be encouraged across all industries so that the 
overall level of knowledge intensity across the entire economy rises. As well, the mix 
of industries within the Australia economy should change to increase the proportion 
occupied by those industries operating at the cutting edge of knowledge generation. 
These higher technology industries include electronics, pharmaceuticals, scientific 
and medical instruments, motor vehicles, chemicals, electrical machinery, 
biotechnology, computer software, advanced design and so on. 
 
Innovation - product and process change as well as management and organisational 
improvement - enables firms and the economy to constantly adapt to changes in the 
competitive environment. Without such innovation firms’ competitive positions 
within their markets are eroded, with downward pressure on profits, employment and 
working conditions. 
 
Government and industry should work together to produce a cultural shift towards 
both knowledge intensity and innovation. This includes action aimed at domestic 
objectives as well as trade outcomes, with the knowledge ‘balance’ being specifically 
targeted in both areas. For government, this will mean applying all of the levers of 
policy rather than retaining a narrow focus on one policy ‘basket’, such as trade 
policy. Other levers that are necessary include procurement, taxation and regulation. 
 
With respect to regulation, for example, it is possible for Governments to use their 
influence over things such as standards to positively affect competitive advantage. 
The Californian legislature has, through its anti-pollution policies, encouraged 
(indeed mandated) the development of alternative forms of motor vehicle propulsion. 
This will give those companies complying with these standards an enormous 
competitive advantage in a world where the prevention and reduction of 
environmental pollution will inevitably become more critical. 
 
Similarly Denmark, using a clever mixture of regulation, trialing and development 
facilities, and providing a market via the national grid, both developed and exported 
superior wind turbines. The result is that Denmark is well ahead in the clean energy 
field while we have only just been given the option of subscribing to ‘green energy’ 
some fifteen years after the Danes. It is clear now that environmental industries, 
whether ‘clean’ or ‘clean up’, ‘green’ or ‘brown’, are a major growth opportunity for 
the future. Australia has good science in this area but government authorities should 
not be afraid to encourage business into a faster rate of change. 
 
A successful learning economy requires an innovation system where the stock and 
flow of knowledge constitute the blood supply of the entire organism. As Part Two’s 
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data analysis demonstrated, Australia has shown significant improvement in some 
vital statistics, but in others  (such as net trade outcomes and trends in intermediate 
industrial linkages) the results show a continued deterioration. 
 
Australian governments must focus their attention on developing polices that will 
increase the production and net export of knowledge intensive goods and services. 
This includes R&D intensive manufactured goods as well as the more innovative 
traded services such as education. Governments should also realise that they are, in 
many sectors, the largest leading edge customers and should use their purchasing 
leverage to assist in the development of domestic industry, especially the more 
knowledge-intensive industry which is more dependent on such customers. 
Government regulation can also be used, in a progressive and consultative manner, 
to both create and enhance competitive advantage. 
 
 
Pathway Four: Improve cooperation and linkages 
 
The advantages of cooperative business linkages are clear from both the theoretical 
and empirical evidence reviewed. Production chains, clusters and complexes can be 
well developed, with strong exchanges of price-based and non-price based 
knowledge, inputs and outputs, or they can be weak and patchy. Well developed 
linkages can and do provide the bases of strong export growth, while weak ones are 
prone to requiring imports to fill important gaps. Further, as imports grow so too can 
the domestic gaps themselves. This appears to have been the case in Australia, as 
shown by the input-output analysis of Part Two. 
 
One of the impacts of trade liberalisation around the world has been, and continues to 
be, increased pressure on SMEs - even in non-traded sectors - by their larger and 
more powerful customers. The evidence seems to be that the larger, more global firms 
can maintain their profit margins largely by squeezing their smaller, domestic 
suppliers. This can be expected to continue and will, in the absence of effective 
innovation strategies by SMEs, result in erosion of profits and working conditions in 
those smaller firms. Effective cooperation among firms is an important means of 
dealing more effectively with these pressures. However, this cooperation needs to go 
further than just between firms - it should extend to cooperation among firms, 
regulators, educational and research institutions and within firms themselves. 
 
This means taking a ‘clusters’ and ‘complexes’ approach to industrial development 
which includes stocktakes of the capabilities of various industrial clusters and 
identification of their strengths and, more importantly, weaknesses. Only through 
such detailed cluster analyses, or ‘cluster audits’, can the true gaps in Australia’s 
industrial potential be identified and rectified.  
 
Thus firms, perhaps with government facilitation, could embark on industry ‘audits’ 
which should cover at least the following areas: 
 
 the organisation of the cluster/complex, including 
 the number, size and focus of companies operating in the cluster or 
complex; 
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 the range and skills of suppliers and especially subcontractors in the 
sector; 
 
 the success of the cluster and any weak points as seen in: 
 the technological capacity of the cluster; 
 the R&D capacity available in the complex as a whole among the firms; 
 the R&D capacity in the public sector which is available to the private 
sector; 
 the efficiency of information flows between the sectors in the diffusion of 
existing knowledge of all the kinds mentioned in Part One; 
 the adequacy of the technological transfer mechanisms in place in the 
complex; 
 
 the support needed for development of training capacity: 
 the training capacity of both firms and public sector institutions in the 
arena at both initial and permanent education levels; 
 the level of skills available in the workforce and whether there are any 
shortages. If so, the audit should identify capacity to rectify those 
shortages; 
 
 environmental factors affecting cluster/complex success: 
 the presence or absence of related and supporting industries, such as 
supply industries or appropriate business services and problems, which 
may be caused by the patchy nature of the industrial structure most 
relevant to the complex; 
 the adequacy or otherwise of capital needed for expansion by firms of all 
types in the complex; 
 whether government regulations relating to the area cramp development 
and what would be specific desirable changes; 
 the ways in which public procurement could aid the development of the 
cluster; 
 
 the ways in which public sector research can be harnessed better via cooperative 
arrangements with private players. 
 
In many cases, such audits will not need to be undertaken or be funded by 
government, while in others government may specifically assist the process. In all 
cases these should act to bring together the various members of Australia’s industrial 
clusters and complexes and better acquaint them with local capability. 
 
In this process, the role of foreign transnational firms is important. In many cases, 
especially in high-knowledge industries, such firms dominate the local industry. 
Explicit and deliberate actions are therefore needed to anchor these firms in Australia 
based on the long term and sustainable attractiveness of the business environment and 
its commercial advantages, not just because of short term tax breaks or other 
incentives. Australia needs to be attractive enough to ensure that major technology 
associated with investment is effectively transferred to the local business community 
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and upgrades our knowledge base. Further, foreign firms should be encouraged to 
source locally and take up and distribute indigenous technology. 
 
Inter-firm networking, as well as ‘cluster audits’, should be encouraged so as to 
facilitate greater cooperative activity among stakeholders. Further, policies aimed 
at attracting foreign transnational firms to Australia should be based on anchoring 
those firms within the economy via research, development, innovation and sourcing 
strategies which link them closely to the domestic industrial fabric. 
 
 
Pathway Five: Target key productivity drivers 
 
Both the literature reviews and the empirical evidence presented here suggest that a 
number of factors may be important in relation to productivity growth. 
 
These include: 
 
 the rates of investment in machinery and equipment, which may reflect changes in 
the industrial mix or the nature of taxation biases; 
 the use of human resources management programs; 
 levels of public infrastructure provision; 
 labour turnover rates; 
 the commitment to training, especially management training; 
 levels of income inequality; 
 the quality of management. 
 
The data reviewed in the report suggest that Australia’s record in relation to a number 
of these factors has been relatively poor. It is important that the strength of these 
factors be identified so that effective public and private sector strategies can be 
developed for shifting the Australian economy onto a more productive growth path. 
High levels of productivity alone may not be sufficient for increasing living standards 
for the majority of the population (for example Spain has very strong productivity 
growth yet the unemployment rate exceeds 20 per cent), but they are certainly 
necessary prerequisites for such increases. Without solid productivity growth, real 
wage increases can lead either to inflation or to unemployment. 
 
Further research should be conducted into the linkages between these factors and 
productivity growth and, where relationships are found to be strong, government 
and private sector initiatives developed to target the relevant drivers. 
 
 
Pathway Six: Ensure programs are performance-based 
 
It is important that public funds used for industry development purposes are used in 
the most effective manner. It is equally important that the public is aware that there is 
accountability attached to such programs and that the initiatives are properly designed 
around achieving the right national objectives, rather than serving the interests of 
powerful vested interests. 
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In this regard it is possible to devise government programs such that they drive the 
changes reviewed by the literature and suggested by the data as being important, as 
either intermediate or final outcomes, in the process of enhancing the development of 
a more robust industrial capability.  
 
Thus programs which involve the expenditure of public funds, or tax or other 
publicly-derived benefits, should maximise, or in some cases mandate, the following 
features: 
 
 increased investment in R&D or other innovative, capability-enhancing 
activities (e.g. market research); 
 greater investment in training for both management and workforce; 
 increased local sourcing; 
 employment expansion; 
 networking with others in the same or complementary sectors; 
 retention of adequate minimum employment conditions; 
 productivity growth; 
 use of inclusive human resources management programs. 
 
 
Pathway Seven: Build global distribution channels and 
capability 
 
One of the ‘complementary assets’ identified in this study as vital for success in 
commercialising new and innovatively recombined knowledge is rapid, effective and 
often global distribution. In many of the knowledge-intensive industries, Australia has 
few if any indigenous firms with the scale to be able to penetrate world markets 
quickly before imitators have done the same. Further, many of the foreign-based 
transnational firms working in this area are either unaware of local capability or are 
unwilling to distribute indigenous technology through their international channels. 
 
One policy area which has contributed to building a more global focus has been the 
use of government procurement leverage. Government is a very demanding leading 
edge customer, particularly but not exclusively, in higher technology goods and 
services. Therefore, government contracts can be used to encourage nationally 
desirable behaviour on the part of suppliers. This has been the case in the information 
technology industries and in shipbuilding. In information technology, the Information 
Industries Strategy has led to increases in both R&D and exports above what would 
otherwise have been the case. In shipbuilding, it is likely that a number of significant 
export contracts in new defence-related technology will be won by Australian firms 
arising from the domestic sourcing of the Royal Australian Navy’s frigates.   
 
Also, overseas venture capital firms can often bring with them access to distribution 
mechanisms because of their connections within knowledge-based industries. The 
problem identified by the ABS innovation surveys as the most important in retarding 
innovation - access to finance - may be addressable to a certain extent via the 
encouragement of offshore venture capital firms.  
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Government should: 
 
 encourage the emergence of a tier of Australian transnationals in high-
knowledge industries with substantial global scale; and 
 actively use its leverage - especially procurement leverage - to encourage both 
local and foreign transnational firms operating in Australia in such industries 
to source and distribute products and services developed by local suppliers; 
 investigate mechanisms for increasing the access to capital of small innovative 
firms, including examination of the foreign venture capital industry. 
 
 
Pathway Eight: Invest in education and research 
infrastructure and training 
 
In order for Australia to move further along the knowledge-intensity continuum, it is 
vital not only that local firms have the distribution capability mentioned above, but 
that they have all of the human capital resources required to develop, absorb and 
transform knowledge into viable goods and services. 
 
Thus, it is important that the educational and research institutions which produce 
many of these high calibre individuals do not have their resources eroded by other 
policy priorities which may be of a more short term nature. Once top-level education 
and training is lost to the nation, it is difficult to rebuild the same capability. 
 
A balance also needs to be struck between pure and applied research. In this context, 
it is important to increase the involvement of the private sector in areas of technology 
development, while not sacrificing key scientific research being conducted in public 
research institutions. 
 
Further, the importance of human capital and the ever-present need for adaptation in 
the learning economy require a constant attention to training and re-training of both 
management and staff. 
 
These factors alone, however, will be insufficient in the absence of the linkage-
building regarded as important by the literature. 
 
Government should carefully weigh the possible long term cost to the nation of 
shorter term policy measures before eroding the resources of scientific and 
research institutions so essential for a learning economy. Further, the links 
between the private sector and R&D institutions should be strengthened, and 
public-private coordination of and commitment to increased training and retraining 
should become a cornerstone of policy in the years ahead. 
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Pathway Nine: Focus public policy and private sector 
attention on innovation and knowledge as the bases of 
competition 
 
The trade outcomes reviewed in Part Two suggested that despite improvements in the 
price competitiveness of Australian exports by as much as forty per cent over the last 
two decades, export/import ratios are lower now than they were in the 1950s and 
1960s. Australia’s share of total OECD exports has also continued to decline even as 
our price competitiveness has improved. 
 
Much of this decline has been identified by the OECD as being due to the 
inappropriate composition of our exports and our mix of destinations, the latter not 
having changed in line with changes in the geography of world economic growth. 
Although much of our export mix has been commodity-based and the OECD research 
suggests that these should have responded well to improvements in relative prices, the 
net outcomes for Australia have been rather poor. 
 
There is obviously much more to trade success, then, than price alone. This is 
consistent with much of the literature reviewed in this study, where factors such as 
adequate distribution channels, innovative management and strongly networked firms 
and other institutions are rated as very important in the learning economy. 
 
The lesson of the traded sector is also relevant to the domestic economy. Competition 
based on innovation and technology is likely to generate both quality and price 
improvement, whereas competition based on cost or price reduction alone is unlikely 
to create enduring competitive advantage. Further, competition based on innovation 
and technology can support employment growth together with high wages. The entire 
innovation system is important and a single-minded concentration on cost reduction 
can impede the proper development of that system. 
 
Governments should shift their policy emphasis from cost minimisation per se 
towards innovation and technology development strategies. This should apply both 
to the domestic and international sectors. 
 
 
Pathway Ten: Deal with real industries and their dynamics 
 
Australian industry is quite heavily concentrated. The effect of this concentration is 
that the actions and decisions of a small number of firms can have an inordinate 
influence on Australia’s trade and economic outcomes. This means that policies 
should be based around the concrete dynamics of particular sectors and, in some 
cases, firms, rather than around idealised notions of market price behaviour. 
 
In order for governments to properly devise policies for industrial development, they 
need to get to know and work with existing industry players, understanding the forces 
that drive their decision-making at a fairly fine level of detail. Policies based on 
economic models which assume perfect competition - at the industry or the national 
level - are inappropriate in contemporary Australia and should not be used. 
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Governments should get to know, and work with, individual sectors and firms in the 
development of policy rather than be driven by abstract theoretical constructs. The 
knowledge levels required of policy officials will necessitate adequate resource 
commitments by governments, even in periods of fiscal austerity. Greater public 
policy capability must be built and this will require closer communication between 
business and government, perhaps involving exchanges of senior personnel. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
All of these proposals involve much more sophisticated understandings of the 
working of the economy than are currently in evidence. In many ways, this involves a 
greater focus on micro variables, but not in the traditional sense of the neoclassical 
theory of the firm which concentrates largely on price determination. Rather, micro 
(or meso as we prefer) analyses should embrace all facets of firm behaviour from an 
innovation and knowledge perspective, including the ways in which firms organise 
their internal processes, their (often non-price) links with other firms and institutions, 
and the impact of macro policy settings and structural gaps in the economy on these 
key factors.   
 
As has been repeatedly emphasised throughout this report, both public and private 
sectors need to re-examine their roles and strategies and put in place the institutional 
and organisational keys to success in the learning economy. Learning economies will 
dominate world competition in the twenty-first century; the requirements for 
successful competition are already visible to those who wish to see. 
 
Upgrading local capability is critical. This is a relatively long term process and needs 
urgent attention. Experience elsewhere in the world suggests that such upgrading does 
not necessarily involve large amounts of government expenditure or significant 
amounts of foregone revenue. Relatively simple measures can make a substantial 
difference. What is important is that public policies are coherent and sustained over 
time, that industry is treated as a responsible partner and that industry, both as a 
whole and as separate sectors, work with government to improve the match between 
corporate and public interest. 
 
The key is taking seriously the findings of the work which we have outlined in this 
report. These must be used to refocus the ways in which we analyse the functioning of 
the economy and hence how we pinpoint strengths and weaknesses. We need to see 
clearly what we have in terms of key players, in terms of chains, clusters and 
complexes and in terms of relevant skills and capabilities. 
 
Policies need to be developed at a number of levels and in a number of areas, not just 
by governments but by all parties with a major interest in the outcomes. The group 
that needs to be involved clearly includes business but it also includes consumers and 
the representatives of labour. This is because decisions have a much better chance of 
being effectively implemented if all stakeholders have contributed to them and can 
see their value. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
OECD TECHNOLOGY CLASSIFICATIONS 
R&D EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTION 
 
 
High Tech  
 Aerospace 
 Computers 
 Electronics 
 Pharmaceuticals 
 
Medium High Tech   
 Instruments 
 Motor vehicles 
 Chemicals 
 Elec. machinery 
 
Medium Low Tech  
 Machinery 
 Other transport equipment 
 Shipbuilding 
 Petroleum refining 
 Stone, clay and glass 
 Other manuf. 
 Rubber and plastics 
 Non-ferrous metals 
 
Low Tech 
 Ferrous metals 
 Fabricated metals 
 Food, drink and tobacco 
 Paper and printing 
 Textiles and clothing 
 Wood and furniture 
 
 
Source: OECD Science and Technology Policy Review and Outlook 1994 
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